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T H E S I S  A B S T R A C T  
Choice of Law in State Contracts in Economic Development Sector: 
Is there Party Autonomy? 
A state contract is a common mode of entry for foreign direct investment, especially in 
developing states. It can form the legal basis of the investment relationship between a foreign 
investor and a host government. But, like any other contract, it cannot stand itself covering all 
aspects of the legal relationship. The contract thus must belong to a specific legal system or a 
body of rules or principles which is usually called “applicable law “or “governing law”. 
Historically, a “concession contract” in the natural resources sector was the predominant 
form of a state contract and it used to be governed by the domestic law of each host state. 
However, since the 1950s, international investment arbitrations have abandoned the tradition 
and advanced a theory subjecting state contracts in the foreign investment sector to an external 
legal system, ie public international law. One of the bases of the theory of internationalisation 
was the principle of party autonomy that allows parties to a state contract to select any law of 
whatever country they like. Then, the 1965 Washington Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention)1 
formally adopted the principle of party autonomy in Article 42 (1) as the primary choice of law 
rule in disputes arising out a foreign investment contract concluded between a state and a 
national of another state. 
The object of this thesis is to prove that the fundamental problems of party autonomy in 
foreign investment contracts involving considerations of public and private law issues remain 
unsettled. It explores the main controversies and confusions in the theory of internationalising 
                                                 
1 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature 18 





state contracts, looking at its historical context. It examines the extent of the application of party 
autonomy in state contracts such as natural resource exploitation contracts and construction of a 
plant and infrastructure contracts which reflect important economic development policies of 
developing countries.   
In considering past and current problems in the field of international investment law, the 
thesis argues that arbitral tribunals resolving disputes between a state and a foreign private 
individual should abandon the party autonomy approach because contractual freedom to choose 
the law of the contract would disregard the objectives which host states normally pursue through 
economic regulations such as development, environment and human rights concerns of foreign 
investment. It suggests a consensus-based approach similar to the rule adopted in the Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities (Hague Securities 
Convention)2 and which would produce the desired effect. It recommends that the choice of law 
provisions found in Article 42 of ICSID Convention would need to be either modified or repealed. 
In doing so, this thesis attempts to contribute to the positive development of international 
investment law balancing state authority and private property rights.  
                                                 
2 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities, opened for signature 5 July 2006, available at 
<http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=72 > at 23 December 2007. 
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P a r t  O n e :  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
“The choice-of-law rule is an odd creature among laws. It never tells what the result will be, but only 
where to look to find the result; and the author of the rule cannot foresee the outcome. Such rules are 
made by theorists in an effort to impose an external order upon the states; they do not come naturally 
from legislatures, which are interested in foreseeable results.”  
Brainerd Currie1 
 
A. BASIC SCENARIO 
Like many other fields of law, the whole investment issue had been an entirely national 
issue until after the Second World War. It was only after the dissolution of colonialism that the 
need for an international system of investment protection became a major concern of capital 
exporters. The reasons for this need must be explained by discussing the changes in world 
politics following the World War Two. 
The most important change was the liberal movements towards political independence 
sweeping Asia and Africa in the 1950’s. Dozens of European colonies in the continents got not 
only independence, but also complete control over their own economies. The governments in 
these states began to play central and pivotal role in their national economies intervening and 
engaging in the economic affairs of the countries. Such interventions were intended to build a 
strong national economy and provide social services such as banking and insurance, 
communications and transportation for public.  
The widespread involvement of the state in economic life greatly affected old concession 
contracts signed between foreign investors and former dependent governments.  In some cases 
the host state’s interference led to expropriation of properties of foreign investors.2 The key 
sectors of the economies such as land, natural resources and other wealth mainly owned by 
nationals of the colonial empires were transferred to state ownership. At the same time, such 
                                                 
1 Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays in the Conflict of Laws (1963) 170. 
2 On the role of economic nationalism in the international society, see James Mayall, Nationalism and International 





interference with contractual commitments seemed legitimate. Under the traditional view, 
transactions between a sovereign state and a subject of another state are governed by the 
domestic law of each host state. In other words, the conditions for the validity of concession 
contract, the capacity of the parties, the process of formation of the contract and as well as the 
operation and termination of the contract were a matter of the host state’s domestic law.  
On the other hand, international law could not provide much protection for foreign 
investors from the interference of newly-emerging states with their contractual arrangements.  In 
the old colonial system, the imperial powers and imperial system gave sufficient protection for 
investments flowing from the imperial states, if not by legal means such as diplomatic protection, 
by the use of force. Such a system of protection was ended with colonialism itself.3 
Besides, the Third World states freed from colonialism had been concerned with the 
unequal nature of international legal order. They started to compel the dominant states to listen 
to their voice. Most of all, the states justified the nationalisation policies of newly independent 
states, claiming that it is lawful to restore and return the properties earned by foreign individuals 
through illegal means to the people of the territory.4 So in most cases no compensation was 
given to the foreign investors. 
Accordingly, foreign companies operating in the newly independent states were put at 
risk of losing their property. The companies rejected the changes to the contracts and demanded 
that the disputes regarding the change be settled by international arbitration not by domestic 
                                                 
3 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd ed, 2004) 22-23.  
4 Eg, Hannan wrote: 
 ”It is not the obligation of the Islamic government to protect properties that has been earned through illegal means rather 
Islamic government will confiscate properties earned through illegal means as all illegal means are forbidden. All illegal means 
are forbidden (haram) and undesirable (munker) in Islam and elimination of haram and munker is the principal responsibility of 
the Islamic government. There are many instances in the Islamic history of confiscating wealth earned through illegal means 
and restoring and returning them to their original owners.” Abdul Hannan, ‘The Role of the Government in an Islamic 







courts of the host state. Therefore, a new type of international arbitration of state contracts 
emerged to provide protection for foreign investors.  
The strategy of protecting investment through international arbitration starts with the 
insulation of foreign investment contracts from the orbit of the law of the host state. The 
traditional position relating to applicable law in disputes between private persons and foreign 
governments needed to be abandoned. Instead, since mid 20th century, international arbitrations 
between a state and a foreign investor have begun to push the idea that a supranational system 
applies to concession contracts. A later extension of this thesis was that disputes arising from 
foreign investment agreements must be settled in accordance with public international law.  
Being inconsistent with prevailing juristic theories, the theory of internationalisation has 
caused serious doctrinal debate among legal scholars. It has posed many serious theoretical 
controversies that relate to both public and private international law. Much confusion arose 
because of efforts of the arbitral tribunals to regulate the state/citizen contractual relationship by 
public international law as if state contracts were akin to treaties between two sovereigns.  
One of the vehicles used for internationalisation of applicable law was the principle of 
party autonomy. It was claimed that, in pursuance of party autonomy, the parties can choose 
public international law as the law applicable to the contract. The Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States5 adopted by the World Bank in 1965 
granted direct legal force to the claim by expressly stating in Article 42 (1) that “The tribunal shall 
decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties.” However, a controversy 
remains on the possible application of party autonomy to state contracts in economic 
development sector despite this legal recognition.  
 
                                                 
5 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature 18 





B. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The problem addressed in this research is: 
• Is the party autonomy rule, which naturally deals with purely private law conflicts, also capable of being 
applied to disputes between a state and a national of another state and what is the outcome of applying 
party autonomy to disputes involving the public interest?  
• How far may a government party to an economic development agreement choose the law of other country 
which has no relevance to its economic and developmental policies? 
Although it has been almost a half century, since the text of Article 42(1) of the ICSID 
Convention gives prominence to the principle of party autonomy, one still wonders how party 
autonomy intended to advance rights and liberty of individuals can work in an area of regulatory 
concern which involves a controversial task of balancing private objectives of foreign investors 
to pursue more profit against public objectives of a host state to improve the welfare of its 
population. The basic problem in this respect is the outcome produced by the application of 
party autonomy. Party autonomy allows parties to a contract the power to settle their contractual 
disputes by their own dispute settlement body and under their own selected set of rules. 
Therefore, national economic policies or social objectives embodied in regulatory laws could be 
undermined and abandoned.                                                                                                                                       
On the other hand, it is not very conceivable that a host state selects a system of law 
other than its own as the law governing its contract concluded with a foreign private party. 
Foreign investment contracts play an important role in the economic development process of 
developing countries. As a result, host states usually subject such contracts to special rules which 
reflect their development policies. Without the application of such rules significant opportunities 







state better chooses its own law rather than the law of other country whose laws have nothing to 
do with its national economic interests and social objectives.  
To explore this research problem, the following research questions are identified:   
• What are the inherent nature and characteristics of a state contract that make them 
incompatible with the notion of party autonomy?  
• How was accepted the principle of party autonomy in disputes between a state and a national of 
another state? What is the theory of internationalisation of state contracts? 
• What are sources of international law on foreign investment and what is their relation to the 
principle of party autonomy? 
• How does the principle of party autonomy work in purely private relationships? What are 
attitudes of domestic and international legal systems in relation to the principle? 
• How has the principle been applied in the context of ICSID tribunals?  
• What barriers there are in applying the party autonomy principle in economic development 
agreements?  
The research questions emerged from preliminary research and were subsequently used 
to establish the focus through which the research problem was considered. Only after the 
process of questioning, expanding, exploring and excluding all these questions has been 
completed, it will be possible to find solutions to the research problem of the thesis “how does 
party autonomy work in state contracts and does a state party to the contract in reality choose the law of a country 
other than its own?”.   
C. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
The question of the law applicable to an international contract of investment has been 
extensively studied since the elaboration of the theory of internationalisation introduced choice 





of internationalisation such as the theoretical incapability of international law to regulate 
contractual arrangements and the scope of law applicable by parties’ choice, but not the assertion 
of party autonomy in state contracts. Some comments have been made with the regard to the 
nature of state contracts that make the extension of the party autonomy principle to foreign 
investment contracts with a state party unwise, but the question raised in this thesis has not been 
specifically addressed in prior studies.  
Meantime, it is true that the area of foreign investment is reflective of a North-South 
political scene. Much of the previous literature on the choice of law issue in state contracts is 
written by scholars from developed states who do not know about developing countries’ legal 
systems and their needs and aspirations. This causes starkly unbalanced views on the nature and 
content of international law on foreign investment furthering developed states’ goals of 
investment protection and liberalisation as bases of the international law on foreign investment. 
Hopefully, the experience of the writer with a Third World legal system on foreign investment 
(her own country, Mongolia) together with her training as an international lawyer makes her a 
suitable person to approach this topic from the viewpoint of developing states.  
Another justification for studying this topic is changes that have occurred within 
international investment law since the adoption of the ICSID Convention. The growing social, 
environment and human rights concerns of foreign investment is one of the most significant 
developments in international investment law. In light of these concerns, the protection and 
promotion of foreign investment is no longer the sole objective of today’s international 
investment law. Reflecting the new trend, now it is common to refer to foreign investment 
contracts as economic development agreements (hereinafter EDAs). Such contracts are meant to 







From this development-oriented perspective, regulatory interventions are necessary for 
achieving the special developmental goals. In this sense, research in this area, therefore, is 
urgently needed to investigate whether the principle of party autonomy is capable of meeting the 
realities of international economic development law. Party autonomy empowers private firms 
investing in developing states to operate free from direct intervention of national legal systems.  
If they choose a different country’s law as the law governing their activities, important policy 
objectives of host states would lose their significance.  
This research paper is written for a broad audience: practising lawyers, legal and social 
academics, and governmental officials of developing states dealing with contracts between a state 
and a foreign investor as well as financers and investors who want to invest in developing 
countries. The paper will allow them to understand better the general picture of contemporary 
international law on foreign investment and its developmental strategies. It will raise awareness 
and discussion among scholars on the importance of modifying the choice of law method. More 
importantly, the research may have significance for policy makers of developing states. It should 
be noted that insufficient understanding of the policy makers on the course of the law may lead 
to the adoption of unfair or inefficient legal regimes relating to foreign investment sector. 
The most important aim of this research is to examine the suitability of traditional choice 
of laws techniques for resolution of disputes of regulatory nature, particularly in the case of 
foreign investment disputes. The thesis reveals that the principle of party autonomy has never 
worked in the field of foreign investment contracts in the way it is supposed to work. The 
potential significance of this research lies in the possibility of replacing the party autonomy 
approach with a new approach which is capable of striking a balance between private rights of 






D. THE STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The material in this thesis is structured as follows. 
•  Part II begins with discussions on the theory of public law contract which is recognised in 
several domestic legal systems though the precise approach varies from system to system. It also 
discusses the nature and characteristics of modern types of foreign investment contracts in order 
to show that these contracts began to be considered as public law contracts.  
• Part III examines the theory of internationalisation of state contracts, which first introduced 
choice of law techniques to the field of former concession contracts. The consideration of the 
theory is very important for understanding issues surrounding the applicable law of an 
investment contract between a state and a foreign private party.  
• Part IV reviews the scope and content of international investment law by presenting the origins, 
problems, and political and legal positions of North and South bloc States in the development of 
this law. It outlines the subject matter of emerging law on economic development.  
• Part V is the core part of this thesis. It investigates major obstacles in applying the principle of 
party autonomy that is used extensively in the field of international commerce to the investment 
environment. It assesses all theories and concepts that may confront the application of the 
principle in foreign investment contracts. 
• Part VI summarises the results and the interpretation of the analysis discussed in previous parts 
of the research to make an overall conclusion. Then it proposes directions for future work. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider all contracts made with a state or state 
agency with a foreign private party. Only those contracts which qualify as foreign investment 
contracts have been investigated in detail. For the purpose of this thesis, a foreign investment 
contract is defined as an agreement concluded between a state or state agency in sovereign 
capacity on the one hand, and a foreign corporation or individual on the other hand for 
execution of a public development project which involves certain risks and lasts over a long 
period of time. This definition is consistent with the approach accepted in the ICSID arbitration. 
Although each contracting party may anticipate its own gain, in order to confer special privileges 
upon either of parties, the investor/ state arbitral tribunal must consider whether the contract 







regard, contracts in the petroleum and natural resources sector and large infrastructure projects 
such as contraction of roads and ports come within the definition of foreign investment 
contracts. Traditionally, these sectors have played a dominant role in the development of 
national economy.  
Other types of state contracts such as procurement contracts or sales contracts between 
states and foreign private parties may have relevance to the discussion of state contracts. But 
such contracts have a quite different nature and do not have the features that may result in 
distinguishing them from ordinary contracts. The significant difference between international 
investment and international sales agreements is that the foreign investment type contract brings 
fresh capital into the host country whereas the procurement contract or sales agreement does not 
create such assets of value in that country. Being more commercial in the nature, international 
sales and procurement contracts are excluded from the scope of the thesis. Such contracts are 
also not considered to be investment contracts under international investment agreements.  
This paper is entirely focused on the choice of law issues of investment contracts made 
by host governments with foreign investors and does not set out to consider other problems of 
private international law that emerge in this particular field. The content of private international 
law generally deals with a function of national rules on three major topics: jurisdiction, choice of 
law and recognition of judgments. The jurisdiction and recognition issues for investment 
proceedings are less controversial than choice of law issue because of the successful acceptance 
of the ICSID arbitration and the New York Convention on Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.6  
The law is stated as at 1 January 2008. 
                                                 
6 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature 10 June 1958, 330 UNTS 
38 (entered into force 7 June 1959) [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 




P a r t  T w o :  U N D E R S T A N D I N G  T H E  N A T U R E  A N D  
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S  O F  S T A T E  C O N T R A C T S  
The concept of state contracts is a fairly complicated issue facing legislators in any 
country. The reason for this complexity is its specificity, which keeps it from being ascribed to a 
particular type of the traditional civil law contract. No one denies the fact that this type of 
contract has the civil law character of the underlying relationships. At the same time it bears 
certain elements of public law (or administrative law) relationship. 
On the other hand, the confusion as to the legal nature of state contracts is even more 
troubled when it comes to the field of international law, for at least two reasons. First, because 
the theory of internationalisation of state contracts was intended to provide protection to foreign 
investors this has undermined the fact that these contracts are not always treated in the same 
manner as civil contracts at domestic level.  Instead of taking into consideration the relevant 
rules of municipal legal systems in relation to public law contracts, the earlier international 
arbitration of investment disputes applied purely commercial law principles in solving conflicts 
arising from the contracts. 
Additionally, the issue has been politicised since the breakdown of colonialism.  In fact, 
private oil companies do not operate independently of their home government. In establishing a 
profitable global investment environment, the home governments’ influence, priorities and 
foreign policy are highly relevant.1 Thus, industrialised countries, mainly through international 
                                                 
1 The developed world position towards the regulation of foreign investment is clearly expressed, for example in the 
speech of David Andrews, the Legal Advisor to the United States. As he stated at the annual meeting of the 
Institute of World Business Law, since “… the US is responsible for 1 trillion dollars of investment abroad, and 
with such huge investments, the effective protection of investment is crucial to economic security”. Further he 
noted that in addition to usual concerns of market-oriented policies, investment protection measures, international 
legal standards, and export provisions, protection of intellectual property rights is a great concern for assessment 
of risk in investing in developing countries. See Institute of World Business Law, Investment Protection (20th 
Anniversary Annual Meeting, 2000) 







financial institutions, have been pursuing investment liberalisation to eliminate the regulatory 
barriers to investment of their own firms entering into the developing host states.  
On the contrary, developing states, strengthening the traditional administrative approach 
of municipal law, have asserted a doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources to 
seek to localise control of the investment in the host state and to subject it to the host state’s 
law.2 They see the public law approach as a way to implement their social and economic policies 
restraining the operations of established foreign companies that do not meet their policy 
standards.  
In focusing on legal considerations related to the concept, Part II attempts to identify the 
legal nature of state contracts. Chapter One discusses the evolution of the theory of public law 
contract, assessing specific approaches of municipal legal systems concerning state contracts in a 
comparative perspective. In the second part of Chapter One, various techniques used to 
distinguish state contracts from ordinary commercial contracts are examined.  
Chapter Two of this part examines the important features of state contracts in the foreign 
investment sector, including their status in international law, the most common types of state 
contracts in this sector. It also argues that the evolution of new principles of international law 
has influenced the characterization of foreign investment contracts from the angle of economic 
development. As a result, foreign investment contracts are no longer contracts which are subject 
to ordinary rules of contract law. 
                                                 
2 Waelde and Ndi noted that:  
 “In the current mood of scramble for foreign investment covering not only the Third World, but also the ex- (and 
the few still-) socialist countries, private and foreign investment is experiencing a strong and positive re-appraisal 
over the state- and national-dominated model of investment of the past.” See Thomas Waelde and George Ndi, 
‘Stabilising International Investment Commitments: International Law versus Contract Interpretation’ (1996) 31 
Texas International Law Journal 215, 217.  




CHAPTER ONE: THE THEORY OF PUBLIC 
LAW CONTRACT 
1.1. The Evolution of  the Concept of  Public Law Contract 
With the development of the welfare state that began in Europe in the late 19th century, 
the activities of government that were previously limited to the maintenance of law and order 
extended to a wide field for non-coercive activities such as social insurance, health, education, 
housing and transportation. To discharge these functions the government organs and 
departments needed to deal with private commercial and industrial organisations, as well as with 
state-owned corporations by concluding contracts with them.3 The concept of public law 
contract thus was introduced to the domain of contract law.  
In order to show important features of state contracts, the reasons for distinguishing 
state contracts from other types of contracts as well as the conceptual differences between civil 
law and common law systems in relation to public contracts must be examined. 
1.1.1. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC LAW CONTRACT 
The involvement of public authority in the contract for the execution of public service 
was a sufficient factor to give birth to a new specific category of contract that has a mixed nature. 
Being commercial, its commercial nature requires that disputes arising from it must be settled in 
accordance of general rules emphasizing the merits of market economy and liberalism. On the 
other hand, being of a public nature, its public character justifies intervention of a public body in 
the realisation of the contract and thereby undermines the rules and conditions of commercial 
law. The existence of these mixed interests that are ingrained in a state contract has raised the 
issue of reconciling public interests and individual rights in this area of economic activity. 
                                                 
3 For example, in 1904 the City of Bordeaux granted a company a concession for the provision of gas and electricity 
within the city limits for a period of thirty years. See Compagnie générale d’éclairage de Bordeaux, Conseil d’Etat, 







The reasoning behind the need to treat such public law contracts differently from 
ordinary commercial contracts is the assumption that the main motive of a state party entering 
into public law contract is the benefit of its people. The state party acts in the public interest.  Its 
value lies in serving the special needs of the public as a whole community. The profit made from 
the contract will be used for the public good. In an early statement of the French law it was 
stated that: 
“In every contract involving the performance of some public service, the state does not 
contract as an ordinary individual. It is not concerned to protect the interests of 
individuals. It contracts on behalf of the society, for the necessities of the public service, 
for the common general interest. Every time, it enters into a public contract, it does 
something more than does a contractor under the Civil Code or the Commercial Code. 
Because it goes beyond this, one should not apply to it the same rules as one does to an 
ordinary private law contract. This is logical and this is also the law.” 4 
Another underlying justification for the privileges of the state party in contracts is the 
legal tradition which divides law into public and private.5 When a contract is made between a 
state or its agency and a citizen, one needs to distinguish public law elements from private law 
elements.  The boundary between the two could serve as a decisive factor in determining the 
degree of government control on the contractual relationship. The legal doctrine itself has 
Roman roots dating back to at least two centuries BC, and has been prominent ever since in the 
continental European countries whose legal system grew from it. The great Roman jurists, under 
                                                 
4 Conclusions of M Corneille, Comm Du Gouv (1918) R. 246 cited in A W Mewett, ‘The Theory of Government 
Contracts’ (1959) 5 McGill Law Journal 222, 226.  
5 For a comparable use of the distinction in contemporary constitutional analysis, see e.g., Henry Friendly, ‘The 
Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later’ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1289 (discussing the 
distinction between state action and private action). Some have recently attempted to connect the public-private 
distinction with liberal political thought. See, eg, Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private 
Distinction’ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1349. 




the influence of Greek philosophy that juxtaposed the state and the individual, divided all law 
into public law (jus publicum) and private law (jus privatum). 6 
The separation of public and private law is a foundation for legal systems of civil law 
countries particularly France, Germany and Italy. In the view of civil lawyers, private law, as a 
rule, deals with the relationship and the resolution of conflicts among individuals. The private 
law areas thus include contracts, torts, property, corporations, agency and partnership, trusts and 
estates, and remedies -- subjects defining the enforceable duties that all individuals owe to one 
another.  Public law, by contrast, focuses on the relationship and the resolution of conflicts 
between individuals and the state, with governmental regulation of individual and corporate 
activities and, with power and its limitations. Public law branches include constitutional law, 
taxation, administrative law, criminal and civil procedure, and at least that part of criminal law 
which regulate the relationship between governmental agencies and between governmental 
agencies and private parties.  
However, the distinctions of law are not always clear in practice. The emergence of a 
variety of social and economic regulation, and the increasing role of government in legal areas 
previously left to market forces, have resulted in a practical complexity of drawing a clear line 
between public law and private law. Therefore, to distinguish public law from private law, a 
variety of theories have been used and the most common ones are “interest theory” and ‘subject 
theory”. Under the interest theory, the classification is made according to the subject matter 
governed and the nature of the rules applied by law. In drawing a line between the two branches 
of the law, the Romans focused their attention on the character of interests protected by the law. 
As Ulpian, a Roman jurist defined, “public law is that branch of the law which focuses on the 
                                                 
6 As Dean Pound explained of Roman law, “private law had to do with adjusting the relations… and determining the 
controversies between man and man, while public law had to do with the frame of government, the functions of 
public officials, and adjustment of relations between individuals and the states”. Roscoe Pound, ‘Public Law and 







status of the Roman state, ie, the interests of the community, while private law considers the 
interests of individuals”.7  
Nowadays, it is difficult to identify which interests are public and which ones are not. 
The regulation of relations between private individuals and the peaceful resolution of conflicts 
are in the interest of the state and the community, as well as of the private individuals involved. 
Public law may place limits on private law to effectuate the public interest. Consumer protection 
and minimum wage laws are examples of this kind of limitations. 
As a result of the overlaps between public and private interests, the traditional “interest-
theory” of the Roman jurists has been abandoned and replaced by other theories amongst which 
the so-called “subject theory” appears to be gaining favour. According to this theory, the 
criterion of division between public and private law is not the character of the interest protected 
by the law, but rather the character of the parties involved in a given legal relation.  If state acts in 
its sovereign capacity and performs the proper functions of its sovereign power, then the action 
or relation is of a public nature and governed by the rules of public law. If a state engages in 
actions or relations as a private party without appearing in its sovereign capacity, then the relation 
is private and governed by the relevant rules of private law.8 
The concept of the state acting in two capacities further has developed into the 
distinction between acts of public power, over which there is no domestic jurisdiction and acts of 
private power which are subject to the ordinary courts in the same way as acts of private 
individuals.9 Although it is generally accepted that a sovereign state may perform “public” and 
                                                 
7 The Digest of Justinian (revised English-language ed, 1998) 1.1.1.2.  
8 Nigel Foster, Austrian Legal System and Laws (2003) xix.  
9 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (2002) 275. 




“private” acts, the way the distinction applied varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The 
question will be discussed later.10 
The classical division of law into public and private also has influenced common law 
jurisdictions. However, a common law perspective in the sphere of public law has its own 
features.11 In common law jurisdictions, the term public law basically refers to constitutional and 
administrative law and it is relevant solely to the type of remedies afforded when one of the 
parties is a public entity.12 The development of distinct administrative law in these countries has 
led to the recognition of analogous distinction between public and private acts of a sovereign 
state.13  
Before the methods and techniques of distinguishing public and private acts of a state are 
discussed, one should conduct a comparative analysis of state contracts in two major legal 
systems. Court cases or other legal principles of handling the problem of government contracting 
are also cited.  The purpose of this exercise is to show that everywhere a distinction between 
public and private contracts is recognised. 
1.1.2. COMPARATIVE LAW ON PUBLIC LAW CONTRACTS 
 (i)  State Contracts in Civil law Countries  
The theory that recognises the specificity of government contracts is dealt with more 
comprehensively in French law, thus it is known universally under the French name of contrats 
administratif. French jurisprudence has long recognised the separate treatment of administrative 
                                                 
10 See Ch 2, Subsection 2.1.1 (The Methods of Determining Public Law Contract). 
11 One of the basic principles of public law in common law countries is the historical theory that the reigning 
monarch was the source of all government power irrespective of whether the power was legislative, executive or 
judicial and he as well as his servants acting on behalf of him thus had legal immunities and privileges which 
collectively became known as “the shield of the Crown”. See C M Doogan, Commonwealth Administrative Law (1984) 
56. 
12 Peter Stein, Legal Institutions: the Development of Disputes Settlement (1984) 107. 
13 See further discussions on this distinction in Ch 2, Subsection 2.1.1 (The Methods of Determining Public Law 







contracts and has developed an independent set of rules to deal with administrative contracts. 
The great French jurist Rene David defines this as follows:  
"The general interest of the public welfare is that it induces this attitude of the tribunaux 
administratifs, which decide cases according to "reason" adjudicated cases at the dawn of 
the common law. The interpretation and effects of contracts in which a public body is 
involved, are not governed in France by the rules of droit civil, but are held to be a 
matter of droit administratif, where special circumstances ought to be taken into 
consideration.”14  
In France, therefore disputes arising in connection to administrative contracts fall within 
the jurisdiction of specialized courts, ie the tribunaux administratifs. Accordingly, French law 
prohibits arbitration agreements in administrative contracts. This general rule was recognised as 
early as 1806 in the original French Code of Civil Procedure.15  In 1972 the French Civil Code restated 
the principle.16 
This principle of prohibition was later lessened as a new law was enacted allowing certain 
public entities of industrial or commercial character to enter into arbitration agreements.17Also, 
in the mid 1960s, France ratified two major international arbitration Conventions, namely the 
1961 Geneva Convention on International Commercial Arbitration authorising public entities to conclude 
valid arbitration agreements and the 1965 Washington Convention on Investment Disputes creating 
arbitration mechanism between states and foreign private parties.  
Despite the government’s willingness to encourage arbitration of disputes involving state 
entities, French administrative judges traditionally have been very reluctant to allow arbitration in 
a contract defined as an administrative contract.  In 1986, when the Conseil d’Etat (the Supreme 
                                                 
14 Rene David, ‘Frustration of Contract in French Law’ (1946) 28 Journal of Comparative Legislation 11, 13-14.  
15 Art 1006 prohibited arbitration of disputes where a notification to the Attorney General’s office was required. Art 
83 listed among such disputes those concerning “public policy, the State, State property, the cities and the public 
bodies.”  
16 Art 2060 provides: “One may not enter into arbitration agreements in matters of (. . .) controversies concerning 
public bodies and entities and more generally in all matters in which public policy is concerned.” 
17 Law of 9 July 1975.  




Administrative Court) was asked by the government to provide an opinion in connection with a 
contract between French administrative bodies and the Walt Disney Company concerning the 
Euro Disney project, the court concluded that the contract should be governed by French 
domestic public policy rules, and “not governed by principles applicable to international 
commerce.”18 
Nevertheless, recently the French government reaffirmed its favour for arbitration by 
issuing an act (the “2004-559 Act”) authorizing parties to a partnership contract to submit their 
disputes to arbitration. Indeed, that was a significant departure from the traditional principle 
prohibiting arbitration clauses in public law contracts. But this time the Conseil d’Etat did not 
oppose the provision of the governmental act, rather the court held the act as valid.19   
Therefore, it seems that in France the principle of non-arbitrability of public contract 
disputes has been replaced by a policy favouring arbitration. However, when it comes to the 
applicable law of public contracts, the government is hesitant in subjecting French administrative 
contracts to a foreign law. When the government authorized by the 2004-559 Act the arbitration 
of administrative contracts, it required the mandatory application of French law.20 The general 
principle of French law is that administrative contracts are governed by administrative law.  
Maintaining a dual contractual approach, French law has developed sets of special rules 
and principles which only apply to administrative contracts. These rules and principles are 
purported to maintain a rational balance of interests of parties in such an unequal relationship. 
One of the principles is theorie de l’Imprévision (the theory of the lack of foresight), according to 
                                                 
18 Opinion dated 6 March 1986, Conseil d’Etat, Ass. Rev Arb (1992) 397.  
19 About the position of the Conseil d’Etat in relation to the 2004-559 Act, see Pierre Heitzmann, ‘The Contrat de 
Partenariat: A New Form of French Public Private Partnership Allowing the Use of Arbitration to Adjudicate 
Disputes’ (2005) 23 The International Construction Law Review 1.  
20 The 2004-559 Act provides that parties to a Partnership Contract may “submit disputes to arbitration, with the 







which the rights and obligations of parties can be revised in the event of unforeseeable external 
events upsetting balance of the contract.   
The principle is well illustrated in the Gaz de Bordeaux case21, where the French Conseil 
d’Etat heard a dispute brought by a private company against the City of Bordeaux. In that case 
the city had granted the company a concession to provide gas lighting to the city. The concession 
contract had a fixed price, but because of the First World War, the price of coal used by Gaz de 
Bordeaux more than tripled causing the company extreme financial loss.  The Conseil d’Etat ruled 
that the company was entitled to compensation for the increased costs of the raw materials from 
the administration.  
The theory imposes to the contracting public person the obligation to help the holder of 
the market financially to carry out the contract, when an unforeseeable and foreign event caused 
the upheaval of the economy of the contract. Accordingly, the contractor has a right which his 
civil law counterpart cannot have.22 On the other hand, the concept of imprévision can be also 
revoked by the government party. If the performance of such a contract contradicts with the 
public interest, the theory also enables a state contractor to escape from its contractual 
obligations.23  
In France, the doctrine of imprévision applies in limited circumstances particularly, in 
contracts where administrative law would apply. In private law contracts the parties may only rely 
on force majeure to excuse his or her non-performance of obligation.24 Prof Rosenn described the 
scope of the application of the principles as follows: 
                                                 
21 Compagnie générale d’éclairage de Bordeaux, Conseil d’Etat, Decision of  30 March 1916.  
22 Mewett, above n 4, 231.  
23 See Barry Nicholas, French Law of Contract (1982) 202; Bernard Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common 
Law World (1954) 158-59. 
24 Force majeure is part of the French civil code and thus applicable to all contracts. The main difference between 
imprévision and force majeure is the impossibility of performance, meaning force majeure is accepted only when the 
performance is impossible. If the event simply makes the performance of the contract more difficult or more 




"...in France, the théorie de l’imprévision did not develop into anything more than a method 
for relieving governmental contractors of unforeseeable hardships to insure the 
uninterrupted functioning of public services. In practice, the theory has been applied 
only to three contracts (1) public works, (2) governmental supplies, and (3) concessions 
such as gas and electricity. Attempts to expand the doctrine of imprévision to private 
contracts have been regularly frustrated by the Cour de Cassation, France's highest court, 
which has only been inclined to excuse performance of contractual obligations only if 
performance is literally impossible.”25  
The next principle which is very important in balancing interests of the private individual 
with those of the public in administrative contracts is fait du prince (government action principle). 
The principle applies when an act of the administration, either the contracting branch or a 
different branch, has an impact on the contract.  For example, if the parties contracted according 
to existing law, and a new regulation increases the obligations of the contractor, then he is 
entitled to an indemnity.26  
Other civil law countries such as Belgium, Italy and Germany also have accepted the 
concept of a distinctive public-law contract.27German law for example, in addition to setting 
administrative courts for contracts concluded with public entities, also provides very similar 
solutions. The Administrative Procedure Act allows parties to administrative contracts to renegotiate 
the provisions of the agreement if the circumstances which determined the content of the 
agreement have changed so substantially that one party to the agreement cannot reasonably be 
expected to adhere to the original provisions of the agreement. If such renegotiation is not 
                                                                                                                                                    
expensive, then the obligation shall nevertheless remain due.  See A H Puelinckx, Frustration, Hardship, Force 
Majeure, Imprévision, Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, Unmöglichkeit, Changed Circumstances- A Comparative Study in English, 
French, German and Japanese Law (1986) 3 (2) Journal of International Arbitration  47, 55-56.  
25 Rosenn Keith, Law and Inflation (1982) 87. 
26 See Soc Chimique, Conseil d’Etat, Decision of 8 Nov 1957.  







impossible or not reasonably expected, either of parties may initiate the termination of the 
agreement.28 
The position of German law is based on the Wegfall der Geschäfstgrundlage (contract basis 
doctrine) which applies more broadly than the French théorie de l’imprévision generally covering all 
contracts including private contracts.29 According to the German doctrine, if unforeseeable and 
new events which change the whole environment of the contract occur after the formation of 
the contract the courts may adapt or even annul the contract, if adaptation is not possible.30 
However, it has been less easily accepted with regard to commercial contracts concluded 
between businessmen.31  
Many capital importing states of Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as former 
socialist countries have civil law traditions, meaning legal systems originally inspired by French 
and German law. As this tradition has evolved, the general philosophy tends to be that a contract 
concluded between a government authority and private party is subject to not only commercial 
but also administrative rules. There are many versions of the contrats administratif ranging from a 
mere prohibition of arbitration of public law disputes to the idea that unilateral termination is 
acceptable if original circumstances of the contract have significantly changed resulting severe 
imbalance in contractual equilibrium.                                               
Notably, in Cameroonian law, the contracting authority may in the case of absolute 
necessity or an act of God and after the opinion of the authority in charge of public contracts, 
terminate a contract in the absence of any default on the part of the private contracting partner 
                                                 
28 German Administrative Procedure Act (1976), s 60 (1).  
29 Aziz Saliba, ‘Rebus sic stantibus: A Comparative Survey’ (2001) 8 (3) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 
<http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v8n3/saliba83.html> at 22 June 2004.  
30 Ingeborg Schwenzer, ‘The Law of Contracts’ in Werner Ebke and Matthew Fink (eds), Introduction to German Law 
(1996) 177, 181.  
31 Chengwei Liu, Changed Contract Circumstances (2005) Pace Law School 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/liu5.html#cl1> at 19 February 2008.  




without prejudice to damages that can be claimed by the latter.32 Thailand has established 
administrative courts along with the existing judicial courts to try and adjudicate administrative 
cases including administrative contracts.33 In Latin America, it is accepted that the rights of 
individuals or companies arising out of concessions might be affected by “a very high degree of 
administrative interventionism and certain restrictions”.34   
If one turns towards former socialist countries, one finds that their formal laws are 
imported from civil law notions. It is said, however, that they used to have a third legal system 
which was Marxist-Leninist law. Although communism has collapsed, one still can see reflections 
of the socialist legal tradition. In the communist era, there was no right of ownership to property 
by private persons and a state was the owner of vast resources and the basic means of 
production.35  
Now in most former socialist countries the general principle is that the subsurface is 
owned by the state. For example, the Mongolian Mineral Law of 1997 states: “The mineral 
resources naturally occurring on and under the earth’s surface and natural water courses in 
Mongolia are the property of the State”.36 Also, in many developing countries that have asserted 
                                                 
32 Cameroonian Public Contracts Code instituted by Decree No.2004/275 of September 2004, Art 101.  
33 Under Thai Arbitration Act B.E. 2545 (2002) following contracts are defined as administrative: 
• in which at least one of the parties is an administrative agency or a person acting on behalf of the 
State; 
• which exhibits the characteristics of  (a) a concession contract; or (b) a public service contract; or 
(c) a contract for the provision of public utilities; or (d) a contract for the exploitation of natural 
resources.  
34 Cecilia Siac, Mining Law: Bridging the Gap between Common Law and Civil Law Systems (1997) Centre for Petroleum and 
Mineral Law and Policy of the University of Dundee <http://www.saj.oas.org/lcp/Cecilia_Siac.doc > at 21 
March 2005. 
35 Pashukanis, a well-known Marxist legal theorist and Soviet lawyer, wrote:   
 “… private ownership of the means of production is the central concept of bourgeois civil law,  public (socialist) 
property is the central concept of Soviet economic law. All bourgeois “civil commerce” is a particular type of the 
circulation of private property. Equally, the system of Soviet  economic law may be correctly understood only as 
public (socialist) property set in motion in the struggle with private property.”  Evgeny Pashukanis, ‘A Course of 
Soviet Economic Law’ in Piers Beirne and Robert Sharlet (eds),  Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law 
(1980) 321 (Translated by Peter Maggs).  







the right of sovereignty over natural resources, minerals are the property of, and are controlled 
by, the state on behalf of its people.37 That position allows the state a right to intervene in order 
to manage or administer the resources as the owner.   
It must therefore be recognised that in civil law countries, contracts such as a concession 
agreement covering the development of mineral resources owned by and under the sovereignty 
of the state can qualify as administrative contracts. In civil law, mining contracts have to conform 
to the codes and administrative acts; and a state has not just a right of control but a right to 
intervene if the public interest so requires.  
 (ii) State Contracts in Common Law Countries 
Common law systems have not set up specific rules for state contracts, as there is no 
bright line separating public law from private law. In common law countries, in particular in the 
UK, the USA, Australia and other Commonwealth countries the general principle established by 
the judicial system suggests a government contract with a private entity is governed by the same 
principles of contract law, which govern contracts between two non-government parties.38 For 
example, judicial cases of the USA assert:  
"When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are 
governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals."39  
"[When the State of Texas] becomes a party to a contract with citizens, the same law 
applies to it as under like conditions governs the contract of an individual."40  
                                                 
37 Some examples are as follows: in Argentina Mining Code (1887) s 7; in Bolivia Mining Code (1997) s 1; in Tanzania 
Mining Act (1998) s 5; in Nigeria Minerals and Mining Decree (Nbr. 34,1999); in Indonesia Law Nbr. 11on the Basic 
Provisions of Mining (1967) and in Philippines Mining Act (1995) s 2. 
38 However, there may be some limited exceptions. Particularly, the English Patents Acts provides certain 
exemptions for the state so that it may procure patented drugs from sources other than the patent-holder or the 
national health system. United Kingdom Patent Act 1977. 
39 United States v Winstar Co, 116 S Ct 2432, 2464 (1996) (quoting Lynch v United States, 292 US 571, 579 (1934)).  
40 Federal Sign v Texas Southern University, 951 SW 2d 401, 406-407 (1997) (quoting Fristoe v Blum, 45 SW 998, 999 
(1898)). 




In Australia, statutes try to make the promises made by governments as nearly a possible 
the same as between subject and subject.41 Judicial Act 1903 enabled an individual to bring a claim 
in tort or contract against the Commonwealth.42 Under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Act 1977, any citizen can bring a claim against a government or a government decision-maker in 
respect of decisions that have caused him loss or damage.43 There are no special administrative 
or constitutional courts for administrative decisions and, superior courts of general jurisdiction 
decide cases of administrative law.  
In the court practice of common law countries, however, it is often acknowledged that 
sometimes an arrangement made with the government may have no contractual effect rather a 
political character. In South Australia v Commonwealth, the Dixon C J said:  
“The agreement now in question certainly contains provisions which no court could 
undertake specifically to enforce… Enough has been said to show that in the first 
place, to generalize about the operation of the agreement in question must be unsafe 
and misleading and that in the second place, it could only be in respect of some 
definite obligation the breach of which is unmistakably identified that a court can 
pronounce a judicial decree in a case such as this. It is only in this way that the 
necessary distinction can be maintained between, on the one hand, the exercise of the 
jurisdiction reposed in the Court and, on the other hand, an extension of the Court's 
true function into a domain that does not belong to it, namely, the consideration of 
undertakings and obligations depending entirely on political sanctions.”44 
Thus, in jurisprudence of the Commonwealth countries as well as American law, the 
theory has been put forward of the splitting up of the state functions into two categories.45  One 
                                                 
41 David Allan and Mary Hiscock, Law of Contract in Australia (2nd ed, 1992) 366. 
42 Commonwealth Judiciary Act 1903 s 56.  
43 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, amended by Act No 56 of 2007, ss 6-8. 
44 See South Australia v Commonwealth (1962) 108 CLR 130,141. Also see the same case for the judgment of Windeyer, 
153-154. Also see Placer Development Ltd v Commonwealth (1969) 121 CLR 353, 367. 
45 See Horowitz v United States, 267 US 458 (1925); Reynolds Metals v United States 438 F 2d 983 (1871) where the court 
held: “there is a long tradition separating the contractual and sovereign capacities of the government. Its 







is the executive function of the state that is governed by statute or statutory rules and can not be 
bound by any contractual commitments. The second is a contractual obligation of the state that 
may be agreed by the parties.46  
If the action of the state is regarded by the courts as falling within the category of 
executive acts or governmental directives, the government action may override private rights 
including its contractual arrangements made with a private party.47 In the US, the government is 
not liable for damages caused by acts performed as an integral part of its sovereign character.48 In 
a substantial number of cases, the US courts also dismissed claims on governmental liability on 
the grounds of a doctrine, which is known as sovereign acts doctrine.49 In the same manner the 
English common law dismisses the government’s liability.50 In Australian law, damages are not 
normally available in public law matters, unless the breach of statutory duty by officers is 
established.51 
The legal basis of the rule which provides the state party to a public law contract an exit 
from contractual obligations is the so called doctrine of executive necessity. In common law 
countries, it is generally accepted that a state or a state agency cannot by contract limit or disable 
                                                 
46 However, the application of this distinction to particular cases may cause problems. See David Allan and Mary 
Hiscock, above n 41, 198. To establish whether the promises made by governments are enforceable, courts need 
to look at factors that point the true intention of a government to enter to a legally binding contract and also may 
apply the doctrine of consideration: at 369. 
47 Robinson and Harvey discussed a number of cases where the public law and private law issues in government 
liability were addressed in Australian and other common law courts. See Mark Robinson and Ian Harvey, ’Private 
Law v Public Law: Issues in Government Liability’ (Paper presented at a BLEC Conference, Melbourne, 4 May 
1995).  
48 IX Williston on Contracts, Chapter XII (revised edition). 
49 In the cases Horowitz v United States, 267 US 458 (1925) and United States v  Winstar Co,  64 F 3d 1531 (1995), the 
courts recognised that the federal government is immune from breach of contract liability whenever its public and 
general acts as a sovereign have the effect of violating the particular contracts into which it enters with private 
persons.  
50 In Reilly v The King, it was established that the state should be free to legislate in the interest of the public, and if the 
effect of a new legislation is to cause a breach of contract with a private citizen, the state ought not to be held 
liable for damages. (1934) AC 176 (PC). 
51 In the Mengel Case, the High Court dismissed liability claims against the Northern Territory Government on the 
ground that there was no misfeasance in public office. See Northern Territory of Australia and Others v Arthur John 
Mengel and Others (1995) 129 ALR 1 (‘Mengel’).  




its future executive action. The doctrine involves the idea that contracts or other agreements and 
promises are unenforceable in the public interest if they fetter or purport to fetter statutory 
executive discretions and powers.52 In other words, it suggests that when there are conflicts, the 
government’s responsibility to govern in the public interest can override its contractual 
commitments made with a private party.  
The first well known case, where the doctrine of executive necessity is illustrated, is the 
English case, Amphitrite.53 In that case, during the World War One, owners of a Swedish ship 
entered into an agreement with the British Government according to which the ship was obliged 
to carry sixty per cent approved goods to a British port and the British government was 
promised to issue a clearance in return. However, the British government denied the ship a 
clearance because of the exigencies of war. The owners of Amphitrite petitioned the Crown for 
damages for breach of contract. But the petition was dismissed on the ground that it was not 
competent for the government “to fetter its future action which must necessarily be determined 
by the needs of the community when the question arises.”54     
Although the decision was criticized on the grounds that it produced a highly unjust 
result,55 it is very important in discussions of public contracts in English law.56 The decision is the 
recognition that in a contract made with a government, rules and principles of ordinary private 
contracts may have no relevance. In the Ansett Airlines Case,57 Mason J summarised the position 
of the common law with regard to a contract entered into by a government in the following way: 
                                                 
52 Mark Robinson, ‘Executive Necessity: Upholding Contracts of Previous Government’ (Paper presented at a 
BLEC Conference, Canberra, 1 November 1996).  
53 Rederiaktiebrolaget Amphitrite v R (1921) 3 KB 500. 
54 Ibid, 503.  
55 See, eg, writings of Australian scholars such as P W Hogg, 'The Doctrine of Executive Necessity in the Law of 
Contract’ (1970) 44 Australian Law Journal 154 and Enid Campbell, ‘Agreements about the Exercise of Statutory 
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“…the public interest requires that neither the government nor a public authority can by 
a contract disable itself or its officer from performing a statutory duty or from exercising 
a discretionary power conferred by or under a statute by binding itself or its officer not 
to perform the duty or to exercise the discretion in a particular way in the future. To 
take an example related to the case: the Commonwealth could not, by making a contract 
with an airline company whereby it promises that the Secretary of the Department of 
Transport would not for the next fifteen years issue to other airline companies import 
permits for aircraft, fetter the future exercise by the Secretary of the discretion conferred 
upon him by the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations. The secretary must at all 
times deal with applications for import permits in accordance with the law; if he 
considers that, in conformity with government policy, the public interest calls for the 
importation of the aircraft, he should grant the application notwithstanding that the 
Commonwealth has entered into a contract which provides to the contrary. To hold 
otherwise would enable the executive by contract in an anticipatory way to restrict and 
stultify the ambit of a statutory discretion which is to be exercised at some time in the 
future in the public interest or for the public good”. 
The application of the doctrine of executive necessity creates considerable uncertainty 
for private parties contracting with a government. Therefore, a contrary tendency to make the 
government liable for undertakings made with a private party has been encouraged in common 
law jurisprudence. Where there is a breach of contract or some other default by the government 
and courts wish to find a right balance between the desirability of upholding the validity of 
contract and the need to preserve the free and unfettered exercise of the discretion, one solution 
to deal with this situation has been to make the contract with express statutory approval.58 Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                    
 See also West Lakes Ltd v South Australia (1980) 25 SASR 389, 390 and an earlier English case, William Cory v City of 
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common law judges have struggled to find a workable solution to solve the conflict between 
private rights and governmental necessities.  
But when one speaks of the lack of experience of common law courts in relation to 
contracts of governmental agencies, one should be mindful of one fact. The concept of 
administrative law, which on the Continent has been a separate branch of the law for over a 
hundred years, was unknown and denied in common law countries.59 So was the idea of 
administrative contracts. Common law judges have not been specialized as administrative judges 
in French who only know contracts with a public authority, but never know contracts between 
private individuals.  
However, because of the emergence of the “cabinet system” of government, common 
law countries needed to develop a comprehensive set of principles and rules dealing with 
administrative matters.60 For the last few decades, a package of administrative legislation has 
been adopted in Commonwealth countries.61As a result of the development of administrative 
law, there has been a tendency in common law countries to place the administration, as regards 
its rights and obligations in a position which differs from that of an individual. This is evident in 
the law of contract. Common law countries have acknowledged that a contract made with an 
administration may differ from one which is made between two private parties at least in terms 
of formation and procedure.62 More specifically, in the US government contract codes with more 
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detailed provisions regulating state contracts, which are similar to ones in civil law countries, 
have been adopted both in federal and state level.63   
Lastly, it should be mentioned that modern common law theory also accepts the notion 
that bargains may change and be changed with time. As a matter of fact, doctrines such as 
frustration of purpose (in the UK) and impossibility (the USA) offer relief to contracting parties 
affected by unforeseen events. Lord Radcliffe interpreted the English doctrine of frustration as 
follows: 
“… frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that without fault of either party a 
contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the 
circumstances in which performance called for would render it a thing radically 
different from that which was undertaken by the contract. … It was not this that I 
promised to do…”64   
Thus it can be said that the doctrines of frustration of contract and impossibility of 
performance are common law notions of the French theory of imprévision. Even though common 
law courts apply the doctrine regardless of the identity of parties or the object of the contract, 
the use of the doctrines in common law jurisdictions shows that the theory of imprévision is not a 
peculiar doctrine only present in French law. The use, scope and effect of the concepts can be 
different in each jurisdiction, but their basis is same which is they all deal with changes in the 
economic, legal and business realities underlying a contractual agreement.   
 The evidence seems to indicate that, although the concept of a distinct administrative 
contract is not present in common law systems, normal commercial law principles that apply in 
private transactions may have limited application to a transaction with a government. To reveal 
that there exists a separate category of contracts, the techniques of determining public law 
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contracts may be examined next followed by an attempt to draw outstanding features of public 
law contracts that differentiate them from  contracts of private law.  
1.2. The Distinction between Public and Private Law Contract  
While the idea of a separate contract seems plausible in theory, practically, it is not always 
easy to draw a straight line between public law contracts and private law contracts. In fact, the 
identification of a contract as a public law contract affects issues regarding the enforcement and 
validity of arbitration clauses, choice of law clauses, and other clauses of the contract. Therefore, 
it is very important to distinguish public law contracts from those of private law.  
1.2.1. THE METHODS OF DETERMINING PUBLIC LAW CONTRACT  
To determine the public law character of a transaction various methods have been 
developed in court and arbitration practice. First of all, in legal systems where the concept of 
public law contract is well developed such as France, courts apply certain criteria to address the 
problem of identification of a contrat administratif. Similarly, in the context of the restrictive 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, municipal courts and international arbitrations have adopted 
some techniques separating the contractual and sovereign capacities of the government. The 
application of these two methods is now discussed.  
 (i) Criteria for determination of Administrative Contract 
There are three criteria that French and German administrative judges may weigh to 
determine whether a contract in hand qualifies administrative contract. The three factors are: (1) 
the identity of parties, meaning at least one of parties needs to be of a sovereign nature; (2) the 
contract must have the community interest; and (3) the contract may contain clauses giving a 









Subject of the Contract 
Under the theory of contrat admisnistratif, the public nature of state contracts is primarily 
due to at least one of the parties to these contracts being a state or state agency. In administrative 
law it is generally assumed that the administration can come to its decisions only for reasons of 
the public interest.65 Therefore, proponents of the conception of administrative contracts often 
insist that in a public contract the administration represents the interests of the public, and every 
contract entered into by it is meant to perform some public service.66   
However, in later decisions of administrative courts, the presence of public authority in 
the contract alone has become insufficient to regard the contract as public, since some of such 
contracts do not qualify for the real characters of state contracts in legal sense. For example, in 
the case of Blaineau Pontamousson, 67 the Conseil d’Etat held that although the contract between BAS 
(publicly-owned establishment) and a Public Office of Public Sector Housing on the hiring of 
building seems to be qualified as a public law contract, it is contract of private law because of its 
object. From this perspective, even contracts signed between two subjects of public law may not 
qualify as a public law contract, if the contract has an aim of the realization of private work, not 
public work.  The contract thus should be subjected to private law.  
In this connection, one should also distinguish those cases where transactions are signed 
by a state itself in its capacity as sovereign from those cases where transactions are concluded by 
a state enterprise or a separate legal person created by a sovereign. In the German case of OLG 
Celle,68 it was stated that when the municipality is carrying on an activity which can by its nature 
also be undertaken on a civil law basis, it is up to the state how it organizes this activity. It may 
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choose either to carry on an enterprise in a relationship of equality of status (and therefore in the 
private law sphere) or to run it in the sovereign exercise of public power. The case thus suggests 
that a state entity or public corporation that performs a function on behalf of the state and in the 
public interest might have some special privileges by legislation69 but may not qualify for the 
important characteristics of a state authority.  
In fact, in domestic jurisdictions there is a general rule that splits away a state from its 
legal persons.70 In Rolimpex Case, the issue was arisen whether a state enterprise can rely on force 
majeure when the government intervention caused its non-performance of the contract. In that 
case, the House of Lords held that in Polish law, Rolimpex is treated differently from the Polish 
State and that it could rely on the force majeure clause and claim that further performance of the 
contract was excused by the government intervention. 71 Former socialist countries also respected 
the legal separation between a state and its controlled state entity.72 
However, one must admit that in the case of state contracts involving international 
elements, arbitrators take a more cautious view of the distinction. There is a fear that upholding 
the distinction in international investment contracts may cause injustice enabling state-controlled 
entities to cancel unfavourable contracts with foreign investors invoking force majeure based on the 
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government intervention. Therefore, in the international context, there is a tendency not to 
separate a state entity from the state.73  
Object of contract 
 To qualify fully for the characteristics of a public law contract, the nature of the service 
provided by the contract is crucial. State contracts serve the needs and benefits of the whole 
population. Under this criterion, thus, a contract is regarded as administrative, if the obligation of 
the contract is the execution of public work. A general rule is stated in the German case: 
"It is not simply the public law nature of the tasks, the public interest pursued by the 
activity or the consideration of community interests which is determinative for 
differentiating between civil law and public law areas of action.”74 
Because of their unique importance to society, a few industries have been recognised as a 
special category of public utilities for over a century. The most common industries classified as 
public utilities include telecommunication, electricity, gas, water services and public 
transportation.75 The mission of public utilisation is the most important characteristic of 
administrative contracts because sometimes the execution of work for the public benefit alone is 
sufficient enough factor to acknowledge the contract as public law contract.  
 Particularly, in the case of Société enterprise Peyrot76, the state signed a contract with a 
company of the Motorway Esterel Cote Azure, at the end of which the company built 
motorways: it was a public service contract by the determination of the law. Then, there was 
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another contract between the Esterel Company and a Peyrot Company which was charged to 
build certain public works. The Tribunal des Conflits (court of the Conflicts) qualified this contract 
as administrative because private organisation A acts in the place of the state and because, to 
some extent the contract arose out of the other contract. The case shows that even a contract 
between two people of private law may be considered as a public contract, if at least one of them 
has been given a mandate by the public person to carry out public work. In that case, the legal 
status of the contracts passed by private people may be interdependent with the principal 
contract signed by the public power.77   
c). The presence of Exorbitant Clause 
Some contracts may contain exorbitant or derogatory clauses of common right which 
make the contract administrative. In French jurisprudence, exorbitant clauses are defined as 
clauses excluded in their nature from private relations and stipulated obligations which cannot 
appear in a similar contract of private law.78 In some circumstances, the clauses create inequalities 
between parties to the contract, by conferring on the public person a superiority compared to the 
private person.79  
The goal of the clause is to place the one under the authority of the public person. For 
instance, a local government can contract with a private party on the opening of a restaurant in 
its building, quoting clauses which put precise obligations on the private party such as an 
obligation to put on sale stocks at the request of the administration and to cease the exploitation 
as soon as the local authority asks it. For certain contracts, one knows in advance that the 
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contracts are public law contracts because the law defines these contracts as administrative 
contracts. It is the case with the contracts of partnership.80  
Nevertheless, the criteria that are used to determine the legal nature of the public law 
contracts are not always helpful, when it concerns a specified case. Sometimes, it may be difficult 
to establish the status of the contract according to one or more criteria alone. Therefore, to 
determine whether the contract concerned is a public law contract or a private law contract, one 
may need “to contemplate the whole surroundings, the parties, the nature of the administrative 
organization with which the contract is made, the nature of the service, and the terms of the 
contract itself and the conditions on which it is made.”81   
Taking into considerations these discussions, public law contracts can be defined as 
contracts where government or a public authority engages with a private party for the execution 
of essential public service functions such as constructing infrastructure or establishing industrial 
complexes for its people. In this connection, ordinary public procurement contracts, which 
could be defined as the purchase of goods and contract services for the consumption of the 
government, ministries and other public agencies should be excluded from the category of public 
law contracts. The reason is that the procurement contracts do not benefit the general public, 
but only those public agencies that requested the service.  
The concept of administrative contract and the criteria of distinguishing public contracts 
from the private ones however have not produced uniformity of practice because of the 
unfamiliarity of this doctrine in other jurisdictions. But criteria adopted in the context of the 
restrictive doctrine of state immunity for purposes of determining immune and non-immune acts 
of a state seem to be more commonly accepted in the international practice. Thus they may 
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provide practical guidance as to which activities of a state are of sovereign character and which 
are not.  
 (b) Criteria adopted in the Restrictive Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity 
In legal regimes, which have a single approach to a contract, arrangements made with a 
government are governed by precisely the same rules as any ordinary contract made between 
private persons. The only difference may be the application of some procedural rules that apply 
in case of government contracts. Therefore, courts in common law countries have generally no 
need to distinguish aspects of public law character and private law character when dealing with 
disputes arising out a government contract.  
 However, in certain circumstances, the presence of a state party in a contractual dispute 
may raise an issue whether the government party to a contract acted in its sovereign capacity or 
non-sovereign capacity. The identification of the state party’s status in the contractual 
relationship has important legal implications. The rules of law which are applicable to this 
relationship and the issue of prerogatives, immunities, and responsibilities are all dependent on 
the state party’s status.  
In making a distinction between governmental and commercial acts, courts both in 
Europe and the US have adopted two tests. One is the purpose test which requires courts to 
look at the purpose of the act to qualify it as governmental. In Kingdom of Roumania v Guaranty 
Trust Co, applying the purpose test the court held that the purchase of boots for the army is a 
governmental transaction.82 The application of this test has proved undesirable from the 
restrictive theory leading to the characterization of most transactions by government as public 
acts. Therefore, it has been replaced by the nature test which requires the examination of the 
                                                 







nature of transaction concerned. In one case, the German Federal Constitutional Court stated 
that: 
“The distinction between acts jure imperii and acts jures gestionis can only be based on the 
nature of the act of the state or of the resulting legal relationship, not on the motive or 
purpose of the state activity.”83 
The trends in European and American legal systems give increasing support to the 
nature test characterizing most transactions by governments as commercial acts.84 As a result, it 
is possible that foreign investment agreements such as agreements for the exploitation of natural 
resources which involve matters of public interest could be wrongly classified as activities of a 
private nature. In fact, such contracts in no way can be equated to other commercial contracts. 
Therefore, now it is proposed to combine the nature test and the purpose test. In 
particular, according to the initial 1984 Draft Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
their Property, the issue whether a transaction is commercial is determined by the nature of the 
transaction rather than the purpose. However, later in 1991 it was rewritten that “reference shall 
be made primarily to the nature of the transaction, but the purpose of that transaction shall also 
be taken into account if, in the practice of that state, that purpose is relevant to determining the 
non-commercial character of the contract”.85 
To date there seems no clear concurrence in state practice on how to draw the line 
distinguishing government transactions from private ones. The best way to show how public law 
contracts differ from contracts of private law is to contrast these two types of contracts.                                           
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1.2.2. PUBLIC LAW CONTRACTS V PRIVATE LAW CONTRACTS 
Being a distinct type of contract, public law contracts undermine some traditions and 
values of contract law. First of all, the conception of contrat admisnistratif deviates from the 
sanctity of contracts, which is a fundamental precept of contract law, as in administrative 
contracts the public interest may override individual rights. As Fatouros observed, “public 
contracts are subject to the overriding interest of the public, as conceived in good faith by the 
state”.86 The general principle established in major legal systems is that a government has a 
unilateral power to modify or terminate its contractual obligations if the public interest so 
requires.87  
On the other hand, from a legal point of a view, a state-citizen relationship cannot be 
pure matters of contract. Dealing with the contention that there was a contract between 
petitioner and the government, the Supreme Court of India stated in the Roshanlal Tandon v Union 
of India:  
“… it is obvious that the relationship between the Government and its servant is not 
like ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is 
something entirely different, something of the nature of status. It is much more than a 
purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between two parties. The duties 
of status are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of these duties society has an 
interest.” 88 
Likewise, Mewett wrote, “any person who enters into a public contract becomes, merely 
through being in that position, immediately subject to the powers of supervision of the 
administration. The contract is a prerequisite to the control, but the control is in no way 
contractual.”89 These statements suggest that parties to a state contract are bound by statutes 
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rather than their own free choices. In contrast, the free choice of individuals to make a contract 
on their own terms is a core feature of contract law.  
 The next difference between the two types of contracts lies in the inherent inequality of 
parties both from legal and economic point of view. In administrative contracts, the state is 
legally in a superior position. This means that the state could vary the other party’s liabilities 
under the contract or even could terminate the contract if its performance is no longer in the 
interest of the state.90 The other party to a state contract is mostly a multinational corporation, 
which holds a huge economic power.91 The existence of such inequalities is contrary to the 
fundamental principle of mutuality of contract law, especially that of common law.   
 In addition, their contracts are different in that parties to a state contract pursue different 
interests. While, in pure private contracts, both parties’ interests are profit motivated, in state 
contracts the state party represents not its own interests but the interests of the public.92 Exactly 
the idea that a state acts in the public interest allows a government to override existing private or 
legal rights including those rights emanating from contract. Thus, when there is a clash of 
interest, the public interest prevails over the private interest meaning that a state would sacrifice 
commitments to private parties in order to serve the public interest.  
Furthermore, one of the distinguishing characteristics of state contracts especially foreign 
investment contracts is that the performance of such contracts requires a long term relationship. 
The long duration of these contracts makes them particularly susceptible to political or economic 
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influences which are unenforceable at the time of contract conclusion.93 Thus, they are more 
accessible to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. By contrast, in private contracts courts tend to 
uphold the validity of an agreement and restrain in intervening into the negotiated terms. 
Finally, they have different fields of operation. The activities of state contracts are 
integrated in the territory of the host country, so the application of domestic law of the state has 
a primary importance. It is a common concept that any person who enters the territory of a state 
as a foreigner is expected to abide by its laws. On contrary, parties to international commercial 
contracts usually operate outside the territory of the host state.  Therefore, they could avoid, by 
choosing another legal system, the application of domestic law of the state unless it is mandatory. 
Admittedly, these characteristics of administrative contracts are just notable ones. There may be 
other differences such as a procedure for making the contract, its form and so on.  
1.3. Summary of  Findings 
This chapter has mostly sought to examine the position of state contract in two major 
legal systems and provide an overview of its legal nature. Because the rest of the thesis will be 
based on the concept that is taken to the legal nature of the contract, this is a very important 
issue. It would be meaningless to argue for the law governing state contract unless a consensus 
on the legal nature of state contract is established.  
The legal regime of a country whose government signed a foreign investment contract is 
crucial to determine the nature of the contract, the rights and obligations of parties and the 
whole other issues surrounding the contract. Some national laws (France and other civil law 
countries of EU) have more advanced concepts towards the public service contracts. In these 
countries, it is generally accepted that the obligations under state contract are defeasible in the 
public interest. This view has led to the development of a theory that recognises the specificity of 
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government contracts.  The concept is more comprehensive in France than any other country 
and known as the theorie de contrat administratif.   
The theory recognises concepts that are absent in ordinary contract law. Under the 
concept of l’Imprévision, if the economic equilibrium of the contract is called into question due to 
the occurrence of an unforseen event at the time of conclusion, either the administration or the 
private party has a right to fix contractual terms or revoke the termination of the contract.  
Another concept, fait du prince enables the private party to an administrative contract ask for 
compensation, if the new legislation or administrative act results in exceptional increase in the 
costs of his contractual obligations.   
Therefore, one cannot say that contrat administratif is biased in favour of the government 
party to the contract. The whole idea of developing the concept of administrative contract is to 
balance the interests of private parties with those of the public agency. On the one hand, the 
public agent can modify the contract unilaterally in the public interest. On the other hand, the 
private party is protected from exceptional loss. The theory thus would be the classical doctrine 
which could be extended to the case of foreign investment contracts. 
The substantive basis of the notion of public law contract also exists in other countries 
with a civil law tradition. More specifically, the national law equivalents of the doctrine of rebus sic 
stantibus that justify intervention into negotiated terms of contact in cases of substantial change 
are more strongly supported in cases where contracts are made with a state or a state agency and 
embody not only commercial, but also administrative, state-related elements.                              
On the contrary, common law countries have a single contractual approach meaning that 
there is conceptually no difference between a contract made with a state and a contract made 
between two private parties. The general principle established in American, English and 
Australian judicial practice is that a government is bound to carry out a contract it has lawfully 




and properly entered into. However, there is every reason to suppose that in common law 
jurisdictions a contract made with a public agency has a somewhat different nature which may 
not be reflected in an ordinary contract. 
First, the doctrine of executive necessity in common law countries forbids a government 
from being bound by a contract which fetters statutory executive discretions and powers. In 
addition, in common law contracting with a government became a restricted process as the 
countries are adopting detailed rules regulating government contracts similar to administrative 
contract codes in civil law countries. Finally, in common law countries it is accepted that changed 
circumstances of a contract which were unforeseen at the time of conclusion of the contract can 
excuse non-performance. Again the result is similar to the French theory of l’Imprévision which 
allows parties to an administrative contract to make adjustments in case of a new economic event 
upsetting the financial equilibrium of the contract. 
To sum up the findings of comparative law on the notion of public law contract, it is 
evident that elsewhere state contracts are treated not exactly as ordinary civil law contracts. In 
other words, all legal systems share the basics of the notion of administrative contracts. But the 
theory seems at a different stage of development in each national law.  
CHAPTER TWO: STATE CONTRACTS IN 
THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT SECTOR 
2.1. International Law and State Contracts 
The notion of state or administrative contracts, which is acknowledged in the most 
developed municipal systems, is even more uncertain and controversial when it comes into the 
field of international law. The uncertainties and controversies are partly due to the fact that 
international law never dealt with contractual relationships involving private parties and partly 







of the contracts. The term “a state contract” first was introduced in the international legal system 
only in the latter part of the twentieth century.94 Since then it has received much attention in 
scholarly writing and judicial practice in the context of the theory of internationalisation of state 
contracts. Before this time, international law knew only one type of state contract, which is a 
concession contract. But the traditional concession contracts were a matter of the municipal legal 
system rather than a matter of international law.95 Therefore, there was no a need to develop the 
notion in the context of the “law of nations”. 
2.1.1. THE STATUS OF STATE CONTRACTS IN ARBITRATION OF INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES 
When the legal environment of traditional concessions was changed to a considerable 
degree due to the dissolution of colonialism, international arbitration practice in the 1950s 
developed the theory of internationalisation, and brought disputes arising from a contractual 
relationship between a state and foreign private party under public international law. The new 
type of arbitration mechanism which emerged was a hybrid system combining features of both 
public international law arbitration between states and private international law arbitration 
between private commercial parties.96 Thus, having a mixed character, the investor/state 
                                                 
94 The term “state contracts” is quite new formula, which had appeared in the international legal literature since 1944 
as this term was coined by Mann in his article. See F A Mann, ‘The Law Governing State Contracts’ (1944) 21 
British Year Book of International Law 11. 
95 Hitherto that every contract, which is not an international agreement, is subject to some municipal law is affirmed 
in the Serbian Loans Case (France v Serbia) [1929] PCIJ (ser A) No 20, 41. 
96 Investor-State arbitration differs in material respects from ordinary private international commercial arbitration. 
Mustill and Boyd warned against reliance on generalized authorities to different types of arbitrations:  
 “… when considering a reported case it is necessary always to bear in mind the type of arbitration with which it 
was concerned. Decisions and statements of principle, which were perfectly valid at the time, and remain good law 
today, may nevertheless yield completely false results if applied in a different context. A commodity arbitration on 
quality and a formal reference pursuant to statutory powers are both examples of arbitration, but they are barely 
recognizable as the same process, and attempts to transfer principles from one to the other will inevitably lead to 
error”. Michael Mustill and Stewart Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England (2nd ed, 2001) 54.  




arbitration could have coalesced principles of these two types of arbitration into one single 
structure.  
 Nonetheless, the arbitration developed in the context of theory of internationalisation of 
state contracts predominantly utilised principles of international commercial law, and largely 
undermined assumptions about sovereignty of the host state in regulating its own matters in 
accordance with public international law. Under the arbitration proceedings, a state did not differ 
from a private commercial party and they both were treated as equals in their capacity as parties 
to a private contract. Since the investor/state arbitration originally emerged as a method of 
investment protection,97 rules which favour a foreign investor gained support.  
 On the contrary, rules which may represent a risk to a foreign investor were rejected by 
the opponents of the internationalisation of state contracts. The theory of the public law 
contract thus was the first principle the earlier arbitrators avoided. They claimed that the theory 
of administrative contract is a unique exception rather than a common approach. Prof Dupuy 
stated: 
 “One should take into account the fact that the theory of administrative contracts is 
somewhat typically French: it is consecrated by French law and by certain legal systems 
which have been inspired by French law. But, it is unknown in many other legal systems 
which are as important as the French system and it has not been accepted by 
international law…”98  
In fact, the arbitrator’s statement was not true. Mitchell found “many similarities in the 
treatment of public contracts even under systems of law which have different origins and operate 
in different constitutional surroundings”.99 Also in the BP Arbitration, Lagergren J acknowledged 
                                                 
97 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, ‘The Climate of International Arbitration’ (1991) 8 (2) Journal of International 
Arbitration 50. 
98 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v Libya 53 ILR 309 (1977) (‘Texaco Award’), para 
57.  







the commonality of principles applicable to state contracts in legal systems.100 Thus, the 
deficiencies of some legal systems such as common law in dealing with state contracts ought not 
to mean complete rejection of the notion of state contracts by international arbitrators.  
With the refusal of the theory of administrative contract in investment contracts, other 
principles which may support renegotiation and adjustment of contract also were denied. For 
example, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus which applies in municipal law when changed 
circumstances affect the basis of contracts was not accepted for long in the international 
arbitration of investment disputes. The proponents of the theory of internationalisation have 
argued that in a contract between a state and an alien, the use of the sovereign authority of the 
state, contrary to the expectations of the parties, to abrogate or violate a contract with an alien, is 
a violation of international law. 101 Therefore, the earlier arbitrators insisted on the application of 
the pacta sunt servanda which prohibits altering an international agreement for any reason except 
by mutual consent.102 
In actual practice, however rebus sic stantibus has a same legal value as the doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda. It is not just a principle that is accepted by civil law countries, rather it is a 
universally recognised legal doctrine initially applied in international treaties.103 In common law 
countries, the court-constructed doctrines of ‘frustration, impossibility and impracticability’ have 
similar result to rebus sic stantibus.104  
                                                 
100 See British Petroleum Exploration company v Libya 53 ILR 296 (1977) (‘BP v Libya’), 349.  
101  See Steven Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems (1987) 111. 
102 The strict application of pacta sunt servanda to a state/foreign investor relationship has raised sovereignty-related 
issues. See Waelde and Ndi, above n 2. They discussed the doctrinal debate between the application of pacta sunt 
servanda and the encroachment on national sovereignty over domestic law making in the context of international 
investment commitments. 
103 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Art 62 (entered into force 
27 January 1980).   
104 Saliba, above n 29. 




The perspective of international arbitrations of investment disputes deviated from 
municipal law traditions dealing with state contracts has sown the seeds of legal crisis. After 
more than a half century, there is still disagreement whether international law is supposed to deal 
with the issues of contract law or whether there exists any rule or principle of international law 
that deals with the contracts. The legal environment of foreign investment has been highly 
uncertain, when a stable and transparent legal environment of foreign investment is essential 
factor for economic development of the globalised world. Many attempts to negotiate 
multilateral investment agreements so far have failed.105 
It seems that the uncertainty and confusion that exist in system of international 
investment arbitration would be cleared up if the arbitrators would accept the public law 
considerations of state contracts. In this sense, international law on foreign investment, instead 
of offering pure commercial principles that govern private transactions between individuals, 
ought to take up the legal theories of municipal legal systems reconciling legitimate state interests 
with individual interests such as those that govern public law contracts. Many academics have 
pointed out that international law should recognise public law features present in state 
contracts.106 Besides, the creation of norms of permanent sovereignty over natural recourses has 
contributed greatly towards a more balanced view that recognizes a certain degree of a state 
power in contracts of public importance.107 
 
                                                 
105 See nn 11 and 37 of Part Four and accompanying texts.  
106 Chukwumerije for example argued that state contracts are a component of public interests of the state party; 
therefore, legal rules specially designed for commercial contracts involving private parties cannot be applied to 
state contracts. Further he questioned why a general approach that public interests are more valuable than the 
private needs of single party cannot be transferred in the area of State contracts. Okezie Chukwumerije, Choice of 
Law in International Commercial Arbitration (1994) 146. See also Philippe Kahn, ‘Law Applicable to State Contracts: 
The Contribution of the World Bank Convention’ (1968) 44 Indiana Law Journal 1, 20-23; Muthucumaraswamy 
Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts (1990) 80; A F M Maniruzzaman, 
‘International Development Law as Applicable Law to Economic Development Agreements: A Prognostic View’ 
(2001) 20 Wisconsin International Law Journa1 1, 31. 







2.1.2. MOST COMMON TYPES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONTRACTS 
State contracts in the foreign investment sector can cover a wide range of issues, 
including loan agreements, purchase contracts for supplies or services, or large infrastructure 
projects, such as the construction of highways, ports or dams. The problem of choice of law 
greatly depends upon the particular type of foreign investment contract under discussion. In 
some contracts such as concessions and joint venture agreements, the relevance of domestic 
legislation is greater than international law. By contrast, in technology transfer agreements and 
loan contracts, the application of law other than the host State’s is more relevant. Therefore, it is 
important to look at types of investment contracts and investigate their nature before choosing 
an applicable law.  
Concession agreements 
The most popular form of cooperation between a state and foreign private party has 
been the natural resource exploitation contract, commonly referred to as a “concession 
agreement”. Concession contracts have two major features. First, it is the oldest form of a state-
alien commercial cooperation. A second feature is that this is the area of state contracts, where 
the ideological battle between the North and South bloc countries has reached the hottest point 
of intensity. This may be because in concession contracts a state party is mostly a developing 
state of the Middle East, Latin America, Asia or Africa, which is wealthy in natural resources but 
lacks technology and cash flow, while the other party is a corporate citizen of any of the 
developed nations who needs ready sources of raw materials, and has good technology and 
money as well. 
The concept of concession may be defined differently in legal systems, but the 
concession in its general sense of the word implies a mere permit from the appropriate state 
authority given to a foreign person to conduct economic activity on the state’s territory.  In the 




narrow sense of the word, the concessions can be construed as a unilateral act of a state that 
authorizes foreign private parties to carry on economic activities in the interests of its economic 
development. 
Traditionally, concessions constituted the usual type of contracts in the field of oil 
production industry. Oil concessions in world practice have over a 100-year history.108 The legal 
nature of the concessions did not raise any difficulties until the collapse of colonialism in mid 
1950s, because there was a clear consensus among states that a concession contract is an 
obligation that is regulated by municipal law and is not an international agreement.109 However, 
the internationalisation theory of state contracts “invented” in this period proposed a different 
approach subjecting these contracts to international law. As a result, there has been a 
disagreement over choice of law issues for last sixty years. In the next chapters the origins of the 
debate, as well as the theory itself, will be more fully discussed.110  
From the legal point of view, the traditional concessions seemingly were not an actual 
contract, since these contracts lacked the basis of free agreement. First of all, the relationship 
between the host state, which was usually a colonial country or a less developed state, and the 
concessionaire who were the citizens of the imperial states had an inherently unequal and unfair 
nature.  Zoloeva pointed out the following distinctive features of the old concession contracts:111 
• grant of a permit by the host country to the foreign company for oil production in the 
territory transferred to concession; 
                                                 
108 The first formalised legislative concessions appeared as early as in the XVIII century, particularly, in France. But it 
is generally acknowledged that the first concession in the history was issued to William d’Arcis in Persia in 1901 
(known as “d’Arcis concession”), though in literature one may come across the mention of early concessions in 
the former Dutch West Indies. See Yana Zoloeva, ‘Will the Concession Agreement Become One of the Possible 
Legal Forms to Exploit the Subsoil in Russia?’ (2000) 1 Russian Energy Law Journal 5, 7.  
109 Serbian Loans Case (France v Serbia) [1929] PCIJ (ser A) No 20, 41.   
110 See Ch Three- ‘Evolution of the Theory of Internationalisation as Choice of Law Rule’ and Ch Four-
‘Controversies in the Theory of Internationalisation’.  







• a large territory of concession, covering in certain cases the entire territory of the country 
or, at least, the most promising in terms of oil production; 
• an extended term of concession (up to 99 years); 
• absence of provision to return to state ownership unused and non-promising mineral 
wealth segments before the maturity of the concessions; 
• full and sole control by the concessionaire of all aspects of economic activity; 
• practical estrangement of the host state from participation  in the management of the 
concession; 
• direct financing by the foreign company of all exploration works within the framework 
of concession; 
• Insignificant financial deductions from the concessionaire’s earnings in the favour of the 
host state, which were confined, as a rule, to a symbolic fee for the right to develop 
mineral wealth, in the form of fixed production charge at the maximum rate. 
Because of such unjust terms, under the old concession system, foreign investors were 
rewarded handsomely, while a host government made very little profit. For example, in 1903 a 
British engineer, William Knox D'Arcy was granted a concession by Persia’s Shah (modern Iran). 
By 1933, his company (the Anglo - Persian Oil Company) had made a profit of 200 million 
pounds sterling, whereas Persia had received only some 10 million of the 32 million pounds 
sterling which it was entitled by the concession.112 
The provisions inherent in the traditional concession contracts, which were 
disadvantageous for the host states, have been dramatically changed due to the political changes 
brought by World War Two. Most importantly, the end of colonialism during the mid 20th 
century has significantly contributed to the establishment of equal and just relations among 
different states, regardless of size, wealth, or military power. As a result, modern day concessions 
greatly differ from the traditional ones.  
First, the terms of modern concessions are more balanced compared to the traditional 
ones. In the new concession model, the government provides on a compensated basis a licence 
                                                 
112 See Middle East and Africa Encyclopedia, British-organised Oil Company based on a Concession Agreement with the Shah of 
Persia < http://www.answers.com/topic/anglo-iranian-oil-company > at 26 February 2008. 




to extract useful minerals, and the investor extracts the mineral and owns it and pays the 
government taxes, royalties and other fees in return. Plus, in the modern system, a mining title-
holder is subject to a range of obligations such as reporting, compliance with environmental and 
social regulations, and employment requirements.113 Lastly, the duration of modern concessions 
is relatively short compared to early ones.114  
The ‘modernised’ concession contracts are now widely used in most countries of Africa 
and Latin America and some countries of Asia as well as in developed countries such as the 
USA, Australia, Canada and Norway. However, Norway’s experience is more interesting and 
could provide an example for other countries in the structure of natural resources industry, thus 
it is worth discussing. Before talking about the model, some features of the Norwegian oil 
industry should be noted. First, Norway has a relatively young oil industry, which was first 
discovered in the mid 1960s.115 Learning from previous experience in other oil-rich countries, 
Norway has established a legal framework which could provide long term revenue and benefits 
for the country.116 The regulatory framework for petroleum activities in Norway is conferred by 
the Petroleum Activities Act (1996) and Petroleum Activities Regulations (1977).  
Second, prior to the discovery oil Norway enjoyed comparatively strong economic 
growth, full employment and a current account surplus, and therefore it was in no hurry to 
                                                 
113 Eg, Minerals Law of Mongolia (1997) Ch Four. 
114 Eg, in Tanzania a mining license is granted for 25 years and can be renewed for up to 25 years. See Mining Act 
(1998).  
115 Official Documentation and Information in Norway (ODIN), Norwegian Oil History in Brief (2004) 
<http://www.dep.no/filarkiv/176322/Fact0103.pdf > at 21 December 2006. 
116 The legal framework provides: 
  “…resource management of petroleum resources shall provide revenues for the country and shall  contribute to 
ensuring welfare, employment and an improved environment, as well as strengthening of Norwegian trade and 
industry and industrial development, and at the same time take due regard to regional and local policy 







develop the petroleum resources.117 This comfortable economic situation formed the basis for a 
strong bargaining position in relation to the international industry and enabled the Norwegian 
government to develop a rational, competent petroleum policy and impose obligations other 
than just taxation on the oil companies.118 The Norwegian government also has ensured that the 
high local content is achieved in activities. Currently, Norway has entered into Bilateral 
Investment Treaties with 16 countries, none of which are developed states.119  
The Norwegian model looks like a mixture of a concession and a joint venture 
agreement. The award of the production license is conditional upon the parties concluding a 
Joint Operating Agreement (JOA).120 The JOA is a contract between the Norwegian state and 
the participants in a license, and forms the core regulatory document for petroleum production 
under the license. The JOA regulates: 
• the structure and arrangement of the JOA, including parties, the State appointed 
operator, voting rules, and allocations;121 
• financial arrangements, including how joint assets are arranged, liabilities and 
payments;122 
• actual work activities, especially work programs, budget of the project, rules relating to 
purchasing, and insurance coverage for participants;123 
• field development proposal;124 
• procedure and information relating to sole risk operations;125 
                                                 
117 Oystein Noreng, Norway: Economic Diversification and the Petroleum Industry (2004) Middle East Economic Survey < 
http://www.mees.com/postdarticles/oped/a47n45d01.htm > at 23 December 2006. 
118 Noreng, ibid. 
119 ICSID, Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties < http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet > at 23 
February 2008. 
120 Petroleum Activities Act 1996 (Norway), s 3-3.  
121 Joint Operating Agreement concerning Petroleum Activities: 18th Licensing Round (2005) Arts 1-6. 
122 Joint Operating Agreement concerning Petroleum Activities: 18th Licensing Round (2005) Arts 7-11. 
123 Joint Operating Agreement concerning Petroleum Activities: 18th Licensing Round (2005) Arts 12-15. 
124 Joint Operating Agreement concerning Petroleum Activities: 18th Licensing Round (2005) Arts 16-17.  
125 Joint Operating Agreement concerning Petroleum Activities: 18th Licensing Round (2005) Arts 19-20. 




• the disposal and distribution of petroleum produced, including ownership of 
resources;126 
• issues relating to assignment of participating interest, cessation of operations, especially 
duties and obligations relating to cessation, and abandonment of facilities127. 
The Norwegian law also requires that a management committee must be established to 
manage the petroleum operation, and is the supreme body of the joint venture.128 Each 
participant has one member and one deputy on the management committee, which is chaired by 
the operator or his deputy.129 The voting rules for the management committee are governed by 
the participating interest (percentage) each party has, and decisions are ratified when a certain 
percent of members agree.130 
However, it should be noted that the concession is not only option for the structure of 
exploitation of natural recourses. Apart from the concession model, two other models have been 
commonly used in the field of exploration of minerals, which are the fixed fee agreement and the 
product sharing agreement. Under the fixed fee agreement or service contract model, investors 
are hired for to carry out certain services such as extraction of minerals for a limited period of 
time and for which they receive a fixed fee. In this model, the state is the owner of the extracted 
raw materials. This model has been the case throughout most of the Gulf region since the early 
1970s.131  
                                                 
126 Joint Operating Agreement concerning Petroleum Activities: 18th Licensing Round (2005) Arts 21-22. 
127 Joint Operating Agreement concerning Petroleum Activities: 18th Licensing Round (2005) Arts 24-33.  
128 Joint Operating Agreement concerning Petroleum Activities: 18th Licensing Round (2005) Arts 1-1 and 1-4.  
129 Joint Operating Agreement concerning Petroleum Activities: 18th Licensing Round (2005) Arts 1-2 and 1-3.  
130 Joint Operating Agreement concerning Petroleum Activities: 18th Licensing Round (2005) Art 2.  
131 Greg Muttitt, Crude Designs: The Rip-off Iraq’s Oil Wealth’ (2005) Global Policy Organisation 







Today, in the sphere of exploitation of natural resources product sharing agreements 
(hereinafter PSAs) have received wide applications.132 PSAs are a form of cooperation between 
an investor and a state in the process of the use of the subsoil. In a PSA contract, a host country 
grants a foreign investor the right to explore and develop a specified area for a limited duration 
of time, in exchange for a percentage of the actual oil produced. When oil is produced, the 
foreign investor is allotted enough oil to cover the costs of the project (cost oil), and whatever is 
left is divided between the foreign investor (profit oil) and the host state (government take) 
according to a pre-determined percentage negotiated in the PSA contract.133  
The PSA initially was promoted by developing states that wanted a fair share in their 
mineral development,134 however now has became a preferable option for oil companies and 
their home states. Key attractions of production sharing agreements to private oil companies are 
that relations between the host government and investors are governed by private law principles, 
a “stabilisation clause” may be inserted protecting investors from future adverse legislation, and 
the right of the host government to terminate a PSA is restricted, unlike under the licensing 
regime.135 In other words, the PSA regime treats a state agency and an investor equally.   
However, the contractual system of subsoil use is unlikely to become a full-fledged civil 
law contract, where both the state and investor stand as equal parties. In relations to subsoil use 
arising on the basis of a PSA, the state acts in two roles.136 On the one hand it fulfils its 
                                                 
132 The model is used in more than 40 countries, including Angola, Vietnam, Libya, Egypt, Malaysia, Peru, Syria, the 
Philippines, and Equatorial Guinea as well as in transition countries such as Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.  
Irina Paliashvili, The Concept of Product Sharing (1998) Ukrainian Legal Group 
<http://www.rulg.com/documents/The_Concept_of_Production_Sharing.htm> at 11 July 2006. 
133 See Ernest Smith and John Dzienkowski, ‘A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements’ (1989) 24 
Texas International Law Journal 13, 28. 
134 Product Sharing Agreements (PSAs) as a special form of service contracts were first used in 1967 in Indonesia. 
See Kassan Hossain, Law and Policy in Petroleum Development (1979) 138.  
135 Alexei  Bardin, ‘The View of Foreign Investors on the Subsoil Licensing Regime and Related Risks in Russia’ 
(2003) 1 Russian/CIS Energy and  Mining Law Journal 7.  
136 Paliashvili, above n 132.  




obligations under the agreement, and on the other hand it preserves its state public-legal 
functions.  When these roles converge or come into conflict with each other, one should be 
guided by the principle that, within the scope of conditions provided by the agreement, the state 
and the investor are equal partners; outside such scope the state acts on its authoritative, 
administrative-law basis. 
Joint venture agreements  
The joint venture is another most common and effective means of conducting business 
internationally.137 There are many areas, in which the state is able carry out joint activities with 
foreign legal persons such as the geological research and exploratory work, assembly and 
construction, servicing plant and machinery, and so on. Joint ventures also become common in 
the mineral development sector, like Saudi Aramco in Saudi Arabia and Erdenet mining 
company in Mongolia. Whatever the type of the joint venture activity, the model allows the 
sovereign or its entity to get directly involved in the development of the project.138  
The state participation in the joint business arrangement structurally can take many 
forms and its structure and the form of operation may vary from one country to another 
country.139 In Australia for example, forms of joint ventures can classified as follows:140 
                                                 
137 In a typical joint venture agreement, two or more existing businesses agree to co-operate and combine their 
resources and efforts to further their business goals. It is suitable where the parties wish to come together for a 
specific project for a specific length of time but do not wish to be bound together indefinitely. However, there is 
no precise definition of a joint venture and the term encompasses a variety of modes of co-operation. For a 
discussion on joint ventures see Stephen King, ‘Short of a Merger: the Competitive Effects of Horizontal Joint 
Ventures’ 1998) 6 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 227. 
138 It has been indicated that the state participation is intended to “phase out” the foreign investor and take over in 
the specific economic activity. See H S Zakhariya, ‘State Petroleum Companies’ (1978) 12 Journal of World Trade 
481.  
139 In the Draft of International Financial Reporting Standard issued by International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) joint arrangements are classified into three basic forms- joint operations, joint assets and joint ventures. See 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), ED 9 Joint Arrangements, Draft of International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS) (2007) 12-14. 
140 Peter Doyle, Tony Holland and John Naughton, ‘Project and Infrastructure Financing’ in David Allan et al, 







• Incorporated Joint Ventures - they involve the establishment of a separate legal entity, 
such as a corporation. The constituent documents of the company usually set out the 
entitlement of the parties to seats on boards, voting rights at both board and shareholder 
levels, powers of the board, quorums of meetings of directors and shareholders, rights of 
pre-emption and options over shares and so on. The advantage of this form is that as 
shareholder, a project sponsor is personally not responsible for the activities of the joint 
venture unless it is the holding company of the joint venture or it is aware of the 
insolvency of the joint venture. 
• Partnerships - partnerships have been commonly used for projects in energy, for 
property developments, and for toll road projects. The partners owe fiduciary 
obligations to each other and each of them has no title to specific partnership assets. 
Partnerships are a “pass through” entities for income tax purposes meaning that the 
taxes are assessed at the entity level, but the profits or losses flow through the 
partnership to the partners and they have to pay tax on their share.  
• Unincorporated Joint ventures - this form of a joint venture does not require the 
establishment of a separate company. The joint venture agreement defines the activities 
of the joint venture. The parties hold joint venture assets as tenants in common and deal 
with them only as provided in the agreement. Each sponsor is liable for their 
proportionate share of costs and expenses of the joint venture.  
• Unit Trust - Unit trusts are occasionally used form of collective investment. In the unit 
trust, the beneficial interest in the trust property is divided into units which may be dealt 
with by the owners of those units. The unit holders are not responsible for the activities 
of the trust. The disadvantage of the unit trusts is their taxation is very complex.   
In the business cooperation with a foreign private party, a state may act itself or 
participate through its organs, agencies and even state entities. The legal implications of the state 
party’s presence may vary depending on whether the state is a direct contract partner or if this 
role is assumed by its enterprise. In relations of the first type, a state is a subject of international 
law with all corresponding prerogatives, while in relations a state enterprise is a corporation 
created by the state and usually governed the state’s public law.141 A state enterprise thus possesses 
a separate legal identity that may allow it to independently operate in a commercial plane. But 
                                                 
141 Peter Wolfgang, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements (1986) 28.  




because such state entities are usually the consequences of economic and social policies of the 
host state, it could not be entirely separate from the state. The state can even liquidate the entity 
if changed circumstances require such a course of action.  
Nowadays, the use of state enterprises in the foreign investment sector has become a 
common practice not just in developing countries, but also in the Western world. Particularly, 
Britain and Norway have established state enterprises for North Sea oil exploitation.142 Statoil is 
operator for 24 oil and gas fields in Norwegian continental shelf and accounts for 60% of all 
Norwegian petroleum production.143 Thus, one of the special features of the joint venture 
agreements is that developed states also can be a host state in these contracts.  
Another important feature of joint ventures is that in majority of states, a joint venture is 
regarded as a juridical person of the country where it is established. For instance, Foreign 
Investment Law of Mongolia144 states: 
“A business entity with foreign investment shall become a legal person of Mongolia 
from the date of its registration and shall conduct its operations in accordance with the 
laws of Mongolia.” 
The rule is in conformity with the incorporation theory that is favoured in the world 
practice. Under the theory, an incorporated entity is regarded a legal person of the country, 
where it is formed.145 The rule would exclude a large proportion of foreign investment of 
international protection. In order to avoid this undesirable result, international investment 
arbitrations have resorted to a variety of methods.146  
Furthermore, the host country may impose additional requirements on foreign investors 
establishing a joint venture within the country. In particular, Australia has a long tradition to 
                                                 
142 Ibid. 
143 Statoil, History (2006) < www.statoil.com > at 22 December 2006. 
144 Art 11 (2). 
145 See Barcelona Traction (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3. 







restrict the foreign participation in the national interest sector such as mining and production of 
uranium.147 Under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975, it is compulsory for a foreign 
investor to acquire a substantial shareholding of an Australian corporation unless the total assets 
are below the $50 million threshold established under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers 
Regulations 1989.148  
The basic provisions relating to joint enterprises are usually contained in the relevant law. 
The establishment of a joint venture requires not only the share of a local party in the basic fund 
of the enterprise, but also other obligations such as employment and the meeting of health and 
environmental standards. The entity is also subject to the public policy of the host state regarding 
export and import licenses for equipment and products, taxation, production requirements. At 
the same time, it enjoys equal rights and interests with local enterprises such as the power to 
conclude contracts, acquire property and personal non-property rights, incur liability, and sue 
and be sued in a court of law or arbitration.149  
Other types of state contracts  
The demands of contemporary complex society have led to the vast expansion of the 
state’s functions.  One of the main actions of today’s government is to promote economic and 
social development of the country to provide healthier and happier lives for people.  To deliver 
such fundamental public goods as property rights, roads, and basic health and education, the 
government cooperates with citizens and communities, thereby taking the burden off the state. 
                                                 
147 Until 1979, when the amendment was made to Guidelines for Australian participation in the natural resources 
sectors, a proposed project for the mining and uranium development would only be allowed to proceed if it has a 
75 per cent Australian entity and was Australian controlled. David Flint, Foreign Investment Law in Australia (1985) 
102.  
148 Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975, Art 26. 
149 For example, the Chinese law states:  “The state shall, according to law, protect the lawful rights and interests of 
the contractual joint ventures and of the Chinese and foreign parties. A contractual joint venture must abide by 
Chinese laws and regulations and must not injure the public interests of China. The relevant state authorities shall 
exercise supervision over the contractual joint ventures according to law. Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Venture Law 
(1998) Art 3.  




This has meant that a state enters into the most diverse types of commercial contracts with 
individual citizens.  
In recent years, the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) has become a popular 
method of delivering needed infrastructure or services. It involves the use of the private sector in 
the construction and funding of public infrastructure work. Some countries, like the UK and 
Australia have been implementing PPPs for many years, when many other countries particularly, 
former socialist countries in Central Europe currently began experimenting PPPs in their 
infrastructure projects.150 There are a number of reasons that support the PPP initiative in the 
transition countries, but the key ones include maximising value for money, reducing public debt 
and strengthening infrastructure.151 
Approaches to the regulation of infrastructure and services may vary from one 
jurisdiction to another depending on a sector or a country practice.152 There seems to be three 
levels of regulation for infrastructure projects. In some countries, the law merely refers to the 
need for an infrastructure project agreement, while other countries have extensive mandatory 
provisions that apply for the agreement. An intermediate approach is taken by some jurisdictions 
which list only the issues that should be addressed without regulating in detail the content of the 
agreement.153 
The fact that such projects usually involve a significant number of parties including the 
sponsors, lenders, borrows, insurance companies and host governments and a network of 
various interrelated agreements between them makes the legal nature of these agreements very 
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complex.154 As Dugue observed, multi-party disputes could arise between the multiple parties to 
a single agreement containing a single choice of forum clause or, more problematically, between 
different parties to different multi-party agreements containing different choice of forum 
clauses.155 Also the unique technical nature of those contracts, which depends on whether the 
project is assembly and construction of roads and infrastructure or servicing of plant and 
machinery or public electricity, may require a specific rule rather than a generalised conception. 
Furthermore, the risk is magnified when one considers the public importance of many of these 
projects, because infrastructure projects deliver important public services such as water, 
electricity, telecommunications, or transportation which normally can be politically sensitive.156  
A quite new and advanced sphere of cooperation is technology transfer agreements for 
the use of inventions and other scientific and technical achievements (know-how). Unlike other 
forms of contract, the technology transfer agreements are subject to international treaties rather 
than local laws. Apart from the old convention on industrial property rights,157 many treaties 
adopted by WIPO and WTO have extended the scope of protection accorded to technology 
owners.158 On the contrary, UNCTAD has sought to control the conditions which technology is 
transferred working on the Draft Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology. 159 
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Lastly, international investment also can be made in the form of a loan.  However, when 
the investment takes a form of loan, stipulations as to choice of law of some State other than the 
host State are common. 160 In practice, the law of the State from which a loan issues is commonly 
adopted rather than the law of the borrowing State.161 Conventional conflict rules are still 
applicable to such contracts because “traditional loan contract more closely resembles the 
traditional kind of contract than it does the complex direct investment agreement”.162 
2.2. Changing Characteristics of  Foreign Investment Contracts  
Foreign investment contracts have played a major role in the economic development 
process, especially in developing countries that are dependent upon the exploitation of natural 
resources for their economic welfare. As such, they represent an important tool of development 
policy. Without the use of such contracts significant opportunities for the development of 
strategic national industries may well have been lost. The theory of internationalisation of state 
contracts, however, has attempted to insulate the contracts from the effects of national controls. 
As a result, current rules of international law have done little to address the developmental needs 
of developing states.163 But the rules of international law primarily concerned with the investment 
protection are changing in the light of the evolution of international development law. Attention 
must be paid to these transformations. 
2.2.1. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT  
Foreign investment does not automatically boost economic growth. The role of law is 
unarguable in promoting sustainable economic growth. Studies have shown that the reduced 
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control over the activities of the foreign investment not only reduces the potential benefits of the 
foreign investment but also may bring harm especially to the environment.164 The Bhopal 
disaster in India, in 1984 killing thousands of innocent people, is an indication of how expanding 
foreign investment in developing countries without enforceable international standards for 
corporate social responsibility could have catastrophic consequences. 
In the 1970s, under the pressures especially from developing states and non-
governmental organisations, the UN General Assembly adopted various sets of resolutions 
aimed at the correction of contractual imbalances and the restoration of developing states’ 
capacity to oversee the evolution of the resulting relationship in a manner consistent with 
national development policies. Although the norms of the General Assembly resolutions such as 
the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources,165 the establishment of a new 
economic order,166 economic rights and duties of states167 may not have binding force, they 
arguably have contributed a lot to the evolution of new values and standards reflecting the 
relevance of foreign investment to economic development.  
These new developments also have affected the attitudes of international investment 
arbitrations to the foreign investment contracts. It was first recognised in the Aminoil 
Arbitration168 that evolutions taking place within in foreign economic sector in the light of global 
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events could change the structure of the contract. The tribunal emphasized this new character as 
follows:  
“The concession in its origin a mining concession granted by states whose institutions 
were still incomplete and directed to narrow patrimonial ends became one of the 
essential instruments in the economic and social progress of a national community in the 
full process of development. This transformation, progressively achieved, took place at 
first by means of successive increases in the financial levies going to the state, and then 
through the growing influence of the state in the economic and technical management 
of the undertaking, particularly as to the control of pricing policy, taken over in 1973, 
and the regulation of works and investment programs. The contract of concession thus 
changed its character and became one of those contracts in the regard to which, in most 
legal systems, the state, while bound to respect the contractual equilibrium, enjoys special 
advantages.” 169 
Not surprisingly, it is now well established that the economic impact of benefits of 
foreign investment contracts is one of the decisive criteria that determine whether an activity of a 
foreign citizen could be considered as investment and thus could be afforded investment 
protection under international law. In many recent arbitral awards of ICSID, it was emphasized 
that the project must represent a significant contribution to the host state development to qualify 
as an investment.170 For instance, in one award of the ICSID tribunal, where it discussed the 
matter whether there was a economic contribution to Malaysia’s economic development, the 
tribunal found that “the Contract did not benefit the Malaysian public interest in a material way 
or serve to benefit the Malaysian economy in the sense developed by ICSID jurisprudence, 
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namely that the contributions were significant.”171 Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that it had 
no jurisdiction over this dispute and dismissed the claims made by the claimant.   
Thus, there is evident transformation from earlier types of internationalized concession 
agreements that were biased in investors’ favour to the newer types of agreements balancing the 
needs of economic development of the host state with legitimate commercial expectations of the 
foreign investor. In the light of these new developments, the approaches developed in the 
context of the theory of internationalisation are no longer suitable. In particular, stabilisation 
clauses, choice of external law, and internationalised arbitration clauses began to be seen as 
inconsistent with the aims of host country development policies and with the right to regulate 
major investment projects.  
It is also worth noting that foreign investment agreements have been renamed as 
economic development agreements (hereinafter EDAs), a name that intrinsically reflects the 
understanding that such agreements are designed to promote the economic and social 
development of a host state, thus they should be subject to the host state’s legal rules motivated 
with developmental objective. In other words, foreign investment contracts are not just a mere 
type of state contract made between a state or a state entity and a foreign national or a legal 
person of foreign nationality, rather it must satisfy certain criteria to be accepted as foreign 
investment contract enforceable under international law.  
Definition of Foreign Investment Contract 
In practice, the issue whether the contract concerned qualifies characteristics of foreign 
investment contracts pretty much depends on the scope of definition of investment provided for 
in an international agreement. The investment protection measures provided in the international 
agreements apply only to investors whose investments qualify for coverage under the relevant 
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provisions. As a result, investor/state arbitral tribunals institutional or ad hoc alike  have to 
consider whether there is an investment under the relevant investment agreement before 
accepting jurisdiction.  
But the problem is that no commonly accepted definition of investment exists. Even the 
ICSID Convention172 as being only international instrument which offers permanent institutional 
system of dispute settlement in this field itself did not define the term “investment”. Article 25(1) 
provides that “the jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out 
of an investment between a Contracting State . . . and a national of another Contracting State, 
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.”173 So far, the 
approach adopted in the Convention gives parties to ICSID arbitration wide discretion to 
describe a particular transaction as investment.  
Besides, most modern multilateral and bilateral investment treaties and trade agreements 
tend to define "investment" in the broadest possible terms to achieve the treaties’ purpose of 
regulating all investments, regardless of the form in which they are made or the name by which 
they are called. They usually refer to every kind of assets followed by an indicative but not 
limitative list of covered assets. They even provide a protection for contract-based rights 
attempting to subject the withdrawal of administrative licenses to treaty provisions.  
                                                 
172 An account of these negotiations given by Broches is pertinent:  
 “During the negotiations, several definitions of investment were considered and rejected. It was felt in the end that 
a definition could be dispensed with given the essential requirement of consent by the parties. This indicates that 
the requirement that the dispute must have arisen out of an  ‘investment’ may be merged into the requirement of 
consent to jurisdiction. Presumably, the  parties’ agreement that a dispute is an ‘investment dispute’ will be given 
great weight in any determination of the Center’s jurisdiction, although it would not be controlling.” Aron Broches 
‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Some Observations on Jurisdiction’ (1966) 5 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 261, 268. 
173 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature 18 








Specifically, NAFTA174 defines investment very broadly covering almost all types of 
ownership interests. Investments under the NAFTA include enterprises, equity and debt 
securities, loans, income and profits, real estate or other property, tangible or intangible and 
contracts including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions. It only excludes 
commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services (procurement contracts) as being 
considered investments. The NAFTA approach has been followed in many free trade 
agreements.175 The 1994 Energy Charter Treaty,176 in Article 1(6) (f), defines investment to include 
“any right conferred by law or contract or by virtue of any licenses and permits granted pursuant 
to law to undertake any Economic Activity in the Energy Sector”.  
Thus, it is evident that the modern treaties pursued a broad objective of 
internationalisation of foreign investment contracts going further than earlier bilateral investment 
treaties which adopted a restrictive approach to the investments that enjoyed protection under 
the treaty. Under these earlier bilateral investment treaties, the form and type of investment was 
at the discretion of the host state authorities, and the treaties often affirmed that this was a 
matter left to local law and regulations.177 For instance, Article 9 of the 1972 Belgium/Luxembourg- 
Indonesia BIT notes that the treaty covers only those investments made into Indonesia that have 
been approved pursuant to Indonesia’s Foreign Investment Law or its other relevant laws. 
In ICSID practice, disputes submitted to the arbitration tribunal must qualify for 
coverage not only under the bilateral or multilateral investment treaty, but also must meet 
                                                 
174 North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the 
Government of the United States of America, opened for signature 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 296 (1993), Art 1139  
(entered into force 1 January 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].   
175 See, eg, FTAs recently negotiated between the US and Australia, Singapore and Chile, the Republic of Korea and 
Chile respectively (chapter on investment). 
176 Energy Charter Treaty, opened for signature 17 December 1994, 33 ILM 360 (entered into force 16 April 1998) 
[hereinafter ECT]. 
177 UNDP, Investment Provisions in Free Trade Agreements and Investment Treaties (2005) UNDP Regional Centre in 
Columbia <http://www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications/BIT-completed.pdf > at 24 February 2008. 




characteristics of investment for ICSID Convention purposes. In the tribunal’s view, the term 
investment should be interpreted in light of the Preamble of the ICSID Convention so that the 
contributions result in some form of positive economic development for the host State.178 
In order to determine the correct approach to the meaning of investment, the tribunal in 
Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v Malaysia examined previous seven cases where the notion of 
investment was discussed.179 On the legal analysis of the relevant authorities, the tribunal  
identified the following elements as characteristics of an investment: i) regularity of profits and 
returns; ii) contributions in money, in kind and in industry; iii) the duration of the contract; iv) 
the risks assumed under the contract and v) contribution to the economic development of the 
host State. According to these criteria, a foreign investment contract can be defined as a type of a 
state contract entered into between a public agency and a foreign corporation or private 
individual for execution of a public development project which involves a considerable degree of 
risks and is expected to be performed over a long period of time.  
As the attitudes to foreign investment contracts began to change, they ceased to be mere 
commercial contracts. In this respect, the public law features of these contracts have been 
revived. The motivation for the concluding foreign investment agreements by host states is its 
economic development and welfare of its people. As a general rule, if there is a public interest in 
a given subject and the need for a regulatory perspective on this subject, then it is the subject 
matter of public law. It is not denying that many disputes between governments and foreign 
private parties involve issues such as expropriation, environmental protection, taxation and labor 
rights which traditionally fall in the orbit of public law.   
2.2.2. NEW PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONTRACTS 
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As the characteristics of foreign investment agreements have undergone substantial 
changes over the years, new principles that reflect the fundamental shift are likely to emerge. But 
it should be noted the principles emerging in the foreign investment sector are not new in the 
legal sense. Most of them are known to major domestic legal systems. Indeed, these principles 
have been largely dispensed by investment arbitrations as they were inconsistent with the 
perspectives of internationalising the applicable law. 
Principle 1: Recognition of sovereign control over its economy 
In the context of the theory of internationalisation of state contracts, the advocates of 
the theory have attempted to curtail sovereign legislative powers of the host state to change the 
legal environment of foreign investment. In this regard, various steps have been taken such as 
the inclusion of stabilization clauses into the contract between a state and a foreign investor and 
the elevation of foreign investment contracts to a treaty level.  But none of such efforts has 
succeeded.  
Nonetheless, current practice has moved towards recognising sovereign power to control 
its economy. Several ICSID decisions on expropriation rendered in the early 2000s have shown 
that the right of expropriation of the host state has returned in international law.180 The current 
view is that not every taking or measure does necessarily constitute expropriation. Dealing with a 
case of indirect expropriation, arbitrators thus, have to draw a line between expropriation and a 
valid governmental activity.  
In Feldman v Mexico, for example the tribunal held that: 
“First, the Tribunal is aware that not every business problem experienced by a foreign 
investor is an indirect or creeping expropriation under Article 1110…,  not all 
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government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or impossible for an investor to 
carry out a particular business, change in the law or change in the application of existing 
laws that makes it uneconomical to continue a particular business, is an expropriation 
under Article 1110. Governments, in their exercise of regulatory power, frequently 
change their laws and regulations in response to changing economic circumstances or 
changing political, economic or social considerations. Those changes may well make 
certain activities less profitable or even uneconomic to continue.  “181  
In another case, even though the tribunal found that the measures adopted by Argentina 
resulted in a violation of the rights guaranteed under the Treaty to foreign investments, it held 
that it was necessary for Argentina to enact such measures to maintain public order and protect 
its essential security interests. Thus, the tribunal absolved Argentina from liability for losses 
caused during the period of necessity.182 
Principle 2: Re-negotiability of contract terms in the light of economic changes  
One of the important features of an economic development agreement is its long term 
nature. Especially in the natural resources sector, the duration of the contract term is much 
longer ranging from 20 to 50 years. So, it must be expected that ecological, regulatory, 
commercial and political risks may occur during such a long period of time. Such risks can affect 
the operation of the contract making it impracticable or, from a commercial and financial 
perspective, no longer viable for one party.  
As a result, international contracting practices in investment sector have recognised the 
necessity of some sort of adaptation mechanism to facilitate the smooth functioning of a long-
term business relationship in the event of fundamental change in circumstances. In that change 
of circumstances, renegotiation becomes for both parties a way to maintain the benefits of the 
contractual relationship by adapting the contractual document to new external circumstances. 
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Therefore, it is now not unusual for parties to international investment agreements in the 
petroleum and mineral sector to include general "cooperation" or "review" clauses by which the 
parties promise to review the satisfactory operation of the agreement from time to time. 183 
Indeed, most legal systems recognise the issue of contract renegotiation in a long-term 
commercial contract when, due to an unforeseen drastic change in circumstances the 
continuation of on-going performances under the contract has became extremely onerous to one 
party.184 The legal basis of such action is the principle of rebus sic stantibus. The doctrine, however, 
was denied by international investment arbitral tribunals advocating the internationalist 
approach. In the Aminoil award for instance, even though the tribunal accepted the idea that there 
could be change in the nature of the contract itself, it did not recognise the applicability of the 
doctrine rebus sic stantibus. 185 
However, recent decisions of arbitral tribunals have shown that there are changes to this 
legal framework. What is more important is international arbitral tribunals of investment disputes 
have acknowledged that economic changes which may affect the equilibrium of long-term 
contracts are unavoidable. Particularly, in a recent award, it was noted that “No investor may 
reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is made remain 
totally unchanged.”186 
The renegotiation practice in international petroleum industry thus suggests that the 
principle of change of circumstance should apply to long-term petroleum investment 
agreements. In other words, the private law versions of the general principle of "rebus sic stantibus" 
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such as American commercial impracticability, the English frustration of purpose,  the German Wegfall der 
Geschäftsgrundlage and the French imprévision are to be accepted in international arbitral awards. 
Then, that would raise conflict over the stability and flexibility of a long-term investment 
agreement shaking the principles to which opponents of the theory of internationalisation of 
state contracts so adhere such as sanctity of contracts and stabilisation clauses.  
Principle 3: Duty to invest with adequate knowledge of risk 
Many recent cases of ICSID arbitration accepted that the investor is bound to assess the 
extent of the investment risk before entering the investment and to have realistic expectations as 
to its profitability because of various risks involved in the operation of the contract. In particular, 
in the Telenor Mobile Communications case the tribunal noted: 
“Any investor entering into a concession agreement must be aware that investment 
involves risks and that in some degree the investor's activities are likely to be regulated 
and payments made for which the investor will not receive compensating advantages. 
These are all part of the price the investor has to pay for securing the concession.”187 
In another award, Maffezini v Spain, the tribunal also emphasized that "Bilateral 
Investment Treaties are not an insurance policies against bad business judgments."188 Besides, 
risks assumed under investment contracts are now one of essential characteristics of investment 
under ICSID jurisprudence.189  
The duty to invest with adequate knowledge of risks is consistent with good business 
practice, as it requires the investor to take responsibility for the normal commercial risk 
associated with the investment rather than to seek a source of relief under the applicable 
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investment agreement.190 When drafting their contract thus, parties to a foreign investment 
contract should discuss management of risk as one of the keys to achieve for beneficial outcome 
of the contract. 
Principle 4: Compliance of related regulations of a host state by foreign investors 
One of the specific characteristics of foreign investment contracts is that the government 
party has a powerful opportunity to impose its own conditions and terms of the contract on the 
private party. In general, most countries, developed and developing ones alike have adopted 
codes or laws to establish a regime that provides an extensive and comprehensive regulation of 
investments, on both the substantive and procedural levels.191 Foreign investors entering the host 
state have to meet conditions laid down by these laws, and obey other regulatory measures.  
The legal basis of the principle requiring foreign investors to comply with legal 
requirements lies primarily on the inherent international legal right of the sovereign state to 
control conduct that occurs upon its territory. Such a right of the host state is also supported by 
the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, some BITs as well as Codes of 
Conduct for Transnational Corporations.  Particularly, the 1990 Draft Code, TNCs imposes on 
multinationals broad duties relating to ownership and control, compliance with national 
economic and developmental objectives, restrictive business practices, taxation, and transfer 
pricing.192 On the other hand, the case law also reaffirms the duty of multinationals to accept and 
abide by the laws of the host state. For instance, the final award rendered on 2 August 2006 in 
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the Inceysa Vallisoletana case, the tribunal accepted investments complying with local law as a 
precondition to benefiting from that treaty's protection.193 
Principle 4: Transparency of proceedings involving a state or a state agency 
The recent case law as well as international instruments on the arbitral proceedings 
appears to be developing a principle that the public is allowed to access to arbitral proceedings 
relating to government and public matters.  In Loewen v USA, the tribunal did not accept the 
claimant's position that each party was under a general duty of confidentiality in regard to the 
proceeding. The tribunal held that a general duty of confidentiality in arbitration to which a 
government was a party would be undesirable, as it would prevent a government (or the other 
party) from discussing the case in public "thereby depriving the public of knowledge and 
information concerning government and public affairs."194 Some recent FTAs also provide for 
transparency of proceedings that hearings can be open to the public, and submissions and 
documents exchanged in the arbitration shall be made public, save for particularly protected 
confidential information.195 
2.3. Summary of  Findings 
This chapter has a key role in the overall arguments of this thesis. It sought to establish 
the position of state contracts in the domain of international law by investigating modern trends 
in the internationalisation theory. The chapter recognised that the principles and authorities that 
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support the internationalist approach to state contracts have been weakened in the light of the 
emerging principles. 
Initially, under the theory of internationalisation of state contracts, a foreign investment 
contract concluded between a host state and a foreign national was regarded as nothing more 
than an ordinary commercial contract. Arbitrators dealing with disputes between host states and 
foreign investors thus predominantly utilised commercial law principles that protect private 
rights. Now, the “investor-protectionist” approach of earlier investor/state arbitral tribunals has 
been gradually eroded by other concepts which have emerged in the light of a broader context - 
that is the concern of economic development.  
These new concepts that have received vigorous assertion through a series of resolutions 
of the GA establishing the right of developing states to control their economies have raised 
certain demands on the part of foreign investors, such as to invest for the benefit of the host 
economy and community. Many recent cases of ICSID arbitration reveal the adoption of certain 
new principles and standards that may lead to changes in current approaches or resolve current 
conflicts arising from the theory of internationalization. From the investigation of the recent 
ICSID case-law, five major principles are identified. These are as follows: recognition of 
sovereign control over its economy, re-negotiability of contract terms in the light of economic 
changes, duty to invest with adequate knowledge of risk, compliance of relevant regulations of a 
host state by foreign investors and transparency of proceedings involving a state or a state 
agency.  
On the basis of the discussions, one may say that changes in approaches of international 
investment arbitration are an indication that the arbitrators now moving away from their early 
straightforward framework designed to protect foreign investment in a new direction of the host 
state’s economic development. This shift may result in the acceptance of other principles which 




recognise public law features of state/individual contractual relationship such as the contrat 
administratif of the French law.  
Over four decades ago Friedmann suggested that the French theory could provide “a 
solution that is theoretically proper and practically fair”.196 This may remain valid so far.  
International investment arbitrators recognizing the distinctive nature of foreign investment 
contracts should develop and elaborate a legal atmosphere which can guarantee the equilibrium 
where the needs of economic development of the host state are balanced with the legitimate 
protection of the investor. 
                                                 







P a r t  T h r e e :  A  H I S T O R I C A L  A N D  T H E O R E T I C A L  
O V E R V I E W  O F  C H O I C E  O F  L A W  I S S U E  I N  S T A T E  
C O N T R A C T S  
Any discussion of the history of choice of law in state contracts must start at the 
emergence of the theory of internationalisation in the mid 1950s. Before this time, according to 
the classical doctrine, traditional concession contracts, which are the “ancestors“ of modern 
foreign investment contracts, were always subject to the municipal law of the host state. It is not 
surprising therefore that there was no discussion of choice of law rules in the context of 
concession contracts. 
However, international arbitral tribunals of 1950s broke with the long standing tradition 
by elaborating the theory of internationalisation of state contracts. According to this theory, 
parties to foreign investment contracts are able to choose public international law as the law 
applicable to their contract. That was the beginning of the development of choice of law rules in 
state contracts.  
The application of international law to these agreements faced a number of theoretical 
and practical obstacles which confront such application, while the choice of law rules 
developed in the context of theory of internationalisation violated traditional rules of private 
international law. The objective of this part of the thesis is to discuss the historical and 
theoretical issues concerning the application of international law to investment contracts.  
Beginning with discussions on the historical reasons for choosing an external system as 
the law applicable to concession contracts, Chapter Three examines the validity of foundations of 
the internationalisation theory. It points out that, initially, international law on foreign investment 
had a single objective - to provide protection for investors. It examines the early arbitral cases 
that gave birth to the theory. The next section of Chapter Three analyses the propositions 
advanced by the early arbitral tribunals of investment disputes to reinforce the claim for applying 




a-national rules to investment agreements. It is argued that these propositions were very 
doubtful. Some of them were inconsistent with prevailing juristic theories or not applicable to 
this kind of relationship, while other norms were too weak to be accepted as valid.  
Chapter Four concentrates on controversies surrounding the theory of 
internationalisation while reviewing theoretical and empirical studies. The application of 
international law to state contracts as a methodology for resolving choice of law issues posed 
many serious theoretical controversies that relate to both public and private international law. 
In the first section of this chapter, it is argued that the adoption of this theory was intolerable 
from all angles of customary international law. First, the theory would put foreign companies 
on an equal footing with states, before the question of the international legal status of 
commercial companies had been effectively resolved. Then, legal uncertainty had arisen as to 
how public international law, that had developed no rules in relation to the state-alien 
relationship, except for the principle of diplomatic protection, could regulate a contractual 
relationship. Furthermore, the longstanding concept of legal positivism was also shaken, as the 
arbitral tribunals arguing for this theory had taken up a monist version of the relationship 
between international law and national law. The next section of Chapter Four deals with the 
controversies relating to private international law. It points out that much confusion arose 
because of efforts of the arbitral tribunals to coalesce two branches of law, ie public and 
private law in single context. It also shows that the internationalisation theory had deviated 







CHAPTER THREE: EVOLUTION OF THE 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONALISATION AS 
CHOICE OF LAW RULE 
 3.1. The Historical Background 
The development of choice of law rules in contracts between a State and a foreign 
private party is a relatively recent phenomenon in the history of private international law. At an 
earlier stage, there was a tradition of applying municipal law in case of state/alien relationship.  
However, this tradition came to be abandoned as a tendency developed since the mid-1950s to 
subject the relationship to international legal norms. The causes and purposes of 
internationalising investment contracts may now be examined. 
3.1.1. CALL FOR NEW MECHANISM TO DEAL WITH STATE/INVESTOR DISPUTE 
From the perspective of conventional public international law, the relationship 
between a state and an individual is exclusively a matter of the domestic legal system. Except 
for a few areas, every sovereign state has an absolute discretion to pass its own laws and 
enforce them over all persons within its territorial boundary. On the other hand, the 
traditional notion of private international law that dominated for centuries always looked at 
the state with which the contract has its closest connection.  As a result, the use of such 
notions in early times led to the inescapable conclusion that the proper law of the contract was 
the law of the host state.  
Besides, there was no practical need to develop choice of law techniques in the field of 
foreign investment, since the legal system of a colonial state was dependent upon the policy of an 
imperial state.1 The investors would get trade or other privileges if they so wanted. For instance, 
                                                 
1 Sornarajah stated that the need for an international system on foreign investment was minimal in the colonial 
period. As he observed, within the colonial system the imperial powers and imperial system gave sufficient 
protection for investments flowing from the imperial states, when the use of force by the imperial states ensured 




the British East India Company in India (1600) was pushing for laws of succession which would 
pass the control of a region to the Company if the ruler had no male successor. 2 
The rule that the host state’s law applied to the contract was however changed as a 
number of arbitral awards of the mid-1950s refused the application of municipal law and 
introduced public international law in the resolution of disputes between a state and foreign 
private parties. The primary reason why the theory was created must be linked to the political 
situation of the period immediately following the end of World War Two. 
In 1945, the United Nations (UN) was founded when 50 nations signed the UN Charter, 
which included a statement of its basis in respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.3 Also, the European colonial powers were weakened, and the balance 
of power passed firmly to new powers, the US on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the 
other. These factors, combined with a resurgence of nationalism in the colonial and semi-
colonial territories, led to nationalistic movements towards autonomy and independence.   
As a result of the struggles for national independence, numerous former colonial 
territories throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America were freed from colonial dependence. The 
governments in these newly-independent states began to play a central and pivotal role in their 
national economies intervening and engaging in the economic affairs of the countries. The role 
and magnitude of state intervention and the growth of the public sector in the national 
economies was essential to build strong national economies and to provide social services such 
as banking and insurance, communications and public transport.  
                                                                                                                                                    
such protection outside the colonial territories. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign 
Investment (2nd ed, 2004) 19-20.  
2  Anoushiravan Khoshkish, ‘International Law on Investment: An Overview’ (1983) 1 World Policy Journal 1.  








More specifically, the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa, the world’s 
major oil exporting countries, began to promulgate a set of ‘socialist laws’. This was aimed at 
increasing the role of the public sector in order to, first, facilitate the planning for and 
implementation of government policies and, secondly, to promote and accelerate economic 
development of these countries.4 The enforcement of new legislation and policies led to 
extensive nationalisation of private enterprises in these countries greatly affecting concession 
rights of foreigners and leading in some cases to expropriation of their property.  
Iran was the first country to nationalise its oil reserves. In 1951, a democratically elected 
parliament of Iran led by Mohammed Mossadegh nationalised the British owned Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company (AIOC). The text of the law nationalising the Oil Industry of Iran read as follows: 
“For the Happiness and Prosperity of the Iranian Nation and for purpose of securing 
world peace, it is hereby resolved that the oil industry throughout all parts of the 
country, without exception, be nationalised; that is to say, all operations of exploration, 
extraction and exploitation shall be carried out by the Government.”5 
The Iranian nationalisation had a colonial character. It was usual for newly-independent 
countries, especially those ones which had chosen the path of socialist development to carry out 
economic nationalisations without paying fair compensation.6 The nationalisations were justified 
on the grounds that colonists earned their property through illegal means, so the properties 
                                                 
4 Following Egypt that embarked on a programme of social reform on the basis of "Arab Socialism" which was 
introduced and put forward by the "National Charter" of 1962 after a series of nationalizations since mid 50s, Syria 
and Iraq enforced many socialist laws to ensure the involvement of the state in developing the national economies 
by virtue of its economic activities in the public sector. The ideology of Arab socialism entailed the engagement of 
the state in the economic affairs in pursuance of the interests of all. For more see Ahmed Jiyad, ‘The Social 
Balance Sheet of Privatization in the Arab Countries’ in M'hammed Sabour and Knut  Vikør (eds), Ethnic Encounter 
and Culture Change (1997) 179.  
5 Passed by the Majlis on March 15, 1951, and by the Senate on March 20, 1951. Source of Text: Iranian Embassy in 
Washington, DC, Some Documents on the Nationalisation of the Oil Industry in Iran (n.d. [1951] 2 in Alan Ford, 
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952: A Study of the Role of Law in the Relations of States (1954) 268.    
6 The first nationalisation was carried on by the young Soviet State in 1917-20 of the land, banks, industrial and trade 
enterprises. Then, other countries which had put on the path of the construction of socialism used nationalization 
as means of creating state ownership. See M M Boguslavskii, Private International Law: the Soviet Approach (1988) 122.  




should be returned to the colonial people.7 Meanwhile, the General Assembly (GA) of the UN 
also pursued policies supporting the struggles for economic independence.8 From these points of 
view, the Iranian nationalisation was a way to establish Iran’s sovereignty and ownership of the 
country's oil industry and resources, end British exploitation in Iran, and mobilize oil resources 
for the country's future development.  
The Iranian oil traditionally was a focus of ‘Great Power rivalry’ as Dr Ford described.9 
Therefore, the act of nationalisation of the Iranian oil not just caused a dispute between the 
Iranian government and the AIOC. But it led to political disagreements involving both the UK 
and the US. The Northern states carried on a desperate struggle against the act of Iranian 
nationalization. After several failed negotiations with the Iranian government, the USA and 
Britain organised a joint Anglo-American secret operation and overthrew the democratically 
elected government with the Shah’s dictatorship in 1953. The oil rights were granted in 1954 to a 
new consortium of Britain and US companies including the AIOC.10  
Although the Iranian nationalisation did not work, Mossadegh’s action subsequently 
served as a model for the nationalisations of oil industries in Northern and Sub-Saharan African 
countries such as Egypt (1956), Algeria (1967), Libya (190), Nigerian (1970) and Gabon (1974).11 
In 1960 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was founded by Saudi 
                                                 
7 See n 4 of Introduction Part of this Thesis.  
8  Eg, the GA Resolution adopted just after one year later declares that: “… the right of peoples to freely use and 
exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their sovereignty and is in accordance with the Purposes 
and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations”. Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources, GA Res 
626 (VII), UN GAOR, 7th sess, UN Doc A/Res/626(VII) (1952).  
9 Ford, above n 5, 3.  
10 History of Iran Oil Nationalization (2008) Iran Chamber Society 
<http://www.iranchamber.com/history/oil_nationalization/oil_nationalization.php > at 23 March 2008. 
11 SEMP INC, What is Rentier State? (2005) Suburban Emergency Management Project 







Arabia, Venezuela, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran. After OPEC’s founding, oil nationalisations followed 
in the Gulf countries one by one.12  
The impact of the nationalisation movements was a devastating blow to the Western 
economies which were major consumers of oil as well as to the profitability of oil companies.13 
On the other hand, the legal status of foreign investment became highly unstable and uncertain. 
Under traditional public international law, regulation of nationalisation was the exclusive domain 
of the state conducting nationalisation. The International Court of Justice ruled that it had no 
jurisdiction to consider a claim of the UK concerning the nationalisation of the AIOC by the 
Iranian government because it was nothing more than a concessionary contract between a 
government and a foreign corporation.14  
The AIOC also brought the dispute before an English court. Although the court 
acknowledged that “a British court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the right to ownership 
or possession of foreign immovables”, it ruled that expropriation without compensation is 
contrary to international law, so the cargo of oil must be returned to the AIOC.15 But Iran did 
not accept the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds of its sovereign independence.  
Therefore, there was a need to establish a new law-based method to deal with investment 
disputes between a state and a national or nationals of other states.16 Oil companies, whose 
original concessions were changed by the new laws, rejected the laws and demanded that the 
                                                 
12 However, other Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraqi, and Quiet did not immediately nationalise their oil 
reserves; rather they took on dominant role in their oil industries by increasing government revenues and reducing 
the role of foreign companies to contractors. See Sean Finnegan, Middle Eastern Oil: An Historical Perspective and 
Outlook (2003) Mercurial Times http://www.megaone.com/mercurial/mt030525sf1.htm> at 23 January 2008; 
Amy Jaffe, Iraq’s Oil Sector: Past, Present and Future, the James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University 
(2007). 
13 See Finnegan, above n 12. 
14 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co Case (UK v Iran) [1952] ICJ Rep 93, 24.  
15Anglo-Iranian Oil Co Ltd v Jaffrate (the Rose Mary) [1953] 1 WLR 246, paras 259 and 260.  
16 Sornarajah wrote that the establishment of the United States and the prohibition of aggressive war by its Charter 
made the use of military pressure no longer feasible. Sornarajah, above n 1, 405.  




dispute be arbitrated.17 As a result, the practice has developed of arbitration between states and 
private individuals. Before this time, there were only two types of arbitration: domestic 
arbitration between private parties and international arbitration between states. The first 
institutional state-investor arbitration was established in 1965 by the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.18 
The new type of arbitration granted to private individuals and corporations a right to 
bring a claim against national governments with whom they were doing business before 
international arbitration.  On the one hand, it was a very critical approach owing to the fact that 
in the 1950-mid 1960s non-state actors had no standing in international law. Traditionally, only 
states had international legal personality which enables them to appear before international 
courts. On the other hand, it was one of the most significant achievements in terms of protecting 
human rights under international law.  
In fact, the primary objective and focus of the theory of internationalisation to protect 
foreign investment and foreign investors and accord them better treatment went too far. It 
erected rigid systems for the protection of foreign investment and was considered to be ignorant 
of the vital economic development issues of the host state and social matters of foreign 
investment. The earlier arbitrators tried to enforce highly unequal agreements of colonial past 
without taking into account their unjust nature for the people of newly-independent countries.19 
                                                 
17 See further discussions in the next subsection- The Development of the Theory of Internationalisation.  
18 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature 18 
March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
19 The typical example of colonial concessions is the concession granted to the AIOC by Iran in 1933.  Under the 
contract, the British government was earning much more than the Iranian government was. Documents submitted 
to by Iranian government to the International Court of Justice provide that:  
 “According to 1948 balance sheets of the former Oil company, (a balance sheet which is not audited and verified 
by the Iranian Government), it has made a profit of f62 million, and has also paid f28 million as income tax to the 
British government. Whereas the taxes paid to the Iranian government in the same year have amounted only to 
f1,400,000 or 21 times less that the f28 million which had been paid to the British government.”  See Anglo-Iranian 







The theory of internationalisation elaborated by them has been criticized as being greatly affected 
by political and economic as well as ideological considerations of western policy. As Mohammed 
noted, “It can be said that arbitral awards in many of the oil dispute cases were made in such a 
way as to satisfy the interests of a particular community and the laws are manipulated to suit their 
need, especially in the choice of law clauses”.20 Similarly, Sornarajah wrote: “The story of 
evolution of the theory [internationalisation] illustrates how ‘highly qualified publicists’ entrusted 
with the ‘sacred trust’ of furthering international law could also pervert it to serve the interests of 
private power.”21 
The next subsection shows the early stages of the internationalisation of state 
contracts. The series of arbitrations involved in the creation of the theory may be briefly 
examined. 
3.1.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONALISATION 
Studies showed that the theory of internationalisation is firmly rooted in three arbitral 
awards on petroleum concession agreements made in mid 1950s between the Middle Eastern 
States and the western major oil companies. Though each of the three arbitrations- Abu Dhabi, 
Qatar and Aramco cases22 cited the dictum that the law applicable to the concession agreements is 
the law of the host state, the arbitrators refused the application of the domestic law, which would 
have otherwise applied as the applicable law for two reasons.  
First, the lack of relevant rules in the legal systems of developing states served as a 
justification for the application of general principles of law rather than the law of the host state.23 
                                                 
20 Khalid Mohammed Al-Jumah, ‘Arab State Contract Disputes: Lessons from Past‘(2002) 17 Arab Law Quarterly 
215, 227.  
21 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Settlement of Investment Disputes (2000) 224. 
22 Petroleum Development Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi 18 ILR 144 (1951) (‘Abu Dhabi’); Ruler of Qatar v International Marine 
Oil Company 20 ILR 534 (1953) (‘Qatar Arbitration’); Saudi Arabia v Arabian Oil Co 27 ILR 117 (1958) (‘Aramco Case’). 
23 However, nowadays the remarks on nonexistence of relevant rules in Islamic law have been disputed by Middle-
East writers. For example, Mohammed Al-Jumah criticized the arbitrators in the oil cases because they did not 




In the Abu Dhabi and Qatar cases, arbitrators rejected the law of Abu Dhabi and Qatar on   the 
ground that these national laws were not sophisticated enough to deal such with complex 
transactions. Particularly, in the Abu Dhabi dispute, Lord Asquith acknowledged, 
“If any municipal legal system was applicable, it would be prima facie be that of Abu 
Dhabi. But the arbitrators then rejected the law of Abu Dhabi arguing, “No such law 
could reasonably be said to exist…it is fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive 
region, there is any settled body of legal principles applicable to the construction of 
modern commercial instruments…”.24 
Another reason for rejecting the domestic law and applying general principles of law to 
concession agreements was based on the belief of the arbitrators that a concession contract in 
these terms could not been intended by the private parties. In the Aramco case, after hearing the 
foreign company’s argument that the company was unaware of the incompetence of Islamic law 
at the time of making the concession contract, the arbitrator came to the conclusion, that even 
though the Muslim law had been agreed by the parties, the dispute should be settled according to 
law, which a reasonable man would purport to apply.25  
It should be noted that the first three arbitrations that supported the idea of 
supranational rules did not really mean that public international law should be the law applicable 
to concession contracts. Rather they suggested that it would be fair if the concession 
arrangements were settled “according to the principles of justice, equity and good governance”.26 
                                                                                                                                                    
exhaust all possibilities for closing the lacunae within the law and made the conclusion without evidence of experts 
with deep understanding of local laws. Mohammed Al-Jumah, above n 20, 220.  
24 18 ILR 144 (1951). 
25 The tribunal justified its decision stating that : 
“Matters pertaining to private law are, in principle, governed by the law of Saudi Arabia but with one 
important reservation. That law must, in case of need, be interpreted or supplemented by the general 
principles of law, by the custom and practice in the oil business and by notions of pure jurisprudence, in 
particular whenever certain private rights –which must inevitably be recognised to the concessionaire if the 
concession is not to be deprived of its substance-would not be secured in unquestionable manner by the 
law in force in Saudi Arabia.” Aramco Case 27 ILR 117(1958). 







Since general principles of law have been regarded as one of the sources of international law,27 
the reference made in the cases to general principles of law enabled later arbitrators and 
commentators to build on the conviction that public international law is competent to deal with 
contractual problems.  
The next case that promoted the idea of excluding the application of the host state’s law 
is the Sapphire Arbitration.28 In this case the justification for subjecting disputes between a State 
and foreign private party to supranational systems of law was the exercise of sovereign power 
that could change the course of the contract or even terminate it by adopting new regulations.29 
To place the contract beyond the reach of the sovereign power, in the Sapphire Arbitration it was 
held that:  
“…such agreements … should be settled according to the general principles universally 
recognized and should not be subject to the particular rules of national laws,… and 
which are always subject to changes by this state and are often unknown or badly known 
to one of the contracting parties.30 
Another justification for subjecting the contract to international law was the assumption 
that foreign investment is beneficial for the development of developing states. Here, Gavin J, the 
arbitrator observed that economic development agreements should be internationalised to 
provide the guarantees of protection for foreign investors because“… these companies undergo 
very considerable risks in bringing financial and technical aid in the process of development”.31 
Thus, the case made a proposition that, no matter how adequate the host state’s law may be to 
                                                 
27 Lord McNair first extended in his article the idea that state contracts should be governed by “the general principles 
of law recognised by civilised nations” taking the formula from Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. Lord McNair, ‘The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations’ (1957) 33 British 
Year Book of International Law  1-19.  
28 Sapphire International Petroleum td v National Iranian Oil Company 35 ILR (1963) 136 (‘Sapphire Arbitration’). 
29 It was argued that the application of the local law of the host state should be denied where the State exercises its 
sovereignty to change ’the local law as to end its obligations under the contract’. See Robert Jennings, ‘State 
Contracts in International Law ‘(1961) 37 British Year Book of International Law 156, 157. 
30 35 ILR 136 (1963).  
31 Sapphire Arbitration 35 ILR 136, 175 (1963). 




deal with the problem, the foreign investment contract by nature, is subject to general principles 
of law.32  
The ideas reflected in the Sapphire Arbitration were carried further in later arbitral awards 
and provided a support for the theory of internationalisation. The three arbitral awards made in 
connection with the Libyan nationalisation of oil concessions- Texaco, BP and Liamco33 agreed 
that foreign investment agreements should be settled according to rules and principles of public 
international law, even though Libyan law was “the principal proper law of the contract” in all 
three concessions.34 The awards thus went further than others. While in the previous awards 
such as Aramco, Qatar and Abu Dhabi, the general principles were applied as distinct from 
international law, in the Texaco Case the general principles of law were applied as part and parcel 
of the international law.35  
Apart from the arbitral decisions, the notions of internationalisation also were supported 
by an impressive body of legal writing. Most scholars from Europe and America were seeking to 
construct new rules and theories that subjected foreign investment contracts to a legal order 
other than to a host state’s domestic law.36 Their views however, were difficult to reconcile 
among themselves.37 Some opponents of the internationalisation suggested transnational law or 
lex mercatoria as the governing law of disputes between a state and a foreign investor, when some 
                                                 
32 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts (1990) 20.  
33 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v Libya 53 ILR 309 (1977) (‘Texaco Award’); British 
Petroleum Exploration company v Libya 53 ILR 296 (1977) (‘BP v Libya’); Libyan American Oil Company v Libya 20 ILR 1 
(1981) (‘Liamco’). 
34 For detail on the choice of law clause in the Libyan nationalisation cases, see Ch Four, Subsection 4.2.2 (Changing 
the Tradition of The Party Autonomy Principle).  
35 Mohammed Al-Jumah, above n 20, 225.  
36 See, eg, Lord McNair, above n 27; F A Mann, ‘The Proper Law of Contract Concluded by International Persons’ 
(1959) 35 British Year Book of International Law 34; Richard Lillich, The Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for 
Injuries to Aliens (1979) 224; F A Mann, ‘The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and 
Municipal Law’ (1979) 48 British Year Book of International Law 1; Steven Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three 
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of them supported the construction of a new branch of public international law. Others even 
considered that a foreign investment contract is a self-governing system which does not belong 
to any legal system. Later, the views have become a subject of much criticism by another group 
of scholars, not only from developing states.38  
3.1.3. THE ICSID AND THE CHOICE OF LAW  
The next step in the evolution of the choice of law principles in the area of foreign 
investment contracts was the adoption of the ICSID Convention on March 18, 1965 by the World 
Bank (former International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). Unlike numerous 
multilateral treaties in the field of international trade and commerce which aim to achieve 
uniformity in the application of the law, the Convention alone did not tried to adopt uniform 
substantive rules. Instead, it welcomed the use of traditional private international law principles 
to contracts between a state and a foreign investor. 
Article 42 of the Convention provides the hierarchy of applicable laws, in sequence of 
importance: 
(a)             Law chosen by the parties; 
(b)             In the absence of a choice of law  
(i) Law of the Contracting State party to dispute; 
(ii) Law of some other state as a result of contracting state’s 
conflict of laws; 
(iii) Rules of international law. 
                                                 
38 See Horacio Naón, ‘Arbitration in Latin America: Overcoming Traditional Hostility’ (1989) 5 Arbitration 
International  137; Sornarajah, above n 32; Okezie Chukwumerije, Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration 
(1994); A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist versus Dualist 
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Therefore, it is clear that the Convention primarily accepts the subjective theory of choice 
of law based on the principle of party autonomy or the will of the parties.39 It has been observed 
that the Convention provides parties with a broad discretion as to the identification of the law 
governing their relationship.40 By authorizing parties to agree on the “rules of law” applicable to 
their contract, the Convention intends to make clear that the choice of parties is not limited to one 
or more national laws or legal system but may refer to, for example, “more fluid concepts like 
those general principles of civilized nations as something distinct from international law, or 
transnational law or the new law merchant”.41 Also, the term “rules of law” is believed to be 
permissive that the parties are not restricted to choosing a national law or part of it at all.42 
Though the drafters of Convention adhered to the principle of party autonomy, one 
doubts whether this principle that primarily has been effectively used in the field of purely 
commercial contracts is also suited for the field of international investment contracts that involve 
the public interest. Not surprisingly, investor/state arbitral tribunals often do not apply the party 
autonomy rule the way it used to be. Moreover, as a matter of fact, both parties to a state 
contract still may face barriers to enforcing a contractual choice of law. These issues will be 
discussed in greater detail in other chapters of the thesis.43 
The next principal method of determining the applicable law of foreign investment 
contracts is the national law approach. As the Art 42 (1) of the Convention further states, the law 
                                                 
39 The first sentence of Art 42 (1) of the ICSID Convention expressly states: “the tribunal shall decide dispute in accordance 
with such rules of law as may be agreed to by the parties”.  
40 See Ibrahim Shihata and Antonio Parra, ‘Applicable Substantive Law in Disputes between States and Private 
Parties: The Case of Arbitration under the ICSID Convention’ in Albert Van Den Berg (ed), Planning Efficient 
Arbitration Proceedings: The Law Applicable in International Arbitration (1994) 294, 298.  
41 Arshad Masood, ‘Law Applicable in Arbitration of Investment Disputes under the World Bank Convention’ 
(1973) 15 Journal of Indian Law Institute 311, 317. The relevant passage is set out in full at n 117 of Part Four.  
42 Aron Broches, ‘Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
of 1965: Explanatory Notes and Survey of its Application’ (1993) XVIII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 627. 
43 See Ch Four, Section 4.2. (Controversies Related to Private International Law), Ch Eight, Section 8.1 (The Rule of 







to be applied by the ICSID tribunal to the substance of the dispute (in the absence of parties’ 
choice of law) is “…the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on 
the conflict of laws)…” Indeed, the role of national laws in resolving disputes between a state 
and its private partner is essential. National law was the natural choice for such contractors even 
before the enactment of ICSID, and it remains so until the present. According to a survey made 
in the 60-70s, more than half of 80 economic development agreements were made subject to the 
law of the host state.44 The significance of ICSID in this regard is that it did not try to undermine 
the role of the law of the host state as the previous arbitral tribunals had done. 
At the same time, the Convention also proposed simultaneously the application of 
international rules. But the proposition has been debated. It served the claims of opponents of 
internationalisation that public international law is relevant in relationships between a state and 
a foreign individual, and applicable in the same way that national law is. In simple terms, the 
creators of the theory further had twisted the meaning of the article and claimed that 
international law is always relevant regardless of chosen law. But this view is objectionable and 
seems contrary to the spirit of ICSID Convention. The supporters of internationalisation have 
failed to acknowledge that the Convention does not undermine the significance of national 
law: conversely it put it in the first place. As the World Bank’s General Counsel, Aron 
Broches, assured the legal committee for the drafting of the Convention, the law of the host 
state would be of primary importance in deciding investment disputes and international law 
might in the first place refer to national law itself.45Also, as one writer observed, the wording 
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Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention 1 (English), Washington DC 1968 at 800-1. 




of Article 42 does not reflect a preference for any of the laws when there is any inconsistency 
between the two bodies of law.46  
Finally, although the ICSID Convention principally concerns procedural matters for 
settling investment disputes, it has given some guidance on the applicable law issue. What is 
important is by ratifying the practices previously followed by arbitrators, the convention has 
given these practices a degree of certainty which they lacked until then.47   
3.2. Doctrinal Foundations of  the Theory of  Internationalisation 
The practical need to prevent deliberate evasion of the law of the state which would have 
jurisdiction has led to the development of a number of arguments in favour of the application of 
international law. Because of the doubtful foundations on which the notion of 
internationalisation rested, there was a need for other mechanisms which could reinforce it. This 
mechanism was built by further efforts of supporters of the theory of internationalisation 
through their arbitral awards and writings.  
3.2.1. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CONCESSIONS: CONTRACT OR TREATY? 
The basic argument that supports the relevance of international law to concessions was 
the idea proposed by the opponents of the theory of internationalisation that concessions have a 
peculiar nature so that they cannot be considered as mere commercial contracts. Supporting the 
idea of applying international law to concession contracts, the opponents of the theory however, 
had viewed this from different angles.  
The main argument for subjecting concessions to international law came from the 
assumption that concessions are akin to a treaty. In positivist international law, an agreement 
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between the state and a foreign private party was regarded as a contract which was subject to the 
state’s law, and international law did not have a role to play in the agreement.48 Thus, the only 
way to subject concession contracts to international law was the equation of these contracts to 
international treaties.49  
As Kissam and Leach claimed in their work written mid 20th century50, contracts between 
a State and foreign private parties should be regarded as equivalent to treaties between two States 
because they are governed by international law. As they observed, “in both cases promises with 
an international scope are made; in both cases reliance is placed on those promises; in both cases 
the obligation to perform those promises should be the same.” Such a claim however was ill-
founded automatically putting the parties on the equal footing, when the parties have different 
legal status in the international legal order.   
With respect, it is now strongly believed by academics and judges that the analogous 
application of treaty rules to investment agreements is not acceptable.51 For example, Sornarajah 
rejected the firm proposition that the agreements amount to treaties by admitting that: 
“The assimilation of foreign investment agreements to treaties is a non-starter as the law 
on treaties was never developed in contemplation of its application to foreign 
investment agreements. The argument that the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties could be applied to foreign investment agreements is too fanciful to have any 
                                                 
48 “…any contract which is not a contract between states in their capacity as subjects of international law is based on 
the municipal law of some country.” Serbian Loans Case (France v Serbia) [1929] PCIJ (ser A) No 20, 41; See also 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case (UK v Iran) [1952] ICJ Rep 93, where the Court held that the concession agreement 
was not “a treaty or convention” and refused to assume jurisdiction over a claim of the government of England in 
relation to the Iranian nationalisation.  
49 Maniruzzaman noted that such assimilation intended to oblige a State party in foreign investment contracts by 
international obligations arising out of treaty law. A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘International Development Law as 
Applicable Law to Economic Development Agreements: A Prognostic View’ (2001) 20 Wisconsin International Law 
Journa1 1, 5. 
50 Leo Kissam and Edmond Leach, ‘Sovereign Expropriation of Property and Abrogation of Concession Contracts’ 
(1959) 28 Fordham Law Review 177, 207.  
51 For scholarly writings that support this view, see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th ed, 1990) 550; 
Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991) 309. For judicial support for the view, see Anglo-
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merit, as the Convention was not made by the parties to apply to anything other than 
agreements between States. It is unnecessary to clutch at such straws if the argument 
that has made any inherent strength.”52 
Meanwhile, the view that a foreign investment contract is not a treaty is fully consistent 
with the rules on the definition of treaties laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.53 According to the description of a treaty contained in the Vienna Conventions,54 one of the 
essential characteristics of a treaty is that it has to be concluded by states or international 
organisations with treaty-making power. But concession contracts do not qualify as having such 
a character.  
Another theory that intended to exclude the laws of the host state was Verdross’ theory 
of contract without law (also known as a concept of quasi-international agreements). This is 
based on the conviction that the concessions need not to refer to a specific legal system, but 
rather it is subject to a new juridical order, ie the agreed lex contractus.55 Verdross and his 
supporters have maintained that agreements concluded between a state and a private party are 
‘quasi international agreements” meaning that they are neither governed by the municipal law of 
                                                 
52 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, ‘Power and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration’ (1997) 14 Journal of 
International Arbitration 119. 
53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 
January 1980). Art 2 of the Convention provides:   
 “a treaty is an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by  international 
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation".  
54 The 1986 Vienna Convention extends the definition of treaties to include international agreements involving 
international organizations as parties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organisations or between International Organizations, opened for signature 21 March 1986, Art 2 (not yet in force).  
55 Prof Verdross, the leading advocate of this theory of quasi international contracts wrote:  
“The contract, created by a quasi international agreement, is an independent legal order, regulating the relation 
between the parties exclusively. Naturally, the lex contractus may refer, for its interpretation or the filling up of 
eventual gaps, to the legal order of the contracting state, or of the other party, or to international law. But 
these legal orders can only be applied in as much as they are delegated by the lex contractus, because it is the 
mutual rights and duties of the parties.” See  Alfred Verdross, ‘The Status of Foreign Private Interests 
Stemming from Economic Development Agreements with Arbitration Clauses’ in Selected Readings on Protection 







a State nor by public international law.  However, the theory has being criticized as leading to 
lawless contract, and it could not have been accepted widely confronting serious opposition.56   
The third theory that supported the relevance of international law to concessions is a 
theory which was known as “doctrine of the New Law Merchant” or the lex mercatoria of the 
1960s.57 The new theory emerged subjecting legal relations concerned with international 
commercial law to the extensive body of rules which includes national laws, general conditions 
elaborated by practitioners, and also bilateral and multilateral treaties, arbitration precedents, etc. 
Although the ideas of the theory were slightly different from each other, the basic point of 
departure was that foreign investment contracts are subject to a new legal order primarily 
consisting of general principles of law, custom and treaty rules. The doctrine resembles to a 
degree to the conception of transnational law termed by Phillip Jessup in his celebrated work, 
Transnational Law. As he wrote in here; 
“I shall use, instead of "international law," the term "transnational law" to include all law 
which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and 
private international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such 
standard categories.”58 
Thus, many supporters of the theory of internationalisation proposed the formulation of 
such a new body of law, even though there was no general consensus among them as to what 
this law is named and what it should contain. Prof Dupuy in the Texaco Award gave no clue what 
the nature and content of the new branch of international law could be, simply labeling it ‘the 
international law of contracts”.59 Dr Mann, one of the leading advocates of the theory of 
                                                 
56 Mann criticised the theory of quasi international contracts that such an idea is ‘doctrinally so unattractive, so 
impractical, so subversive of public international law, so dangerous from the point of view of legal policy.... It 
hardly requires emphasis that every legal relationship in general and every contract in particular must be governed 
by a system of law and is otherwise ‘unthinkable’.” Mann, above n 36, 49.  
57 Kahn, above n 47, 18.  
58 Phillip Jessup, Transnational Law (1956) 3.  
59 Texaco Award  53 ILR 389 (1977), para 32.  




internationalisation, on the other hand, believed that a new body of law that applies to the 
relationship between states and private parties was in the course of formation referring to it as 
‘the commercial laws of nations’. According to him, the further development and consolidation 
of commercial law of nations would come about through a most comprehensive investigation 
and analysis of various legal systems, in particular the private law doctrines which provide the 
principal source of the emerging rules.60 
Such a hybrid system of law was artificial and unrealistic partly due to its mysterious 
character and partly due to its invalidity as a governing legal rule.61 Despite this, in the arbitration 
cases of the 1950s and 1960s it was extensively referred to such general principles of law equity, 
amiable composition, good faith, trade practices and international economic law, composed 
essentially of treaty rules.62 The idea of a new branch of law may be solid evidence that, from the 
outset, the arbitrators knew that international law itself could not be the law of contract. In other 
words, those who embraced the theory of the new law merchant did not intend the application 
of public international law in the traditional sense, but rather suggested a new body of law 
something similar to lex mercatoria in international trade.             
3.2.3. INCLUSION OF CONTRACT CLAUSES  
One of the efforts to internationalise the contract was the inclusion of certain types of 
clauses in foreign investment contracts such as stabilisation clauses, arbitration clauses, and 
choice of law clauses to indicate that the contract was subject to an external regime and not 
solely to the laws of the host State. To examine the strength of the theory of internationalisation, 
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principles, most of which are too broad and too general to be applied as governing legal standard. Michael Mustill, 
‘The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty Years’ (1988) 4 Arbitration International 2. 
62 It was concluded in the Abu Dhabi, Aramco and Sapphire arbitrations that investment disputes should be settled 
according to commercial law of nations. See Abu Dhabi 18 ILR (1951); Aramco Case 27 ILR (1958); Sapphire 







it is necessary to consider the validity and effects of such clauses that justify the relevance of 
public international law. 
Stabilisation clause 
Stabilisation clauses first emerged in arbitration practice as arbitral awards of the late 
1970s confirmed the validity of the clauses without considering the question of their validity 
under relevant theories.63 In general, there are three possible ways of stabilising the contract.64 
Firstly, the state law can be frozen precluding the application of any further changes of 
subsequent legislation that would otherwise apply to the contract. Examples of this kind of strict 
clause are usually found in traditional concession agreements. For instance, a stabilisation clause 
contained in a Concession Agreement of 1933 between the State of Iran and Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company reads as follows: 
“Concession shall not be annulled by the Government and the terms therein contained 
shall not be altered either by general or special legislation in the future or by 
administrative measures or any other acts whatever of the executive authorities.”65 
According to the second method, obligations under the contract can be altered only by 
the mutual agreement of the parties. The concession agreement discussed in the Texaco 
Arbitration contained a clause which reads as follows,  
“Government of Libya will take all steps necessary to ensure that the company enjoys all 
the rights conferred by the concession. The contractual rights expressly created by this 
concession shall not be altered except by the mutual consent of the parties”.66  
Lastly, any subsequent legislation is inoperative if it is inconsistent with contractual 
provisions or has a material adverse effect on it. A modern stabilisation clause, which is designed 
                                                 
63 The following is a list of earlier cases where a stabilisation clause is found. Lena Goldfields v USSR, 5 Annual Digest 
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AGIP Co v Popular Republic of Congo 21 ILM 726 (1982); American Independent Oil Company v Kuwait Independent Oil 
Company v Kuwait  21 ILM 976 (1982) (‘Aminoil Award’). 
64 See Chukwumerije, above n 38, 144. 
65 Art 21, Agreement between the Imperial Government of Persia and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited Made at Tehran 
on 29 April 1933 available at < http://peymanmeli.org/oil2.asp > at 22 January 2008.  
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for a product-sharing, participation, or service agreement fits into this category. An example of 
the clause was cited by Prof Anderson and it provides as follows:  
“After the effective date of this agreement, if there is a change in the domestic law that 
results in a material adverse impact on the economic value derived from operations by 
the contractor, the state (NOC) will ensure that the contractor will derive the same 
economic benefits as it would have derived if the change in law had not been affected.”67   
Thus, the role of a stabilisation clause in the investment contract is to prevent the state 
party from changing its own law to the detriment of a foreign investor and breaching the 
contract obligations on the ground of the change. In other words, the clause is intended to freeze 
the host state’s law at the time of entry of the foreign investor and to ensure that only the 
freezing law controls the foreign investment. 
However, the legal foundations of the stabilisation clauses are very suspect and the 
legality of the clauses has been amply discussed by international lawyers.68 First of all, it is 
theoretically unconvincing to bind a state legislature by a mere contractual provision.69 It has 
been pointed out that the stabilisation clause attacks the asserted sovereign right of the host state 
to legislate according to changing social and economical frameworks.  
Second, due to the complexity and long term nature of investment contracts, this type of 
contracts naturally requires flexibility but not stability.70 In this sense, stabilisation clauses are 
                                                 
67 Owen Anderson, Risk: Emphasising Political Risk, CEPMLP Course Materials, Contracts Used in International Oil 
Industry Development, Slides p18-19 CEPMLP June 2003. 
68 See Enid Campbell, Legal Problems involved in Government Participation in Resource Projects (1984); Esa Paasivirta, 
‘Internationalisation and Stabilisation of Contracts versus State Sovereignty’ (1989) 60 British Year Book of 
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sovereignty over natural resources. See Eduardo Arechaga, ‘Application of Rules of State Responsibility to the 
Internationalization of Foreign-Owned Property’ in Kamal Hossain (ed), Legal Aspects of the New International 
Economic Order (1980) 230. 
69 It is very likely that domestic courts would not enforce the stabilisation clauses because the idea of freezing the 
host state’s law is unacceptable under legal concepts embedded firmly in many domestic legal systems. One of the 
strongest principles is the English doctrine of executive necessity which forbids a government to fetter its 
executive action by a contract. For a discussion of this principle see Ch One, Subsection 1.1.2 (Comparative law 
on Public Law Contracts), (ii) State Contracts in Common Law Countries.   
70 In recent years there has been an increasing trend toward including renegotiation clauses in development 







incompatible with a host country’s changing needs of development. Even the international 
arbitrations themselves have recognised the impossibility of controlling the future of national 
economy by stabilisation promises. Particularly, in the Aminoil Award, the tribunal while stating 
that “no doubt contractual limitations on the State’s right to nationalise are juridically possible, 
but what that would involve would be a particularly serious undertaking…”,71 it hold that it 
cannot interpret the stabilisation clauses of the concession contract “as absolutely forbidding 
nationalisation…”72  
Besides, there is a trend towards recognising the impact of changed circumstances on 
contractual undertakings. As a study shows, renegotiating and adapting long-term commercial 
contracts in case of unforeseen and unregulated external events has become widespread 
practice over the last 30 years.73 As a result, stabilization clauses which were included in earlier 
types of concession agreements have been replaced by newer types of provisions that allow for 
the regular review of long-term investment contracts.74 Furthermore, there are no general 
comprehensive rules at both the international and national levels which can give the 
stabilisation clause a legal power. Some countries do provide stabilisation promises to attract 
foreign investment.75 But when specific legal problems arise from the attempt to stabilise 
investment conditions, it is hard to uphold the clause.  
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Particularly, the ruling of the Comalco Case76 provides an excellent example of how 
promises made by a state no matter how they are clearly drafted can turn into an unenforceable 
agreement at the exact moment. In the Australian case, the plaintiff entered into an agreement 
with the Premier of Queensland for the exploitation of mineral deposits in Queensland. The 
agreement had provisions which read as follows:77 
“Upon the making of the Agreement the provisions thereof shall have the force of 
law… The agreement may be varied pursuant to agreement between the Minister for the 
time being administering this act and the Company with the approval of the Governor in 
Council by Order in Council and no provision of the agreement shall be varied nor the 
powers and rights of the Company under the Agreement be derogated from except in 
such manner. 
Then, the Queensland Parliament enacted the Mining Royalties Act 1974 under which the 
royalties payable by the plaintiff under the 1957 Agreement were increased. In considering two 
inconsistent provisions found in two Acts of Parliament, the majority judges concluded that an 
entrenchment provision relates only to the executive power to amend or vary the agreement, and 
not to the legislative power so to do.78 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Queensland held that 
the Mining Royalties Act 1974 (Qld) could validly alter the royalty provisions of the agreement 
between Commonwealth Aluminum Corporation limited and the Premier of Queensland. 
In Mongolia, the Foreign Investment Law (1993) permits the concluding of stability 
agreements by foreign investors.79 But it is hard to implement such a critical provision of law in 
actual practice. For instance, the negotiations on a stability agreement between the Mongolian 
Government and Ivanhoe Mines, a Canadian mining company have faced with strong public 
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protests.80 Mongolian civil society groups accused the government in putting the interests of 
people of Mongolia in a disadvantaged position by concluding an unfair agreement with foreign 
investors.81 
Even when the stabilisation agreement is reached, this might cause other problems such 
as an issue of inequality. As a matter of constitutional theory, everyone must be equally subject to 
law. Thus, the discriminatory favours granted by stabilisation clauses to foreign investors are 
likely to arouse political criticism from domestic entrepreneurs against the government 
negotiators.82  It also should be noted that because foreign investment contracts are not treaties, 
they are usually concluded by state officials, who are not in a high position and do not represent 
the State.83  The conclusion of contracts signed by officials of the state who lack legislative 
authority may lead to the unenforceability of the contract.  
Given the evidence, it can be inferred that stabilisation guarantees are suspect and 
unreliable even in cases where states themselves promise not to alter their legislation. As one 
commentator observed,  
“The clause may not serve as anything more than a comforter to the foreign investor 
who just believes that his partner, a foreign state, would keep its promise not to apply its 
future law to the contract”.84 
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82 Thomas Waelde and George N’Di, ‘Stabilising International Investment Commitments: International Law versus 
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84 Sornarajah, above n 1, 408. 




Choice of law clause 
The second clause, which seeks to exclude the application of the municipal law in 
investment agreements, is the choice of law clause.  As Higgins stated, 
“…the best way to avoid sole reliance on domestic law is one has to say, by having a 
governing law clause that introduces international law.”85 
The inclusion of a choice of law clause into foreign investment contracts has caused 
less trouble than the inclusion of stabilisation clauses. The clause derives its validity from the 
world-wide recognised principle, party autonomy, which permits parties to choose their legal 
system of preference to govern the contractual relationship.  From the perspective of private 
international law, such a choice of law by parties must be respected and enforced.  
However, there are several insuperable objections to the use of the clause in foreign 
investment contracts. Primarily, the traditions of applying the choice of law rules have been 
violated in two cases. First, the opponents of the theory of internationalisation have transferred 
the choice of law rules which used to apply only to matters in the domain of private law into 
matters of public law such as taxation and expropriation issues.  
As a general rule, public law cannot be excluded by agreements of the parties.  Thus the 
choice of law clause is only valid if the matter of a dispute raised between parties concerns the 
application of private law. Otherwise, the choice of law clause has no effect on matters 
exclusively in the domain of public law. As far as foreign investment contracts are concerned, 
only issues concerning the form and the term of contract, performance of obligations, and 
contractual rights can be subject to the rules and principles of contract law, including choice of 
                                                 







law techniques. But issues such as expropriation, nationalisation, taxation, labour regulation and 
environment protection are subject to public law. 86   
 Secondly, the theory suggests that international law superimposes parties’ choice. This 
is something peculiar to the traditional rules of private international law that upheld the will of 
the parties to a contract in a contractual situation. Obviously, there is no doubt that mandatory 
rule of international law which is independent of any conflict rules will be superimposed on 
the parties’ choice. But in the context of the theory of internationalisation, it has been stated 
that international law is relevant as the whole system, and not only mandatory rules. This is 
one of the greatest controversies of the theory and this will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
Arbitration clause 
Another clause intended to subject the investment contract to an external regime is the 
arbitration clause as the sole means of dispute mechanism.  By using such a clause, the parties to 
the contract agree to arbitrate any future disputes. In other words, the insertion of the clause in 
the contract guarantees foreign investors the exclusion of the jurisdiction of domestic courts of 
the state party.  
Like the choice of law clause, the arbitration clause is widely used in contemporary 
commercial practice. With the expanding international economic activity and globalisation, the 
use of the arbitration mechanism of dispute settlement has been increased. The voluntary 
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nature of the arbitration process provides parties with the opportunity to make the process 
very flexible and adaptable without much interference from public bodies.87  
 But, despite its growing role and success in international commercial operations, 
arbitration has had little success in the settlement of commercial disputes which involve a 
state. The reasons are due to a number of practical reasons as well as theoretical constrains. 
First, the arbitration mechanism in the field of state/foreign private party disputes is a recent 
phenomenon compare to the international commercial arbitration practices that for several 
hundred years have proven to be an efficient, capable and practical alternative to compulsory 
dispute settlement by the State. 
Then, many developing states were suspicious about the arbitration methods of settling 
investment disputes until the adoption of ICSID arbitration.88As Sornarajah noted, 
”since international arbitration had its genesis in the framework of international law rules 
on investor protection, it is regarded as tainted with the same faults of prejudice and 
partiality”.89 
Furthermore, because of its voluntary nature and private character, arbitration has been 
seen as an unsuitable mechanism for commercial disputes which have a public interest element. 
As Lazar claimed, arbitral tribunals are not designed to be forums for balancing competing 
social, economic, environmental and political concerns.”90 In its common sense, arbitration is a 
private system resolving disputes without laws or juries.91 
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88 Jan Paulsson wrote: “The historical distrust of international arbitration on the part of developing countries arose 
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Apart from the above defects of arbitration in this field, there are also some issues that 
reduce the effectiveness of arbitration clauses in state contracts. In the first instance, even though 
now there is an increasing assurance that the state has no sovereign immunity over the other 
party of the contract in governmental transactions of a commercial nature such as the sale or 
leasing of real property, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity has not been recognised 
universally.92 According to the principle “par in parem non habet imperium” rejecting the subjecting 
of one State to the jurisdiction of another State, only public international law tribunals have the 
capacity to question the actions of states towards their violations of international obligations.  
On the other hand, it should be realised that disputes arising from commercial 
transactions with a state often involve matters of public law. Under most national legal systems, 
public law disputes are not arbitrable. Thus, if the source of the dispute is classified as regulatory, 
the arbitration method of the dispute may not be is possible.93 For instance, under the Brazilian 
Law on Arbitration which applies to both national and international arbitration, questions 
connected to antitrust and unfair competitions, as well as environmental regulations, where the 
public interest is involved, are not arbitrable.94  
Finally, the role of the arbitration clause as a strategy of excluding domestic legislation 
can be reduced by the mere fact that the choice of arbitration itself does not affect the choice of 
substantive law. When the arbitration clause is included in a contract, only the procedural rules of 
                                                                                                                                                    
undemocratic opportunity to challenge restrictions and regulations which they [corporations] believe hinder their 
ability to do business.” Lydia Lazar, ‘NAFTA: Structural Damage to the Ship of State?’ in Henry Perritt (ed), 2001 
Employment Law Update (2001) 169.  Also see Sornarajah above n 32, 164.  
91 According to some arbitration rules, arbitrators do not have to be lawyers. For example, there is no requirement 
under the ICC Rules of Arbitration that the co-arbitrators, the chairman of an arbitral tribunal or a sole arbitrator 
be a lawyer. See ICC Rules of Arbitration in force as from 1 January 1998.  
92 Georges Delaume, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’ (1987) 3 (1) Arbitration International 45. 
93 However, in a few countries there has been a tension in favouring arbitration of certain public law-related disputes. 
For example, in the United States courts have authorised arbitration of securities related claims and claims brought 
under competition legislation. See Mahmood Bagheri, International Contracts and National Economic Regulation (2000) 
Ch VI. 
94 Brazilian Law No 9.307of 23 September 1996, ANNEX I. 




arbitration apply. The clause cannot guarantee the application of international law, so 
international arbitrators still may apply local law.95 Particularly, the World Bank’s Convention 
permits an ICSID tribunal to apply in the absence of a choice of law by parties the law of the 
host state. 
3.2.3. UTILISATION OF LEGAL DOCTRINES 
The next effort to make public international law relevant to state contracts rested on 
transference of the notions of other areas of law such as party autonomy, pacta sunt servanda and 
acquired rights, to foreign investment contracts The problems of applying the principle of party 
autonomy to state contracts will be separately discussed in the last chapter of the thesis. Two 
other doctrines, on which the theory of internationalisation rested heavily, now have to be 
examined. 
Pacta sunt servanda 
This doctrine is used to provide the foundation of the binding force of treaties in 
international law and of contracts in private law. In other words, it is a principle of both treaty 
law and contract law that obliges parties to keep their promises. In its most common sense, it 
refers to private contracts, stressing that contract promises are law between the parties, and 
implies that the non-fulfilment of those promises is a breach of the law.  
Now, pacta sunt servanda is widely accepted as a basic legal principle in international 
instruments. The Article 26 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states, "every treaty in force 
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Also, norms that 
impose legally binding obligations of international commercial contracts are found in 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 2004.  
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The early arbitral awards of 1950s and 60s supporting the theory of internationalisation 
had relied on pacta sunt servanda to bind the state party absolutely to a concession contract by the 
promises made in the contract no matter what changes occurred after signing the contract.96 
Particularly, in the Texaco Award, the arbitrator held that: 
“…the recognition by international law of the right to nationalise is not sufficient 
ground to empower a state to disregard its commitments, because the same law also 
requires the power of a state to commit itself internationally, especially by accepting the 
inclusion of stabilisation clauses in a contract entered into with a foreign private party.”97 
The case suggested that the state was unable to remake contracts they made.  Thus, the 
opponents of the theory of internationalisation tried to show that the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda was an inflexible doctrine which did not admit any exceptions.98 In fact, one must accept 
that pacta sunt servanda is not an absolute principle. The principle of rebus sic stantibus is universally 
considered as a dangerous exception to the principle of pacta sunt servanda it.99 Both contract law 
and treaty law recognise rebus sic stantibus.100 
The competing doctrine makes treaty or contract binding only in situations where the 
original conditions under which the treaty or contract was made. But the early arbitral tribunals 
had ignored the principle which has the same validity and acceptance as pacta sunt servanda in 
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international practice. In state contracts, the risk of changing circumstances is naturally higher 
than that in those ordinary contracts, so it is likely, particularly in sectors vital to national 
economy, for any philosophy maximising the chance to change to be accepted.  
On the other hand, the acceptance of the early arbitrations that pacta sunt servanda is a 
general principle of law was based on insufficient analysis of the function of contracts in various 
legal systems. It should be noted that in some legal traditions there are still different attitudes to 
fidelity of contracts. For example, in the Japanese tradition, the surrounding circumstances are 
important for harmonious continuance of contractual relationship.101  
 Besides, the impact of “soft” or “social” values such as human rights profiles on global 
commerce and trade has had a negative effect on pacta sunt servanda policies.102 Thus, in recent 
years there is a trend in international contract law to move away from “a contractual model 
which is static and ‘complete’ at the time of conclusion and thus unalterable towards a 
contractual understanding which is dynamic and therefore unavoidably accepts the interference 
by the parties or the third parties that they have authorised”.103  
Acquired rights 
Another principle that is used to advance the theory of internationalisation is the 
principle of acquired rights. This is one of the most equivocal concepts of Western law. The early 
international arbitrations of investment disputes had attributed significance to this, in order to 
                                                 
101 See Takeyoshi Kawashima, ‘The Legal Conscience of Contract in Japan’ (1974) 7 Law in Japan 1.  
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International Procurement’ in Sue Arrowsmith and Arwel Davies (eds), Public Procurement: Global Revolution (1998) 
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debar any initiative that might reduce the rights or advantages of investors.104 However, one must 
note that the concept of acquired rights is not a universal principle and its meaning and content 
vary in its historical context. Like all human freedom and rights in municipal legal systems, the 
degree of inviolability of acquired rights is dependent upon the legal order that promotes or 
excludes it. The logical problems of accepting the doctrine may be even greater than those 
relating to the acceptance of the principle of pacta sunt servanda partly because it is not widely 
accepted as pacta sunt servanda and partly because it is a mere contractual principle. 
The suitability of both principles of pacta sunt servanda and acquired rights in the context 
of state contracts has been debated by many scholars.105 Maniruzzaman, who studied the 
different scholarly views regarding the matter, commented,  
“…whatever weight was once attributed to the principles [pacta sunt servanda and acquired 
rights] as the protective shields for foreign investors’ interests in the host state seems to 
have waned to some extent in the face of the well-recognised ‘fundamental principle of 
contemporary international law’, i.e. the principle of permanent sovereignty of states 
over natural resources.”106  
3.3. Summary of  Findings  
In the foregoing discussion the origin and the development of the theory of 
internationalisation that supports the applicability of international law to concession contracts 
has been examined. The purpose and nature of creating the theory of internationalisation were 
reasonable to bring concessions under supranational regulation and to thereby protect foreign 
investment from the mass nationalisation process that took place in newly-independent states 
just after the colonial period. The theory thus grew up and took shape under the conditions of 
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nationalisation, when takings of foreign property had reached an extreme point, when foreign 
investment needed protection.   
The earlier international arbitral tribunals had seen international law as a device 
through which foreign investment protection could be ensured. For them, the exclusion of the 
application of national laws had become an immediate practical solution. Therefore, 
internationalisation represented a radical point of departure from classical theories that were 
accepted in the past according to which, concession agreements were normally governed by 
the law of the State party to the contract. 
In a trilogy of cases in the mid 1950s international arbitral tribunals reversed the long 
standing tradition of applying the host state’s law to concession agreements and held that 
concessions were subject to general principles of law. Rejecting customary international rules and 
state practices in this area, the arbitrators had continuously insisted on the subjection of foreign 
investment contracts to lex mercatoria or general principles of law, which existence is doubtful. It 
is evident from the decisions that the early arbitral awards did not mean that the international law 
would be applied as a law of contract. It was the policy implications that were reflected in the 
Sapphire Arbitration and later carried to the Libyan nationalisation of oil concessions- Texaco, BP 
and Liamco that pushed the idea that public international law is applicable to state contracts.  
However, there was no fundamental theory or theories that directly contribute to the 
idea that international law should govern state contracts. So, the opponents of the theory had 
resorted to various rules and techniques borrowing them from other fields of law in order to 
make the application of international law to state contracts acceptable. Yet, the utilisation of legal 
doctrines and principles of other fields of law had caused more disagreements among legal 







Firstly, in order to lift concession agreements from the orbit of national legal systems, the 
early arbitral tribunals had pushed through their awards the idea that concession contracts were 
either treaties or special arrangements that were subject to some supranational regulation. The 
opponents of the theory had offered different arguments in support of the correctness of the 
notion. The assimilation of concession contracts to treaties, the concept quasi-international 
contracts and ‘new law merchant” were all the reflection of the efforts of the arbitral tribunals to 
internationalise concessions. 
In fact, none of the arguments had won acceptance by both scholars and arbitrators.  
The indications are that old concession contracts as well as their modern ancestors are not 
treaties, but a species of commercial contracts with a peculiar nature. Such a peculiarity has given 
it a special character that might justify the relevance of international law or some kind of a new 
legal order but never can entirely exclude the relevance of the host state’s law.  
Then, certain contractual clauses were brought to justify the relevance of international 
law. Choice of law clauses were utilised to make reference to international law as the law 
applicable, stabilisation clauses were included to freeze the law applicable and arbitration clauses 
were intended to bring a state party to a neutral tribunal outside its territory. Hence the inclusion 
of all these clauses in state contracts has, proven to be an ineffective method of externalising the 
agreement. This is partly because of lack of legal foundations to contest their validity except a 
prejudice of some arbitrators and partly because of their unsuitability in state contracts. There is 
greater danger that the clauses can be held unenforceable. 
Furthermore, several other rules also extracted as general principles of law and were 
transferred into the area of law on foreign investment to support international protection of 
foreign investment. Among them are the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda which is said to bind 
absolutely a state by its promises made in contract and the doctrine of acquired rights which 




ensures protection of property rights vested in foreign party as a result of contracts it was 
entered with a state. The application of these principles to state contracts has faced however, a 
number of problems opposing such application.  As one scholar observed:  
“A blind insistence on the application of pacta sunt servanda to such transnational 
[concession] contracts betrays a lack of a sophisticated appreciation of the nature and 
origin of such transactions, the inherent instability in such long-term arrangements and 
the formidable difficulties posed by their administration”.107 
Given this evidence, it can be seen that the theory of internationalisation is an artificial 
doctrine deliberately intended to create a new regime that protects foreign investors and their 
property as response to the mass nationalisations made by newly independent states in 1950s and 
1960s. It would be time to recognise this fact and redevelop legal rules and principles that 
maintain a fair contractual balance considering the framework of new rules and principles 
applicable in the arena of development. Importantly, it is advisable that the public features of 
foreign investment agreements that had been ignored by the international arbitrators are 
accepted.  
The repetitious arbitral practices and their confirmation by the international instrument 
could not settle many controversies in the theory of internationalisation. Despite the claims of 
internationalists for the application of international law to the concerning agreements, there has 
been a number of theoretical and practical obstacles which confront such application.108 These 
obstacles and contradictions further have weakened the strength of the theory of 
internationalisation, and they should be investigated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONTROVERSIES IN 
THE THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONALISATION  
4.1. Controversies Related to Public International Law 
The theory of internationalisation of state contracts has raised a great deal controversy 
as it attempted to regulate contracts between states and private persons by public international 
law. Most scholars have considered this to be impossible because of the nature of international 
law. Especially for positive international lawyers, such an application was doomed to be a 
daunting and frustrating exercise. As one scholar put it, 
“An attempt at applying international law to private relations would be tantamount to 
seeking to apply the matrimonial laws of France or England to relations between cats 
and dogs”.109  
 The arguments opposing the application of public international law must to be discussed.   
4.1.1. THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF 
MULTINATIONALS  
The first greatest theoretical argument confronted the application of international law 
to state contracts was the traditional positivist notion which holds that only States are subjects 
of international law. Until the late 1950s this view was the dominant one. As Kahn states, 
public international law is designed to govern relations between States and, if necessary, 
between States and international organisations, not to govern juridical relations involving 
private persons.110 
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However, one of the changes in international law that has been raised in the second half 
of the twentieth century dealt primarily with the status of individuals in international law. 
International protection of certain minorities111 and human rights has led to the granting of 
limited legal capacity to groups and individuals. Then, the adoption of fundamental human rights 
by the UN Charter 1945 made a great contribution towards the development of humanitarian 
international law which allowed capacity to individuals to claim respect for rights granted to 
them against their own governments before international commissions or tribunals. 
In the field of international relations, international non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) formed by individuals and associations have played a major role in seeking basic rights 
for people and improving their conditions. Because of the undeniable influence of international 
NGOs in world affairs scholars begun to speak about the limited legal capacity of NGOs in the 
international arena where previously only states were granted a full legal capacity. However, the 
legal status of NGOs under international law is granted on the legal basis just in 1991, when the 
European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental 
Organizations112 came into force.  
Today, the number of internationally operated NGOs has reached six thousand.113 These 
organisations – which often are referred as to “non-state actors” suggesting their legal capacity - 
have become the most effective voices for the concerns of ordinary people in the international 
policy arena. Apart from traditional human rights concerns, modern NGOs address a number of 
other social, economic and political activities of communities and the country as a whole such as 
promotion of economic development, improvement of health care and prevention of 
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environmental degradation. The most well-known organisations are Oxfam, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, CARE, Doctors without Borders, Amnesty International and 
Greenpeace. 
Indeed, the fact that private individuals either themselves or through the creation of 
associations or some voluntary organisations like NGOs can bring their concerns on the 
international level has served the foundations of the theory of limited legal personality of 
international law. Under the theory, some members of international society may be given a 
certain standing and certain recognised capacities, but their standing or capacities are restricted 
only within that field of international activity where they are a subject of legal rights and 
obligations. For example, insurgents claiming for independent status of their country can be 
granted a legal personality in the field of international human rights law. 
In this sense, the procedural capacity of a private partner or corporation to bring its 
dispute before an international tribunal has become a decisive factor for the recognition of legal 
personality of investors in the area of international investments. Lauterpacht, who first radically 
opposed the idea of the early positivists, commented that there is no principle in international 
law, which ‘prevents States, if they so wish, from securing to individuals …access to international 
courts and tribunals’.114 Also, one of the main representatives of the theory, Kelsen, stated 
‘individuals can have international rights only if there is an international court before which they 
can appear as plaintiffs’.115  
Therefore, international investment arbitration tribunals set up by a multilateral 
agreement, such as the ICSID tribunal, consecrate the capacity for direct action of investors 
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against host states. This capacity for action was further increased as many international 
investment protection treaties started to contain similar provisions confirming the capacity of 
individuals for bringing the state before an arbitration panel. Under these circumstances, 
hardly any contemporary international lawyer would deny the international legal personality of 
transnational corporations in the international arena.116 
However, as far as the legal capacity of foreign investors under international law is 
concerned, one must note that there still exists some uncertainty and ambiguity. First, it is 
doubtful whether one could go as far as to accept the international legal personality of 
individual private investors. In domestic jurisdictions, companies are regarded as a juridical 
person that is distinct from its shareholding members and has a legal capacity to manage its 
own affairs. The shareholders are usually not able to pursue legal rights owned by the 
company. International practice departed from the general rule of distinguishing between the 
corporation and its shareholders. More specifically, in the ELSI case shareholders were 
afforded protection as to the rights of control, management, use and dispose of their property, 
that is, of their local subsidiary.117 
Besides, the question of legal personality of multinationals or foreign investors may 
attract some criticism. In a technical sense, the legal status describes a position of a particular 
actor having both rights and obligations in the legal system. Today, multinational companies 
enjoy extensive international rights and protection because of the adoption of the theory of 
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internationalisation. But as regards duties, there have been not many obligations prescribed on 
the activities of multinationals,118 despite the fact that environmental, labour and human rights 
abuses have been committed by, or through the complicity of foreign investment enterprises 
operating in the developing world. 119 Thus, it would be illogical to argue for multinationals’ 
international legal personality if they do not accept correlative duties on the international 
plane. 
4.1.2. THE RELEVANCE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PRIVATE CONTRACT   
The next theoretical difficulty of applying international law to investment agreements has 
been the absence of any legal ties between a private contract and public international law. From 
the positivist standpoint, public international law does not govern contractual relationships and it 
purports only to control relations between States or between States and intergovernmental 
organisations. This view is best observed by the words of Judge Jessup,  
“Since the cases [before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals established under the peace treaties 
at the end of World War I] …were not international in the sense of being state v state, 
public international law, or what the Permanent Court called true international law, was 
not considered generally applicable except for the purpose of interpreting treaties. The 
Tribunals, therefore, while resorting in some cases to private international law and to 
national laws, frequently fell back on general principles of law and equity.”120 
On the other hand, to be legally enforceable, every contract has to belong to a certain 
legal order which provides security and legal recognition to it. The idea that every contract has to 
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be founded in some legal order is a traditional one. The best expression of the idea may be found 
in Lord Diplock’s following statements: 
“[C]ontracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum. They are mere pieces of paper 
devoid of all legal effect unless they were made by reference to some system of private 
law which the obligations assumed by the parties to the contract by their use of 
particular forms of words and prescribe the remedies enforceable in a court of justice for 
failure to perform any of those obligations.”121 
 That legal system ensures mechanisms to rebuild the lost rights of one party, when the 
other party fails to perform the obligations under the contract. At a national level, municipal law 
guarantees parties to make their agreement a valid, binding and enforceable obligation through 
sanctions established by the law concerned. But international law lacks such sanctions that could 
enforce contractual arrangements made between a State and a foreign party.122 There are a few 
sanctions in international law such as reprisal and retorsion which apply only in the case of 
international responsibility of a State as an act perpetrated by one nation upon another.123 This 
means that international law is not the legal order or system from which the binding nature of 
the contract stems.  
Leaving the theoretical aspects aside for a moment, it is as a practical matter difficult to 
apply international law to investment agreements due to the absence of substantive rules in its 
context. Jurists and scholars often acknowledge the fact that public international law lacks the 
detailed contractual rules suitable for application to foreign investment contracts.124 Kahn argued 
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“it [public international law] is poorly adapted to the role it is asked to play in investments; it has 
many lacunae and investment agreements were not a consideration in its evolution. 125  
Another practical objection against the applicability of international law is the fact that 
foreign investment contracts have more contacts to national law than to international law. It was 
suggested that the possibility of complete internationalisation of the contracts by referring 
exclusively to international law is not advisable because of the contacts of the investment activity 
to various technical provisions of the host state’s law.126 
On the other hand, nowadays foreign investment as a tool to implement economic 
development programmes has been increasingly viewed as a matter of national policy of 
developing states. This has led to the construction of national legal rules and norms by 
developing states to control the investment activities carried on their respective territories.127 
Then, being a part of public policy, the most rules adopted in the field of foreign investment 
independently apply to foreign investment agreements concluded by the state with a private 
foreign party. Finally, due to the overwhelming view that investment agreements are not treaties 
there is strong juristic support for the view that a breach of contract by the State party does not 
constitute international responsibility.128 As a result, one cannot enforce contractual obligations 
by international law. 
4.1.3. ADVOCATING A MONIST APPROACH 
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The issue on the relationship between international law and municipal law is itself very 
controversial one. Two opposing theories have been competing for acceptance, monism and 
dualism. Monists assert that there is only one legal order, of which both international and 
national law are part, and that therefore either national or international courts or arbitral tribunals 
can apply international law directly without any transformation at the national law level.   
Dualists, on the other hand, argue that there are two essentially different legal systems. 
They exist side by side within different domains - the international domain and the domestic 
domain. Therefore, international law needs be first transformed into national law by means of 
some legislative devices at the national law level before it can be regarded as valid applicable 
rules.  
Historically, the dualist concept of international law prevailed in the practice of most 
states dominating throughout the centuries. That is because the dualistic vision was based on 
legal positivism and was consistent with the fundamental principles of international law such as 
state sovereignty and territoriality. State sovereignty is an ambitious concept in international 
law and it keeps relations between individuals and groups in the sphere of individual autonomy 
of a particular state not letting supranational governance to rule them.  
On the contrary, the monist vision of the relationship between international law and 
domestic law is a relatively recent phenomenon which has emerged as a result of the increasing 
influence of international law upon the municipal legal system, especially the influence of 
international human rights norms since the end of the World War Two. However, because of 
new developments created by globalisation, the strict substantive separation of domestic and 
international law as postulated by traditional dualism is becoming more and more plausible, 
and there is a increasing influence of international law on decisions of national courts.129 
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But the current changes in international law and its strong influences over domestic 
law do not mean that dualism is giving way to monism. Since the debate on the interrelation of 
international and domestic law has not been settled at a universal level, it seems impossible to 
draw a conclusion whether monism or dualism prevails in the modern international legal order.  
In a great majority of the states, there is still adherence to dualism.  
Practically, international law and treaty rules have no direct effect in municipal law.130 
According to generally accepted rules in the state practice with respect to issue of interrelation 
of national and international law, a few rules that apply directly are ones known as mandatory 
rules of international law or as jus cogens. 131 All other international rules have to be transformed 
into national law to be obeyed by the state concerned. And the provisions of national law 
cannot prevail over those of treaties, to which the state is a contracting party.132  
National courts disregard international rules, if they find that those rules are not 
adopted by the country concerned. Even international rules and principles approved by states 
may be violated because there no central organ or law-enforcing authority in international 
community to enforce those rules. Under the international legal principle of non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of states, it is usual for sovereign states to deny individuals’ rights and 
privileges provided by international human rights instruments.133 
                                                                                                                                                    
Kirby, ‘The Impact of International Human rights Norms: A Law Undergoing Evolution’ (1995) 25 Western 
Australian Law Review 1. 
130 But some states, by virtue of their membership of supranational bodies, allow the direct incorporation of rights or 
enact legislation to honour their international commitments. For example, decrees and rules adopted by the EU 
may be directly applicable to all member states. 
131 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties used jus cogens and peremptory norms interchangeably.  According to it, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community 
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character (Art 53). 
132 The Greco-Bulgarian Case (1930) PCIJ (ser B) No 17.  
133 For example, the Chinese government broke up democratic activity with troops killing hundreds of students. For 
more about the event see, Daniel Schugurensky, Selected Moments of the 20th Century (2001) the Ontario Institute for 
Studies in Education of the University of Toronto (OISE/UT) 
<http://fcis.oise.utoronto.ca/~daniel_schugurensky/assignment1/1989tiananmen.html> at 27 August 2004.  




From this angle, monism and dualism is a matter of consent of the state in the 
question. The acceptance of treaty rules of international law by its subject, ie by states depends 
upon the consent of those states. Fortunately, most national constitutions define its openness 
or closeness to international law. Particularly, the Norwegian Constitution provides,  
“Treaties on matters of special importance, and, in all cases, treaties whose 
implementation, according to the Constitution, necessitates a new law or a decision by 
the Parliament, are not binding until the Parliament has given its consent thereto.”134   
In the context of the theory of internationalisation, ICSID arbitral tribunals however 
have taken a different position contrary to the international practice. The proponents of the 
theory had rested on the strict monist angle that superimposes international law on municipal 
law.135 Arguing in the monistic tone, Judge Lauterpacht observed that subjecting an 
international contract to some municipal law does not necessarily mean that the municipal law 
is ‘…a matter which is wholly outside the orbit of international law’. As he commented,  
“It is not enough for a State to bring a matter under the protective umbrella of its 
legislation… in order to shelter it effectively from any control by international law.”136  
Lauterpacht’s monist approach since has been adopted by international arbitral 
tribunals. In many cases the tribunals gave priority to international law in the case of 
inconsistencies between these laws declaring that international law is an integral part of 
municipal law without questioning whether the rules concerned are jus cogens or not. 
Specifically, in SPP v Egypt the tribunal held,  
“We find that reference to Egyptian law must be construed so as to include such 
principles of international law as may be applicable and that national laws of Egypt can 
be relied upon only in as much as they do not contravene said principles.”137  
                                                 
134 Norwegian Constitution (1814), Art 26 (2).  
135 Schwebel noted, “… it appears to be assumed that international arbitral tribunals, including those sitting between 
States and aliens, are ‘monist’ rather than ‘dualist’ in the place they accord to international law”. Schwebel, above n 
36, 140. 







The controversial position with respect to the relationship between international law 
and domestic law has become one of the weaknesses of the theory of internationalisation. The 
theory implies that international law applies as the overriding governing law even in situations 
where foreign investments were not made subject to international law. Particularly, it has been 
suggested that notwithstanding the silence of the agreement on the question of the applicability 
of international law, the arbitral tribunal dealing with issues of investment protection should 
call on the principles of international law to save investors from injury.138 
In practice, it is important to establish whether the country concerned is monist or 
dualist in its approach. There is a possibility that an award of the tribunals could be resisted in 
a country which has a dualist system such as Mongolia.139 Courts of Mongolia would refuse an 
award of tribunals, if they find that the award is based on provisions of a treaty which is 
ratified by the parliament but incompatible with the Constitution of the state.  
4.2. Controversies Related to Private International Law 
The fundamental rules of conflict of laws also have been twisted to some extent in the 
face of principles supporting the theory of internationalisation of state contracts. First of all, 
the dichotomy of public and private law has become irrelevant in case of state contracts. 
Though earlier advocates of the theory of internationalisation had accepted the principle of 
party autonomy which is a basic rule of conflict of laws, they did not apply the principle in its 
traditional sense. The problems of the theory of internationalisation arising in the field of 
private international law must be examined in turn. 
                                                                                                                                                    
137 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICC Award) (11 March 1983), 3 ICSID 
Reports 46, 65. 
138 Masood, above n 41, 319. 
139 Art 10 (3), (4) of the Constitution of Mongolia of 1992 declares: 
“The international treaties, to which Mongolia is a Party, shall become effective as domestic legislation 
upon the entry into force of the laws on their ratification or accession. Mongolia shall not abide by any 
international treaty or other instruments incompatible with its Constitution.” 




4.2.1. BLURRING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE IN LAW 
Basically, in all jurisdictions law is divided into two aspects, public and private.140 The first 
group comprises all regulations that directly affect society as a whole. They are enforced by the 
authorities by means of fines, penalties or withdrawal of licenses. As a general rule, matters 
governed by public law are beyond the pale of choice of law, since the rules of public law apply 
irrespective of private choice of law. Parties to contracts cannot simply exclude, alter or limit 
these rules.  
The second group of laws makes up private law branches which directly affect the legal 
relations between individuals, families, or small groups dealing with their contractual and non-
contractual issues. Naturally, a majority of rules of private law (ius dispositum) is applied when the 
parties have expressed their intention to regulate a given situation. Thus, only these rules are the 
subject matter of private international law or conflict of laws, which deals with the differences 
between the municipal laws of different countries.141  
Nevertheless, a series of oil-related arbitration cases of 1950s involving the question of 
state expropriation and national land use rights broke with this tradition of public/private divide 
in law and pushed the notion of party autonomy into the domain of public law. In the support of 
their decisions, these arbitral tribunals had relied on the same justifications that support 
autonomy in private law matters.142 Therefore, the traditions of public rights and sovereign 
regulatory authority  that always have been the legitimating standard for interference with private 
                                                 
140 This traditional widespread belief of continental legal systems continues to be of a great importance as legal 
theorists often rely on it in their new approaches to legal issues.  
 Daniela Caruso stated: “… the obsolete public/private distinction, rather than simply ruling European scholars 
from its grave, is forever reincarnated in new forms and never fails to shape legal theory and practice.  Daniela 
Caruso, ‘The Missing View of Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration’ (1997) 3 (1) 
European Law Journal 3, 8. 
141 In this context the public/private divide has served an important purpose within the Continental European 
tradition in insulating private international law from political concerns. This is less true in the US, where the 
relationship between law and politics has been monitored by comity in the international arena. See Joel Paul, 
‘Comity in International Law’ (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal 1. 







rights in national contract laws have been neglected by the international law on foreign 
investment ever since.143  
State contracts belong to a category of legal relationships, where principles of 
commercial law interact with notions of public law and public international law.144 On the one 
hand, because of their financial character, state contracts are a type of commercial contract, 
which logically would be founded on the private law notions of commercial contracts. On the 
other hand, it is equally logical to subject them to public law since the presence of a state and the 
public interest element require the contract to be flexible, meeting the requirements of the 
changing administrative regulations and public policies of the state.145  
As a consequence of the mixed private/ public law nature of foreign investment 
contracts, the discussion on choice of law issues relating to investment disputes should involve 
the application of both the private and public law of countries. However, international arbitrators 
supporting the theory of internationalisation had made no distinction between matters where the 
parties’ choice can be validated and matters where the law applies regardless of any choice made.  
What they had tried was to show that all matters of investment disputes were subject to the 
chosen law which is most likely international law.  
Furthermore, the opponents  of the theory of internationalisation had supported the 
inclusion of the choice of law clause in foreign investment contracts in order to make the direct 
                                                 
143 See Ch Five, Section 5.2 – Sources of International Law on Foreign Investment. It shows that rules of 
international law developed in the context of internationalisation of state contracts were intended to reduce the 
regulatory controls of the host state over foreign corporations’ operations.  
144 As Trachtman wrote, international commercial law straddles any gap between the two types of international law, 
because it "regulates both private persons and states." See Joel Trachtman, ‘The International Economic Law 
Revolution’ (1996) 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 33, 35.  
145 Campbell rightly observed that: 
 “Those who enter into agreements with governments and governmental agencies are always at risk that the 
performance of the agreement may be rendered wholly or partially impossible by either supervening legislation or 
by action taken by the governmental party or another governmental party in the exercise of a statutory power. The 
exercise of statutory powers is not inhibited in any way by the prior existence of contractual arrangements which 
might be detrimentally affected if those statutory powers were to be exercised”. Campbell, above n 68, 144.  




reference to international law as the governing law of contract. But the mission is eroded by the 
fact that public international law does not have any substantive rules applicable to contracts 
except for some general treaty rules.146 On the other hand, as a general principle, the treaty rules 
apply automatically without being chosen by parties as the governing law of the contract. Thus 
the internationalisation theory also confused the domains of public and private international law. 
In fact, traditional limitations imposed on conflict of law rules are greater in the case of 
state contracts due to the substantial public interest involved in the contracts. Recently, it has 
become common for arbitrators to deal with public interest issues, as economic development has 
been viewed exclusively as a matter of public policy. Drawing the line between public and private 
law can define the scope of economic regulation which comes within the sphere of public policy.  
Thus, the public/private distinction should be reinforced in the international economic system.  
4.2.2. CHANGING THE TRADITION OF THE PARTY AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE 
One of the basic theses with which supporters of applicability of international law to the 
contractual relationships began is the principle of private international law that permits parties to 
international contracts to choose the law of their contract. It has been claimed that since the 
principle is universally accepted in international business parties to state contracts also should be 
granted it. As Mann argued,  
“…by exercising their rights to choose the applicable legal system the parties may make 
public international law the object of their choice… that fact that one party is not a State 
should not prevent the contract from being submitted to public international law…. it is 
their will, their choice, founded upon and permitted by the private international law of 
the forum, that may submit a contract to the law of States, to public international 
law”.147  
                                                 
146 Sornarajah wrote: 
 “The choice of international law may be possible but the theoretical difficulty is that … there is no body of 
international law applicable to contracts between states and foreign private entities”.  Sornarajah, above n 1, 411.  
147 F A Mann, ‘The Theoretical Approach Towards the Law Governing Contracts between States and Private 







Looked at from the standpoint of private international law, once the parties to 
international contracts have chosen a particular law as the applicable law, the choice of law 
should be strictly observed. Except for certain mandatory rules from which there is no escape, 
there is nothing that subverts or modifies the choice. In general, traditional rules of private 
international law knew only such limitations as can be justified for the protection of weaker 
parties or genuine state interests. 
However, the early ad hoc arbitrations that gave birth to the theory of internationalisation 
had violated the tradition of party autonomy. They meant that a state contract will always be 
subject to international law despite any municipal law being chosen by the contracting parties as 
the sole proper law of the contract. The arbitrations involved in the building up of this rule may 
be briefly examined. 
It was the Aramco arbitration that first eroded the parties’ express stipulations. Despite 
the article in the concession agreement stating that, in case of dispute, the Muslim law as taught 
by the Hanbali School would be applicable, the arbitrators held that even though parties have 
agreed to the application of a particular law, the law which a reasonable man would purport to 
apply, should be the law applicable. Thus, the arbitrators came to the conclusion that the 
contract could not be governed by national law alone because of its “sui generis”148 character and 
“because of its parties and of its ramifications, an international character”149 
Then, the Libyan nationalisation cases- Texaco, BP and Liamco made a clear departure 
from traditional choice of law. All three concessions had a choice of law clause which reads as 
follows:  
“This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles 
of law of Libya common to the principles and rules of international law and in the 
                                                 
148 Aramco Arbitration 27 ILR 164 (1958).  
149 Ibid, 166.  




absence of such common principles of law, then by and in accordance with the general 
principles of law, including such of those principles as may have been applied by 
international tribunals.” 150 
In the Liamco and BP Arbitration, arbitrators interpreted the meaning of this provision 
that both systems are applicable and if there is inconsistency, then the general principles of law 
should prevail.151 Especially, in the Texaco Case, Prof Dupuy, the sole arbitrator reached the 
decision not on the basis of the choice of law clause, but rather he relied on the view that foreign 
investment contracts are better be governed by public international law. He stated: 
“…treaties are not only type of agreements governed by international law… contracts 
between states and private persons, under certain conditions, come within the ambit of a 
particular and a new branch of international law: the international law of contracts”. 152 
The most categorical and explicit pronouncement on the rejection of party autonomy in 
the field of law on foreign investment comes from the CMI case, where the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal disregarded the parties’ choice of law on several occasions and applied a-
national rules or general principles of law.153 Here, the arbitrators based their justification for 
overriding parties’ choice on the Claims Settlement Declaration (CSD). The declaration provided 
the tribunal with a broad discretion in its choices of applicable law by virtue of which it was 
possible to disregard the parties’ choice.154 
                                                 
150 This is modified version which was amended on 20 January 1966, after the enactment of the ICSID Convention. 
Clause 28 (7) of the original concession agreement dated on 12 December 1955 contained a provision which reads 
as follows: 
  “This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the Laws of Libya and such principles 
and rules of international law as may be relevant, and the umpire or sole arbitrator shall base his award upon these 
laws, principles and rules.”  
151 Georges Delaume, Law and Practice of Transnational Contracts (1988) 19.   
152 Texaco Award 53 ILR 309 (1977), para 32.  
153 For example, the tribunal stated that it ‘prefers to analyse the damage questions in accordance with general 
principles of law’, rather than by reference to the law chosen by the parties in the particular case. See CMI 
International Inc v Iran-US CTR (1983 III) 263 et seq., 268.  
154 Art V of the CSD provides that:  
 “The tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles 







The tribunals’ approach to apply international law regardless of parties’ choice has been 
adopted by some international instruments. Particularly, by virtue of Article 17 (2) of the 1998 
ICC Rules of Arbitration, the ICC Tribunal is authorized in all cases, whether in the case of an 
express choice of law or in the absence of it, to take account of the relevant trade usages.   This 
suggests that if the parties’ chosen law is inconsistent with relevant trade usages, the latter may 
override the chosen law to the extent of its inconsistency. However, research has not found an 
exact case in which parties’ chosen law is overridden because of its inconsistency with the 
relevant trade usages.  
Another example of the approach is found in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)155 and the Energy Charter (ECT)156, where the arbitral tribunals are authorized to decide 
the issues in dispute in accordance with relevant treaty provisions and applicable rules and 
principles of international law directly binding Party Governments by international law 
standards. Since both treaties did not provide for parties autonomy to select the governing law of 
their agreement no matter what the parties may expressly choose to the contrary in their 
investment contracts. In this regard, the application of national law or anything else that the 
parties may have agreed to be applicable is controlled by the aforesaid standards provided in the 
treaties.157 
                                                                                                                                                    
usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed  circumstances.” See George Aldrich, the Jurisprudence of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: An Analysis of the Decisions of the Tribunal (1996) 156-170.  
155 North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the 
Government of the United States of America, opened for signature 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 296 (1993) (entered into 
force 1 January 1994). Art 1131, entitled ‘Governing Law’, provides as follows:   
 1. A Tribunal established under this Section shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement 
and applicable rules of international law. 
156 Energy Charter Treaty, opened for signature 17 December 1994, 33 ILM 360 (entered into force 16 April 1998). Art 
26 (6) reads as follows:   
 A tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and 
applicable rules and principles of international law. 
157 See Thomas Waelde, ‘Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty-From Dispute Settlement to 
Treaty Implementation’ (1996) 12 Arbitration International 429, 457-458; Andrew Tucker, ‘The Energy Charter 




4.3. Summary of  Findings  
The analysis within this chapter (Chapter Four) illustrates the theoretical controversies 
surrounding the theory of internationalisation of state contracts. The theory has triggered off 
the burning controversy as to the very nature and also the extent of the application of both 
public and private international law. By providing private actors with international personality 
and attempting to regulate of internal affairs of sovereign states by international law the theory 
had contradicted the historical definition that international law is ‘the rules which determine 
the conduct of sovereign states in their dealings with each other’.  
In fact, multinationals have increasing international rights and the capacity to sue states 
which may accommodate them as the limited subjects of international law, it is still illogical, 
unconventional and dangerous to permit multinationals to act in the international plane 
independently as states. Notwithstanding the extent to which multinationals have been given 
the extensive rights and protection under international law, they must not be able to avoid the 
application of national legal systems in whose territory they carry out their business and should 
remain subjects of those municipal systems.  
At the same time, selecting international law as the proper law of a contract seems to 
be the least bad option for a private party who wants to obtain a contractual remedy, when 
national contract law or private international law can give a better guarantee. Principally, 
international law can or should be pleaded by foreign investors only in circumstances where 
their basic human rights are violated or they are mistreated. That is the area where international 
law operates and applies regardless of parties’ choice. Furthermore, the issue of hierarchy or 
combination of international law and national law is a controversial one. Generally, only 
mandatory rules of international law can superimpose national law; other rules have no effect 
                                                                                                                                                    








unless they are approved by a State concerned. On the other hand, the issue depends on the 
nature of dispute concerned and the position of a country concerned in relation to monism 
and dualism.   
The second part of Chapter Four was devoted to a discussion of problems and 
controversies raised by the theory of internationalisation in relation to private international law. 
First of all, it mixed up the traditional function of conflict of law rules blurring the traditional 
public/private distinction in law. Historically, conflict of law rules applied only to optional rules 
of law but not mandatory. Thus the application of party autonomy to public international law is 
inconsistent with any system of conflict of law that permits only the choice of private law. 
In addition, although party autonomy gave rise to the idea of internationalised 
concession contracts, the theory of internationalisation actually did not intend to accept the 
principle as such.  A trend superimposing international law over the freedom of parties had 
arisen in arbitral practice of ad hoc arbitrations existed prior to setting up of the International 
Centre for the settlement of investment Disputes under the ICSID. The arbitrators had striven 
to give credibility to the view that the parties’ choice of municipal law is valid only when it did 
not contradict with rules of international law they found applicable. It was somehow new to the 
traditional function of party autonomy.  
On this basis it may be inferred that the theory of internationalisation of state contracts 
has many defects that weaken its strength and validity. In the course of more than 50 years 
since the decisions of the early arbitral tribunals, the development of the theory of 
internationalisation has been promoted by arbitral decisions and scholarly contributions; 
however, it also has been the subject of sharp criticism by other scholars. It is noteworthy that 
the initial aim of this theory to completely detach state contracts from its municipal law has 
never been achieved and probably never will.  




P a r t  F o u r :  T H E  L E G A L  S O U R C E S  O F  
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  I N V E S T M E N T  L A W  –  A  D U A L I T Y  
A P P R O A C H  
After World War Two there was a fundamental shift in power from Western Europe and 
the British Empire to the new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same 
time, dozens of European colonies in the continents of Asia and Africa freed themselves from 
the grip of colonialism and gained the capacity to participate in the international system.  From 
this perspective, after World War II, the world split into three competing blocs: the Western 
camp (often referred to as the “First World”), the socialist or Soviet bloc (referred to as the 
“Second World”), and the remaining three-quarters of the world's population, the states not 
aligned with either bloc which were regarded as the “Third World”.  Since the socialist bloc 
collapsed, the world today is divided into two essential blocs; The North including Western 
Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and the South which itself divides into to two subblocs; 
developing countries and least developed countries.1  
The emergence of different groups of states with very different social, economic and 
cultural backgrounds in the international arena laid the seeds of political crisis among them. Each 
bloc was constantly engaged in the political task of defending its economic independence, 
advantage, and freedom of action, and thus conflicts of interests arose. Especially, in the field of 
foreign investment, the North-South conflict has been so sharp causing the development of 
conflicting principles and approaches. Even an advocate of arbitration conceded that “… the 
                                                 
1 Special attention to what were then called the less developed countries among the developing countries began at 
the first Session of UNCTAD in 1964. The first resolution on the subject of the "Least Developed Countries" 
(LDCs) was adopted at UNCTAD II in 1968. Fifty countries are currently designated by the United Nations as 








principles established by capital-exporting countries are often pure and simple reproductions of 
the demands of private investors and are not accepted by the capital-importing states”.2 
The current Part of this thesis intends to investigate the scope of international law 
applicable to foreign investment disputes. It argues that, because of the existence of politically 
sensitive state interests in the outcome of disputes in the field of economic regulation over the 
years following the World War Two, two different approaches have emerged for regulating 
foreign investment. Chapter Five shows the perspectives of each bloc of countries. Then it 
examines the sources of international investment law within the confines of the theory of 
internationalisation. It points out that the rules aiming at the creation of an international regime 
for investment protection have caused the exclusion of other interests involved in that process. 
In Chapter Six, discussion moves forward to identify a number of opposing norms which 
emerge from efforts of developing states and the international human rights community to 
create a more just international economic order. It will be seen that these norms, which were 
mostly reflected in various UN Resolutions, have contributed to the evolution of the law of 
economic development.  
CHAPTER FIVE: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT  
 5.1. International Law from a North-South Perspective 
Since the breakdown of colonialism, foreign investment has become one of the most 
controversial political and legal issues. Western governments sought a favourable climate for 
their firms with direct foreign investments outside the Western hemisphere, pushing trade and 
investment liberalisation policies. On contrary, though socialist countries and third world 
                                                 
2 Philippe Kahn, ‘Law Applicable to State Contracts: The Contribution of the World Bank Convention’ (1968) 44 
Indiana Law Journal 1, 20. 




countries needed capital and technology to promote growth, they were more interested in 
formulating rules reinforcing their sovereignty than in policies restricting it.  
Therefore, it is not only useful and also imperative to consider the development of 
international rules concerning the foreign investment from this political perspective. 
5.1.1. PERSPECTIVES OF DEVELOPED STATES  
As discussed previously, with the independence of former colonized territories, Western 
states were threatened by the loss of capital.3 The revolutionary changes that took place in newly-
independent countries including a string of nationalisations increased political and legal hazards 
of foreign investment. Meantime, the 1962 UN General Assembly “Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources” further eroded economic interests of overseas investors.4 
Therefore, it was significant for capital-exporting industrial states to devise investor-friendly legal 
structures.  
For this purpose, they have strongly supported the applicability of international law in a 
new context. The content and the nature of international law on foreign investment constructed 
by industrialised states were reflected in the theory of internationalisation of foreign investment 
contracts. It was founded primarily on the view that a breach of a foreign investment contract is 
an international wrong. The second argument of the theory was an idea that foreign investors are 
disadvantaged, thus they should be protected. 
With these objectives in mind, the developed states have attempted to adopt substantive 
rules on foreign investment protection through arbitral practices and treaty negotiations. In fact, 
most of the international law rules relating to foreign investment were formulated by awards of 
                                                 
3 See discussions in Ch Three, Subsection 3.1.1 (The Call for New Mechanism to Deal with Investor-State Disputes). 
4 The ideas embodied in the Resolution suggested that defining the standards of admission and treatment of foreign 
investors as well as the amount of compensation in case of nationalization of property was a matter within 
domestic law and jurisdiction. See further discussions on this Resolution in Ch Six, Subsection 6.1.2 (Doctrine of 







ad hoc international investment tribunals during the mid 1950s and earlier 1980s.5 The awards 
addressing the illegality of oil nationalisations conducted in developing states of the Middle East 
put forward ideas which were served as the basis for the internationalisation theory. The ideas 
were heavily biased in side of foreign investors. 6 
The establishment of ICSID arbitration as a permanent neutral forum under the 1965 
World Bank Convention7 has advanced the investor/states dispute resolution system.8 Allowing 
direct claims by foreign investors, the ICSID mechanism replaced other forms of dispute 
settlement such as the use of local courts of the host state and diplomatic protection.9 Since the 
mid 1980s, the ICSID arbitration has became the most popular method of investor/state dispute 
settlement, when BITs began widely to accept providing for direct claims by investors.10 Thus, 
unlike previous ad hoc arbitral tribunals, ISCID is an investment treaty arbitration enforcing 
obligations of BITs.  
                                                 
5 See discussions in Ch Three, Subsections 3.1.2 (The Development of the Theory of Internationalisation) and 4.2.2 
(Changing the Tradition of the Party Autonomy Principle).  
6 It is not contested that the earlier system of international investment arbitration served the interests of the Western 
states. See Jan Paulsson, ‘Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration’ (1987) 2 ICSID 
Review- Foreign Investment Law Journal 19, 21. Also see Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, International Commercial 
Arbitration: the Problem of State Contracts (1990) 6-11.   
7 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature 18 
March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
8 It is the first specialised dispute settlement mechanism which operates permanently and only deals with disputes 
“arising directly out of an investment between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State” 
(Art 25 of the ICSID Convention) and disputes “where only one of the parties was connected to a Contracting State 
and to matters which do not arise directly out of an investment” (the 1979 Additional Facility Rules).  
9 Under the ICSID Convention, once an investor has made a direct claim against the host state,  both parties are 
precluded pursuing other remedies (Art 26), and the national state of the investor is also forbidden from exercising 
diplomatic protection with respect to disputes submitted to ICSID (Art 27 (1)).  
10 Between 1987 and 2007 the total cumulative number of known treaty-based cases reached 290. These disputes 
were filed with ICSID (or the ICSID Additional Facility) (182), under the arbitration rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (80), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (14), the 
International Chamber of Commerce (5), and ad- hoc arbitration (5). One further case was filed with the Cairo 
Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, one was administered by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration and for two cases the exact venue was unknown at the time of writing. The overwhelming majority of 
these cases were initiated on grounds of violating a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) provision (78 per cent), 
followed by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (13 per cent) and the Energy Charter Treaty (6 per 
cent). See UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (2008) 1-2.  




Despite various efforts made by developed states to establish a global regime for 
international investment, no multilateral arrangements have ever been achieved.11 However, 
numerous bilateral, and to a lesser extent, multilateral agreements have emerged which confirm 
and extend notions that favored movement of foreign investment and their treatment in 
accordance with external standards.12 The provisions of these agreements mainly prohibit host 
countries from taking regulatory measures and restrictions on the entry and operations of foreign 
firms13 and require host countries to apply higher standards of treatment than that is provided 
under customary international law14 and to eliminate any discrimination against foreign 
enterprises. In order words, these international investment treaties whether bilateral or regional, 
have created a positive legal environment for foreign investors and their investments, thereby 
encouraging investors to invest more.   
In addition to this, from the end of World War II, developed states have pursued 
liberalisation and free market ideals through the world’s leading economic organisations such as 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
These liberalisation policies allow foreign-investor companies to undertake bigger commercial 
activities beyond their own countries’ borders while requiring states to open up their markets. 
Such policies have been much more beneficial to developed states which enjoy a competitive 
“wealth” advantage than to developing states which usually lack the economic structure to 
                                                 
11 International Trade Organisation (ITO) of Havana Charter which contained a comprehensive set of investment 
rules failed to come into being in 1950. Also the 1944 Bretton Woods order attempted to regulate issues of 
international investment. OECD’s Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) failed mainly because of its 
provisions biased in favour of foreign investors.   
12 For more detail on these treaties see Ch Five, Subsection 5.2.1 (International Investment Treaties).  
13 See, eg, North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States 
and the Government of the United States of America, opened for signature 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 296 (1993) 
(entered into force 1 January 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Art 1106 prohibits, on the part of States parties to the 
agreement, the imposition or enforcement of a number of performance requirements “in connection with the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or operation of an investment of an investor of a 
Party or of a non- Party ...”  
14 The Hull Doctrine, which required compensation for foreign investors that was “prompt, effective and adequate”, 







compete with Western big corporations.15 Also, these economic liberalisation policies have 
placed constraints on states' ability to direct economic development and fashion social and 
economic policy.16  
It is evident therefore, that the rules and policies advanced by industrialised states are 
designed to benefit the interests of large transnational corporations (TNCs). By the early 1990s, 
ninety percent of world’s largest 37,000 TNCs had their headquarters in developed states.17 As a 
result, the great bulk of their sales and assets were concentrated in parent companies or home 
states.18 Since trade and capital primarily rest in the hands of developed states, a free trade agenda 
works for them, but not for developing states.19 
5.1.2. PERSPECTIVES OF DEVELOPING STATES 
From the very beginning of the decolonization of the early 1960s, the South or the Third 
World states have been concerned with the legitimacy of international rules built up on western 
notions.20 With the active support of the Soviet Union that had emerged as one of the great 
political powers after its victory over fascism, developing states struggled to restructure the 
                                                 
15 See generally Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger, ‘Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the 
Rules of GATT/WTO’ (2004) 63 (1) Journal of International Economic Law 1-29.   
16 For example, Christopher McCrudden observed that domestic human rights purposes such as tackling long-term 
unemployment, promoting fair labour conditions, promoting the use of local labour in economically deprived 
areas may be invalid under international trade law disciplines. See Christopher McCrudden, ‘International 
Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of ‘Selective 
Purchasing’ Laws under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement’ (1999) 2 (1) Journal of International 
Economic Law 3-48. 
17 UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2005) 13.  
18 Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson, Globalization in Question (2nd ed, 1999) 82.  
19 Critics of foreign direct investment in developing countries argue that trade and investment liberalisation policies 
cause disastrous effect on developing states. For example, Morris argues that the benefits to which developed 
countries have become accustomed now threaten developing economies as wage rises, environmental protection, 
and insurance and employer liability lift costs of production and reduce international competitiveness. David 
Morris, ‘Free Trade: The Great Destroyer’ in Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith (eds), The Case Against the 
Global Economy (1996) 223.  
20 In the post-decolonization era, international law was perceived by anti-colonial legal scholarship as “Eurocentric” 
meaning that international law is founded by European ‘civilized” states to benefit them. See Mohammed 
Bedjaoui, ‘General Introduction’ in Mohammed Bedjaoui (ed), International Law: Achievements and Prospects (1991) 5.  




international legal and economic order in accordance with their own interests and needs. In this 
regard, the UN General Assembly (GA) was extremely active in promoting changes to existing 
law and introducing new concepts that reflect aspirations of developing states.  
The Third World states aimed at first, at preserving national sovereignty and maintaining 
control over all aspects of their political and economic life. For their achievement of economic 
independence, these countries used nationalisation as a means of freeing the national economy 
from foreign control and creating state ownership.21 As a result of the nationalisation, the key 
sectors of the economy such as land, natural resources and other wealth previously owned by 
nationals of the former colonial states were transferred to newly-sovereign governments of the 
Third World states.  
The second step towards the new international legal system was the adoption of a 
number of principles that give nations or peoples of the newly independent states a chance to 
control their economies. Among the new norms promoted by the GA, the doctrine of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources has greater legal status in international law.22 The 
significance of the principle is that it ensured that total control over foreign investment activities 
in the area of natural resources belongs to the host state. Therefore, it has shaken the whole 
content and nature of the theory of internationalisation that aimed to withdraw the host state’s 
control.  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, developing states not just continuously affirmed the 
principles of economic independence, but also, together with former socialist states, had 
demanded to participate more effectively in decision making on international economic matters 
and proposed changes to the old economic system. In this regard, a program for a New 
                                                 
21 M M Boguslavskii, Private International Law: The Soviet Approach (1988) 123. 
22 Some writers argue that the doctrine constitutes a principle of jus cogens of international law. See, eg, Ian Brownlie, 







International Economic Order (NIEO)23 was the most remarkable initiative. The idea of the NIEO 
had, in fact three general connotations; first, there is something wrong with the existing system 
of international economic relations, which needs to be corrected by a change in the system, 
second, that the wrong originated from the past and present policies of Western countries, which 
for their guilt should accept the obligations of the NIEO, and third, that the change in the 
system requires a massive shift of political power from the major countries to the United States.24 
In spreading the NIEO ideology, the role of the United Nations, especially the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), was central. UNCTAD advanced 
a global reform strategy with three main prongs. The first was commodity price stabilization, the 
second was a scheme of preferential tariffs for Third World exports in First World markets, and 
the third was an expansion and acceleration of foreign assistance.25  
The next effort of developing states in the evolution of new international economic 
regime was the elaboration of values and moral standards concerning developmental needs of 
nation states. These values and principles are now considered to be the subject matter of an 
emerging branch of public international law which recognizes people’s right to develop.26 The 
significant point of the evolution of the new law is the assertion that foreign investment activities 
must meet the host states’ developmental prerogatives.27  
Apart from developing states, environmentalists and human rights activities have been 
protesting against the unfair nature of international law in the field of foreign investment since 
the 1970s. One of the important steps made by human rights advocates through NGOs has been 
                                                 
23 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, GA Res 3201 (S-VI), UN GAOR, 6th secc, 2229th 
plen mtg, UN Doc A/Res/3201 (S-VI) (1974). 
24 Harry Jonhson, The New International Economic Order, Selected Papers No 49 (1976) 1.  
25 Bernard Nossiter, The Global Struggle for More (1987) 45. 
26 It has been commonly accepted now as a new branch. See Oscar Schachter, ‘The Evolving International Law of 
Development’ (1976) 15 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1; Francis Snyder and Peter Slinn (eds), International 
Law of Development: Comparative Perspectives (1987). 
27 See Ch 6, Subsection 6.2.2 (Move to Economic Development Approach).  




the promotion of an idea of the accountability of transnational corporations to ensure the 
observance of human rights by them. The NGOs have called on all actors of the international 
market place, particularly national governments, transnational corporations as well as 
international economic organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO to ensure the 
compliance of corporate practices with international human rights standards.28 
The development of a code of conduct for multinationals on the global level, that took 
more than 20 years’ negotiating process, has been finalized as the UN Sub-Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights adopted Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations.29 Though the norms are non-binding, it will provide a definite new international 
standard or global guideline for behaviour of multinationals.30 Most importantly, they have 
introduced human rights concerns to the normative content of international law on foreign 
investment.   
As a result of the struggles of the two groups, developing states and the international 
human rights community, the nature of international law on foreign investment has undergone a 
great deal of change over the last two decades. The early law of the post-colonialism period 
concentrated on the single objective of the protection of foreign investors has sifted to new 
competing objectives of protecting human rights and environment. The next section examines 
                                                 
28 The idea for regulating behaviour of multinationals was broached by both governmental bodies and non-
governmental organizations in the earlier seventies but the current revival of interest in "codes of conduct" for 
businesses has largely been led by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including development organisations, 
trade unions and environmental groups. See Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: An overview (1998) 
Cleanclothes org <http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/overvieuw.htm> at  4 December 2005. 
29 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (the 
Norms) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).  
30 Under the Norms, the most remarkable responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
are respect for applicable norms of international law, national laws and regulations, as well as administrative 
practices, respect for the rule of law and the public interest, respect for development objectives, social, economic 
and cultural policies including transparency, accountability and prohibition of corruption, and authority of the 







rules of international law evolved through the theory of internationalisation of investment 
contracts.  
5.2. Sources of  International Law on Foreign Investment 
It can be said that the ICSID Convention took a very vague view of international law. It 
does not give any definition what it meant by the expression “such rules of international law".31 
Suggestions to clarify the contents of “rules of international law” were made by reference to the 
established sources of international law which are stated in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. In the Report of the Executive Directors, it was stated that  
“The term ‘international law’ as used in this context should be understood in the sense 
given to it by Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, allowance 
being made for the fact that the Article 38 was designed to apply to inter-State 
disputes”.32  
Therefore, sources of international law applicable to investment contracts should be 
looked at in a similar way as in the International Court of Justice. 
5.2.1. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
As the Report of the Executive Directors directs, ICSID tribunals first look at treaties. It 
has been considered that negotiation and agreement on uniform substantive rules by 
governments through the treaty making process is the best solution to conflict of laws 
                                                 
31 Kahn, above n 2, 28.  
32 Report of the World Bank Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, adopted 10 September 1964, 4 ILM 524, para 40 (1965) [hereinafter Executive Directors’ 
Report]. The following footnote was attached:  Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
reads as follows:  
 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, 
shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognised by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
d. subject to Article 59, judicial decisions and the teaching of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
law.  




problems.33 Since the late 19th century, public international law increasingly started to evolve in 
the context of private international law providing a framework for treaties for recognition and 
enforcement of civil judgments, codifying rules for choice of law, and defining other private law 
matters. In other words, public international law and private international law that once were 
independent branches of law with clear-cut principles and rules started to merge rules.34  
However, it should be noted that international negotiations often fail unless they achieve 
agreement among widely diverse states with language and cultural differences, civil and common 
law traditions, capitalist and socialist political philosophies, and developed and developing 
economies.35 One of the fields of transnational activity where multilateral treaty negotiation has 
not reached an agreement is foreign investment. During the last half century there have been 
many efforts at contributing to a global, codified international investment law through binding 
and non-binding international agreements.36  
The most recent attempt by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) to create a truly global investment code, the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI), was unsuccessful mainly because of its provisions for excessive liberalisation of 
international investment, and its unbalanced regime for the protection of interests of foreign 
private parties against the host states of such investment.37At present, the attempts to negotiate a 
                                                 
33 Alina Kaczorowska, International Trade Conventions and Their Effectiveness: Present and Future (1995) 26.  
34  Some writers argue that the traditional gap between international law and private international law has narrowed. 
See Mark Janis, ‘Should We Continue to Distinguish Between Public and Private International Law?’ (1985) 79 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 352.  
35 Trachtman acknowledges that treaty negotiation often is impracticable because of levels of controversy.  Joel 
Trachtman, ‘Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility’ (1994) 26 (5) 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 975, 990-91.  
36 The OECD Codes (1976) created by developed countries, the UN Code on Transnational Corporations (1976-1992), the 
World Bank Foreign Investment Guidelines (1992) have non-binding character, while three other treaties: The 1992 
North-American Free Trade Agreement, the 1994 Mercosur Agreements with its Colonia Protocol dealing with investment, and 
the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty  are binding agreements.  
37 See Sol Piccioto, ‘A Critical Assessment of the MAI’ in Sol Piccioto and Ruth Mayne (eds), Regulating International 







multilateral treaty on investment regulation have reached an agreement in only two fields 
particularly procedures for international settlement of investment disputes (ICSID) and 
multilateral investment guarantee (MIGA) facilities. 
Basic Similarities of International Investment Treaties (IITs) 
Since attempts to negotiate a multilateral agreement on investment at the WTO or the 
OECD have failed to come up with a binding agreement, regional and bilateral treaties are the 
main sources in this field. Though each treaty has its own structure, scope and objectives, they 
share some basic features. Therefore, before discussing them separately, a general indication of 
most commonly shared features of the existing IITs should be provided.  
First, structurally, modern investment treaties have retained broad uniformity in their 
provisions. They begin with determining the scope of application of the treaty providing the 
definition of foreign investment. In most cases the definition is so broad covering tangible and 
intangible assets, direct as well as portfolio investments. Basically all investment treaties cover 
four substantive areas:  
• admission of investments; (definition of investment,38 right of entry and performance 
requirements39) 
• treatment of investment; (national and most-favoured-nation treatment, fair and 
equitable treatment, non-discrimination and free transfer of funds)40 
• expropriation; (prohibition of expropriation and prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation in the case of expropriation)41 
• the settlement of disputes; (either State-to-State or investor-to-State)42 
                                                 
38 See Appendix I, Mongolia – US Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art I.  
39 See Appendix I, Mongolia – US Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art II (1) and (5).  
40 See Appendix I, Mongolia – US Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art II (2) and (8). 
41 See Appendix I, Mongolia – US Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art III (1), (2), and (3).  
42 See Appendix I, Mongolia – US Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art V and VI. 




Second, they provide similar standards of treatment of foreign investment or foreign 
investors. IITs rely on a combination of standards, “national treatment”, “fair and equitable 
treatment”, “full protection and security” and the “treatment in accordance with international 
law”. Most of them guarantee “fair and equitable treatment” which means a state must treat the 
foreign investor in accordance with certain basic standards no matter how it treats its own 
nationals.43 Along with this, they also require that “full protection and security" be accorded in 
respect to the investor's rights regarding ownership, control and benefits over his property 
including intellectual property.44  
The next feature of IITs is that they provide protection against expropriation. Most IITs 
prohibit nationalisation or expropriation and measures tantamount to expropriation by a host 
state. Expropriation is allowed only when all basic criteria are met: which are that it was for a 
public purpose, done on a non-discriminatory basis and accompanied by compensation equal to 
the market value of the investment.45 In addition, many IITs often impose certain duties on the 
host state such as to stabilise the national legal regime, to negotiate in good faith and to obey 
contractual obligations.46 
The last significant feature of IITs is that a reference to social, developmental and 
environmental concerns of host states is missing from the contents of IITs whether regional or 
bilateral. They are usually silent as to the need for government intervention or regulation to 
                                                 
43 Daniel Price, Foreign Investment Protection under International Treaties (2006) Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 
Industry < http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/06070601.html> at 23 November 2007. 
44 Sacerdoti, Giorgio, ‘The Source and Evolution of International Legal Protection for Infrastructure Investments 
confronting Political and Regulatory Risks’ (2000) 5 The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy 
(CEPMLP) Internet Journal <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol5/article5-7a.html> at 18 March 
2006. 
45 See Appendix I, Mongolia – US Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art III (1).  
46 See, eg, ASEAN Investment Agreement , signed 15 December 1987 by the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the 
Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of 
Thailand < http://www.aseansec.org/6464.htm> at 3 February 2007. Art 3 (3) states: 
 “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation arising from a particular commitment it may have entered 







further its environmental, developmental, health and human rights goals.47 As a result, there is a 
danger that any attempt by a host government to take a measure for public policy reasons could 
be interpreted as expropriation or discrimination. The government faced with this issue has to 
choose either not to take such public policy action or to pay millions of dollars for 
compensation. More specifically, the Mexican government was forced to pay a US company 
US$16 million based on the refusal to allow Metalclad to operate a hazardous waste facility.48 
Similarly, in the mid-1990s US tobacco companies threatened Canada with an investment treaty 
suit alleging expropriation of trademarks if Canada would move forward with a public health-
inspired proposal for plain packaging of cigarettes and tobacco products.49 
Regional Investment Treaties 
At a regional level, two treaties that impose obligations on governments to protect 
foreign investments and accord them more favourable treatment were adopted in the early 
1990s. The first one is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which was signed in 
1992 by Mexico, Canada and the US. Most provisions of the treaty were built on the 1988 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) thus it is often referred as CUSFTA’s 
successor.  
NAFTA is generally regarded as an important codification of disciplines and procedures 
concerning international investment. It provides higher level standards of protection and 
liberalisation than those found in other investment agreements and customary international law 
and offers a dispute settlement mechanism for both state-to-state and investor-to-state disputes. 
More specifically, both investors and their investments are entitled to the better of national 
                                                 
47 UNDP, Investment Provisions in Free Trade Agreements and Investment Treaties (2005) INDI Regional centre in Columbia 
<http://www.undprcc.lk/Publications/Publications/BIT-completed.pdf > at 24 February 2008. 
48 See Metalclad Co v United Mexican States (Award on Merits) (30 August 2000), 40 ILM 36 (2001).  
49 See Affadavit of David Schneiderman, in Council of Canadians, CUPW, et.al. v Attorney General of Canada, 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File No 01-CV-208141, at 4-5.  




treatment and MFN treatment and investments are entitled to “treatment in accordance with 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”50 
freedom of transfers,51 and protection against expropriation without compensation.52 However, 
NAFTA differs from other trade arrangements in its attention to environmental issues and in 
the degree to which it places environmental concerns before commercial considerations.53  
The second treaty is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) which was signed in December 1994 
and which entered into legal force in April 1998. Its scope is limited to the energy sector 
establishing legal rights and obligations with respect to a broad range of investment, trade and 
other subjects such as the transit of energy goods, competition, the environment, access to 
capital markets and transfer of technology. The treaty, which initially was designed to be a 
European Energy Charter creating a privileged relationship between West and East of Europe in 
the energy sector, has became a multilateral treaty as the US, Canada, Australia and Japan joined 
in.54 
One of the important features of the ECT is that it does not only provide a variety of 
protections to foreign energy investors but also tried to set up some sort of balance between the 
rights of investors and the rights of the host state. In particular, the Charter recognises the 
exercise of certain discretionary powers by a host country under the applicable national legal 
order pertaining to foreign investment such as controls over illicit payments and the extension of 
competition laws to their activities, and preserves discretion to take measures for national 
                                                 
50 NAFTA, Art. 1105 (1).  
51 NAFTA, Art. 1109.  
52 NAFTA, Art. 1110.  
53 See Ch Six, Section 6.2.2 (Move to Economic Development Approach).  
54 Greg Bamberg, Jan Linehan and Thomas Waelde, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty in 2000: In the New Phase’ in 







security or other vital public policy reasons.55 The ECT also allows member states to take 
precautionary measures to prevent or minimise environmental degradation," and to "take 
account of environmental considerations throughout the formulation and implementation 
of their energy policies".56 
At the multilateral level, agreements negotiated at the WTO also can impact on the 
domestic regulations of a host country that apply to foreign investors.  An Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)57 which was concluded as part of the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations and entered into force on 1 of January 1995 regulates various trade-related 
investment measures. The purpose of the agreement is to restrict preference of domestic firms 
and thereby enabling international firms to operate more easily within foreign markets.  
It requires member states to notify investment measures that restrict and distort trade 
and eliminate them within a limited period of time.58  It provides that no contracting party shall 
apply any TRIM inconsistent with Articles III (national treatment) and XI (prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions) of the GATT.59 The TRIMS Agreement does not explicitly define what a 
trade related investment measure, but provides an illustrative list that explicitly prohibits local 
content requirements, trade balancing requirements, foreign exchange restrictions and export 
restrictions (domestic sales requirements) that would violate Article III (4) or XI (1) of GATT 
1994.60  
                                                 
55 ECT, Art 18 
56 ECT, Art 19.  
57 Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A. 
58 Developed, developing and least-developed countries were given, respectively, two, five and seven years from the 
date of entry into force of the WTO agreement to eliminate notified TRIMs. See TRIMs, Art 5 (2). 
59 TRIMs, Art 1. 
60 See TRIMs, Annex. 




As any other WTO regulations, the TRIMS Agreement is designed to eliminate barriers to 
trade and investment flows. Since the late 1980s, developing countries receiving foreign 
investment have imposed numerous restrictions to protect and foster domestic industries and to 
capture more benefits from FDI.61 The most undesirable effect of the TRIMS Agreement is that it 
will seriously hinder the efforts of developing countries to promote local industries. 
Liberalisation between two unequal partners such as TNCs and local enterprises is as a likely 
result to throw local medium and small companies out of business. 62 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 
According to a list of treaties published by ICSID, the first modern bilateral investment 
treaty was concluded between Germany and Pakistan in 1959. Since then an increasing number 
of European countries concluded similar treaties with developing states. However, only since the 
end of the 1980s, the bilateral investment treaties have become universally accepted as 
instruments for the promotion and legal protection of foreign investment. 63 
The number of investment treaties increased rapidly over the past 20 years and the rapid 
proliferation of these treaties witnessed to date appears to continue. By the end of 2006, more 
than 2,500 bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 2,600 double taxation treaties and 240 other 
agreements with investment provisions such as free trade agreements have been concluded 
across the globe.64 It also shows that these treaties are no longer concluded exclusively between 
                                                 
61 Chaipa Tekere, Impact of the WTO TRIMS Agreement on the Marginalized in Developing Countries (2007) Trade and 
Investment Study Centre <http://www.tradescentre.org.zw/publications/index.html> at 23 January 2008. 
62 Ibid. 
63 For a list of bilateral investment treaties and related information, see the World Bank’s website at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icisid/treaties/intro.htm.> at 27 February 2008. 







capital-exporting and capital-importing countries but that an increasing number of the treaties 
are concluded between developing countries themselves.65 
However, it is doubtful whether the increasing treaty development in the field of 
foreign investment witnesses the success of the development. Actually, these treaties are meant 
to ensure mutual promotion and protection of foreign investment. But in reality, the 
investment is a one-way flow because investment usually comes from developed states to 
developing states, not from developing states to developed states.66 In particular, a recent 
OECD report shows that in 2006 direct investment outflow of Turkey was only 0, 9 billion, 
whereas that of the USA in the same year was 248, 9 billion.67 
In these asymmetrical relationships, developed states are the party whose large stake of 
investment is protected, and thus benefit from the provisions of BITs, while developing states 
are other party whose government is restrained from taking certain actions and sued by foreign 
individuals before an external mechanism. Even rule-makers do not deny that BITs were 
historically intended only for developing countries.68 For their part, developing states have 
accepted such investment treaties as a way to promote foreign investment in their territories 
and have thus willingly negotiated them. In the hope that these treaty provisions will attract 
                                                 
65 At the end of 2006, the total number of South–South agreements reached 680. See UNCTAD, Recent Developments 
in International Investment Agreements: 2006- June 2007 (2007) 3. 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20076_en.pdf. > at 23 December 2007. 
66 Salacuse commented “A BIT purports to create a symmetrical legal relationship between the two states, for it 
provides that either party may invest under the same conditions in the territory of the other. In reality, an 
asymmetry exists between the parties to the BITs since one state will be the source and the other the recipient of 
any investment flows between the two countries. Jeswald Salacuse, ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’ (1990) 24 International 
Lawyer 662. 
67 OECD, International Investment Perspective in a Changing World (2007) 17, Table 2.1. 
<http//www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/43/38818788.pdf> at 17 March 2008.  
68 Daniel Price, one of the American negotiators of NAFTA Ch 11, admitted that these types of provisions were 
historically intended for developing countries such as Mexico. See Daniel Price, ‘An Overview of the NAFTA 
Investment Ch: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (1993) 27 International Lawyer 727, 736.  




more foreign capital and the capital would benefit its economy, poorer governments agree to 
be bound by the unfavourable provisions.69  
Chapter 11 of NAFTA was the first occasion when two developed OECD countries 
[the US and Canada] have made the same commitments to each other that they have 
demanded of developing countries.70 The investment protection accorded under the NAFTA 
has resulted in excessive claims launched against all three NAFTA governments.71 For Mexico, 
as a developing state being brought before an international tribunal by foreign individuals is 
not a surprise, but for the US and Canada, this has been an inconvenient experience.72 
Learning from the NAFTA experiences, developed states now are seeking a mechanism to 
reduce their risks of being sued.73 Such an attempt was made in the Australia-United States FTA 
(AUSFTA) which was signed on 18 May 2004.  
Both the US and Australia are parties to ICSID Convention, but they did not give 
investors the right to pursue direct claims with governments. Under Article 11.16, parties 
should consider through consultations whether to allow investor-state dispute settlement if 
“there has been a change in circumstances affecting the settlement of disputes on matters 
                                                 
69 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd ed, 2004) 207.  
70 Price, above n 68. 
71 As of March 2008, 13 cases have been filed against the USA, 4 against Canada, and 12 against Mexico. See US 
Department of State, The NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations <http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm > at 27 March 
2008.  
72 Under NAFTA corporations are encouraged to attack government regulations to improve the food security, 
public health, and safety of its citizens. As a result, in the most cases filed under NAFTA, all three governments 
have been sued for providing public service and regulating economic activities.  Eg, in Ethyl Corporation Case, a US 
company claimed that a Canadian ban on the gasoline additive MMT breached NAFTA Ch 11. After the 
preliminary tribunal judgments against Canada, Canadian government annulled the statute, issued an apology to 
the company and paid US $13 million in compensation.  Ethyl Corporation v Government of Canada (Jurisdiction) (24 
June 1998), 38 ILM 708 (1999).  
73 Dodge considers that the reason for the absence of investor-state dispute settlement provisions in AUSFTA is a 
desire to avoid the experiences of the United States and Canada under NAFTA Ch 11.” See William Dodge, 
‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement between developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia- United States Free 







within the scope of this Chapter.”74 Then, AUSFTA Chapter 11 is only enforced through the 
state-to-state dispute settlement procedures set forth in Chapter 21.75  
The removal of investor-state provisions from AUSFTA will have both negative and 
positive implications for international investment law which is still developing. The drafters of 
AUSFTA moved backwards undermining the most significant accomplishment of foreign 
investors which is a right to pursue a host state before an international arbitral tribunal.76 The 
whole idea of developing international investment arbitration mechanism was to grant to 
individuals the capacity to protect themselves on the international plane without the intermediary 
of their states.  The approach taken in the AUSFTA, therefore may damage this positive 
development of international law.77  
On the other hand, the AUSFTA experience illustrates a need for the reconstruction of 
multilateral or bilateral investment treaties to respect the environment and recognise regulatory 
measures by a host state addressing important environmental and social issues and concerns of 
foreign investment. Developed states now fear powers given to corporations by investment 
treaties. Thus, they are unlikely to grant foreign investors from other developed states the 
NAFTA-standard-mechanism of protection in future FTAs.78 Even though the current practice 
                                                 
74 Australia-US FTA, signed 18 May 2004, Art 11.16 available at 
<http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/asset_upload_file819_51
64.pdf> at 13 December 2008.  
75 Chapter 21 provides in the first instance for consultations between the state parties (Art 21.5) and referral to the 
standing Joint Committee established by the agreement (Art 21.6). If these fail to resolve the dispute, it may be 
taken to a dispute settlement panel of three (Art 21.7). The panel may determine if the measure at issue is a breach 
of the agreement but does not award damages (Art 21.9).  
76 Dodge wrote:  
“What Australia and the United States have created, then, is a system for protecting foreign investors that 
depends entirely on diplomatic protection and resembles those in operation before the advent of ICSID 
and the BITs. Indeed, in one respect, the agreement is even more restrictive than earlier treaties, for 
breaches of AUSFTA may not be raised in domestic courts, whereas the provisions of earlier treaties could 
in at least some instances.” See Dodge, above 73, 25. 
77 For the benefits of investor-state arbitration compared to state-to-state method, see Rafael Pacquing, Investor-State 
Arbitration: Canada’s Experience in NAFTA and the Case for its Inclusion in the Australia-US FTA (2003) APEC Study 
Centre <http://www.apec.info/asia/AUAPEC/pacquing2003.pdf > at 23 March 2008. 
78 Dodge, above n 73, 35.  




of BITs treats unequally developed and developing states, the AUSFTA approach will have a 
profound impact on the negotiation process of future BITs.  
It also should be noted that the new rules and standards evolved by the international law 
on economic development in the last three decades have been reflected in numerous bilateral 
investment treaties. As a result, the normative content and scope of BITs are gradually changing. 
In particular, a recent UNCTAD research report identified several important features introduced 
by new and newly re-negotiated BITs.79 First, the new generation of treaties clarifies the meaning 
of minimum standard of treatment and the concept of indirect expropriation in line with a 
traditional interpretation given by arbitral tribunals. For instance, in the new Canada and United 
States model BITs it is accepted that an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment 
alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred.80 In addition, both BIT 
models state that, except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party 
aimed at protecting legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.81  
Another significant feature is that the new generation BITs address not only specific 
economic aspects, but also other issues affecting the protection of health, safety, the 
environment, and the promotion of internationally-recognised labour rights.82 Lastly, new 
generation BITs make significant innovations to investor-State dispute settlement procedures 
such as greater and substantial transparency in arbitral proceedings, including open hearings, 
                                                 
79 UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2005). 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/webiteiit20051_en.pdf> at 30 August 2007.  
80 See 2004 US Model BIT, Annex B (a) (ii) <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf  > at 23 
January 2008; 2004 Canadian Model BIT, Annex B.13 (1) (b) (i) <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Canadian2004-
FIPA-model-en.pdf > at 23 January 2008. 
81 See 2004 US Model BIT, Annex B (b) <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf  > at 23 
January 2008; 2004 Canadian Model BIT, Annex B.13 (1) (c) <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Canadian2004-
FIPA-model-en.pdf > at 23 January 2008. 
82 See 2003 Korea-Chile FTA, the Preamble <http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/Chi-SKorea_e/ChiKoreaind_e.asp > at 







publication of related legal documents, and the possibility for representatives of civil society to 
submit “amicus curiae” briefs to arbitral tribunals.83  
Along with the new developments in investment treaties, arbitral tribunals’ attitude 
towards treaty law also has changed. It has been acknowledged in recent arbitral awards that 
treaty provisions should not limit and restrain the host state’s legitimate rights to regulate an 
investment in accordance with its national policy goals. Particularly, in the CMS Gas Transmission 
Company case the tribunal emphasised: 
 “… these treaties [BIT] cannot entirely isolate foreign investments from the general 
economic situation of a country. They do provide for standards of fair and equitable 
treatment, non-discrimination, guarantees in respect of expropriation and other matters, 
but they cannot prevent a country from pursuing its own economic choices.”84 
In light of these considerations, some departure from the investment-protection-based-
structure of international investment treaties ought to be acknowledged. Investment protection 
is no longer the exclusive aim of international investment treaties. Some public policy measures 
of a host government, especially regarding the environment are also likely to be included in 
investment treaties. 
5.2.2. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The next important source of international law is customary rules or state practice. 
However, unlike treaty rules, customary rules may be difficult to establish due to their 
unwritten nature. In principle, international customs are a general and consistent practice of 
                                                 
83 See 2004 US Model BIT, Art 28 <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf  > at 23 January 
2008; 2004 Canadian Model BIT, Art 19 < http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf > 
at 23 January 2008. 
84 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction) (17 July 2003), 42 
ILM 788 (2003), para 29. 




states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation. Another difficulty is that the evidence 
of state practice can be found in a wide variety of sources.85 
In the field of foreign investment there are a few customary international rules whose 
existence is undisputed.86 The issue of state responsibility for injuries suffered by aliens within 
its territory has historically led to the building up of norms and principles of international law 
on treatment of aliens by host states. Under the norms and principles of international law, a 
state whose subjects were injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another 
state was entitled to protect them. 
The protection of individuals’ rights in international scene was traditionally ensured by 
the method of diplomatic protection.87 Because individuals were not in a position to defend their 
interests at international level, a State had to do this on their behalf. By virtue of the diplomatic 
protection, when a national of one state suffered an injury within another state’s territory, only 
the state of which the individual is a national was entitled to demand reparations. 
The customary international law of diplomatic protection was spelled out in a more 
comprehensive manner in practices of the PCIJ and the ICJ. In the Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions case, decided by the PCIJ in 1924 the Court held: 
“It is true that the dispute was at first between a private person and a state... The 
dispute then entered upon a new phase; it entered the domain of international law, and 
became a dispute between two states... It is an elementary principle of international 
                                                 
85 In 1950, the International Law Commission listed the following sources as forms of evidence of customary 
international law: treaties, decisions of national and international courts, national legislation, opinions of national 
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International Law Commission 367, UN Doc A/CN.4/Ser.A/1950/Add.1 (1957).  
86 Sornarajah argued that if there was customary international law on investment protection, there would be no need 
to confirm so many times over what already existed by making bilateral investment treaties. Sornarajah, above n 
69, 213. 
87 For literature on the law in the area of diplomatic protection, see Edvin Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of 
Citizens Abroad or the Law of International Claims (1915); Frederick Dunn, The Protection of Nationals: A Study in the 








law that a state is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to 
international law committed by another state, from whom they have been unable to 
obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels…Once a state has taken up a case 
on behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter 
the state is sole claimant." 88 
However, a modern principle of protection of foreign investment rejects the use of 
diplomatic protection. This was a conclusion of the drafters of the Washington Convention that, 
in exchange for direct access to an international jurisdiction, investors should not be in a position 
to ask protection from their home States.89  
The next significant rule of customary international law applicable to state/alien 
relationship is the incorporation theory that determines the connection between a certain legal 
person and a state.90 The theory implies that a corporation is a national of a state where the 
foreign legal person is incorporated and physically exists. Shortly, the act of incorporation 
provides for a foreign company a ‘licence” to carry out economic activity on a sovereign territory 
of the state.  
In the sense of the incorporation theory, an incorporated company is a distinct legal 
person separate from its shareholders or individuals founded it. It has its own rights and 
obligations under national law of the state where it is incorporated. Therefore, the shareholders 
of that incorporated company are legally unable to bring disputes between the state and its 
incorporated company under international law, insulating the company from the legal system 
under which it was created and operated. 
                                                 
88 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v UK) [1924] PCIJ (ser A) No 2, at 11-12.  
89 See Executive Directors’ Report, above n 32, para 33.   
90 Though there are also other techniques that determine the corporate nationality, the incorporation theory is the 
dominant one. It has been supported by various writers and has been accepted in arbitral awards, it also has been 
criticized by other scholars. See general discussion of these criteria in Ignaz  Seidl-Hohenveldern, Corporations In 
and Under International Law (1987) Ch 10. Also see Roberto Bruno, Access of Private Parties to International Dispute 
Settlement: A Comparative Analysis (LLM Thesis, NYU School of Law 1997).  




This rule was clearly affirmed by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case. The court here 
stressed that, for purposes of diplomatic protection, the nationality of a company should be 
established by reference to its place of incorporation and its principal seat of management, not 
by reference to the nationality of the controlling shareholders through a lifting of corporate veil.91  
In particular, the Court so held:   
"In allocating corporate entities to states for purposes of diplomatic protection, 
international law is based, but only to a limited extent, on an analogy with the rules 
governing the nationality of individuals. The traditional rule attributes the right of 
diplomatic protection of a corporate entity to the state under the laws of which it is 
incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered office. These two criteria have 
been confirmed by long practice and by numerous international instruments."92 
As the incorporated company is unable to seek diplomatic protection or international 
protection against the country where it is incorporated, this custom would be inconsistent with 
the objective of the theory of internationalisation. However, in order to avoid the conflict and 
extend the scope of investment protection covering all foreign-controlled investments, the 
ICSID Convention made a modification to this rule. Under the Convention, national of another 
contracting state means any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State 
other than the State party to the dispute and which because of foreign control, the parties have 
agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this 
Convention.93 
On the other hand, even if the company is unable to pursue a claim against the host state 
because of the incorporation theory, shareholders in that local company are free to pursue the 
claim in their own names. The ICJ in the ELSI case had recognised the direct protection of 
shareholders under bilateral treaties. In that case, rejecting the Italian argument based on the 
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incorporation theory, the ICJ held that, in respect of acts committed against the corporation, the 
provisions of the Treaty dealing with foreign investment conferred rights on shareholders as 
well.94 Thus, the Court had allowed the United States to protect American nationals who were 
shareholders in an Italian company.  
However, one should note that in the context of investor-state arbitration, tribunals have 
taken inconsistent approaches to the issue of a corporate nationality and used to interpret 
established rules of international law to broaden the scope of investment protection. In earlier 
decisions, tribunals looked beyond the place of incorporation and accepted the ‘control test’ in 
determining the foreign investors’ nationality.95 In recent decisions of investment treaty 
arbitrations, tribunals have opted for the incorporation test instead of inquiring into the actual 
control and ownership of the firm. The mechanical application of the incorporation theory has 
resulted in a transformation of the object and purpose of the whole investor-state arbitration 
system. In the Tokios Tokelës,96 Ukrainian nationals, who established an entity in the territory of 
Lithuania and re-invested in their home state, were regarded by the tribunal as “foreign 
investors”, so they were allowed to pursue international arbitration against their own 
government.97 Likewise, in the Saluka, nationals of third country (the UK) who have been 
                                                 
94 Elettronica Sicula SpA (ELSI) (United States v. Italy) [1989] ICJ Rep 15. 
95 In Amco v Indonesia, SOABI v Senegal and Klockner v Cameroon, the tribunals rejected the incorporation theory and 
regarded the incorporated entities as foreign nationals on the basis of the “control test”.  See Amco Asia 
Corporation and Others v Republic of Indonesia (Award on Jurisdiction) (25 September 1983), 23 ILM 351, 1 ICSID 
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decision was inconsistent with the ICSID Convention’s goal to protect ‘truly international investment’ and not to 
intervene in domestic disputes. For a detail, see Prof Prosper Weil, ‘Dissenting Opinion of April 29, 2004’ (2005) 
20 ICSID Review- Foreign Investment Law Journal 245.  




incorporated under the contracting party’s territory (the Netherlands) enjoyed treaty 
protections when investing into another contracting party (Czech Republic).98  
Another example of customary rule in the area of law that applies to disputes between a 
state and foreign people living in its territory is the exhaustion of local remedies rule. In the 
Interhandel case the ICJ stated that: 
“The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may 
be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law; the rule has been 
generally observed in cases in which a State has adopted the cause of its national 
whose rights are claimed to have been disregarded in another State in violation of 
international law. Before resort may be had to an international court in such a 
situation, it has been considered necessary that the State where the violation occurred 
should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its 
own domestic system.”99 
The rule was further developed by the ICJ in the ELSI case. In that case, the court 
rejected the US argument that the exhaustion of local remedies was unnecessary because the 
subject of the dispute was a breach of treaty. It held that an important principle of international 
law should not be rebutted unless parties in the treaty not to exhaust local remedies.100 The US 
further claimed that the US itself suffered for the breach of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
Treaty (FCN Treaty), so the dispute in question is between states on the plane of international law. 
The court however, rejected the US submission on the ground that it had to look at the nature 
of the dispute, but not the relief sought. Accordingly, it held that the US claim was not based on 
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the alleged violation of its own rights and the claim was brought on behalf of injured nationals.101 
The ELSI decision thus provided an important development in the rule.102 
Like the rule of diplomatic protection, the exhaustion of local remedies rule also has 
been left out in the practice of investment arbitration because the use of local courts was avoided 
for purposes of internationalising foreign investment contracts. Modern arbitral tribunals, 
including both ICSID and non-ICSID tribunals, take a position enabling foreign investors to 
institute international arbitration directly without first going to domestic courts of the host 
state.103 But a host state may still insist on the local exhaustion rule through treaty negotiation. 
Particularly, some BITs contain a provision requiring using domestic remedies for a certain 
period of time.104  
However, the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies before bringing a claim to 
international arbitration may be overridden by a Most Favourable Nation (MFN) clause in an 
investment treaty. The issue was first addressed in Maffezini v Spain,105 where the claimant 
invoked the MFN standard of the Argentina-Spain BIT providing for fair and equitable 
treatment to benefit broad dispute settlement provision contained in the Chile-Spain BIT.106  
                                                 
101 Ibid, para 52 
102 After the ELSI decision modifications were made in statutes of some countries. Eg, the Third Restatement (1989) 
confirmed the principle stating that: 
“Under international law, before a State can make a formal claim on behalf of a private person … that person 
must ordinarily exhaust domestic remedies available in the responding State… local remedies need not to 
be exhausted for violations of international law not involving private persons.” Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1989), Part II, para 902, cmt k, p. 348. 
103 See Lanco v  Argentina (Decision on Jurisdiction) (8 December 1998), 40 ILM 457, 469/70 (2001), para 39; Yaung 
Chi Oo v Myanmir (Award) (31 March 2003), 42 ILM 540, 547/48 (2002), para 40; Loewen Group Inc and Raymond L 
Loewen v United States of America (Award) (26 June 2003), 42 ILM 811 (2003), paras 142 et seq. 
104 Argentina - Germany BIT, Art 10 available 
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Art 10 available at <http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/france_morocco_fr.pdf> at 25 January 
2008.  
105 Emilio Augustín Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain (Decision on Jurisdiction) (25 January 2000), 40 ILM 1129 (2001). 
106 The Argentina-Spain BIT, at issue in that case, contained a dispute settlement clause for investment disputes 
provided for a six-month negotiation phase before the dispute could be submitted to the competent courts of the 




There is now a string of tribunals addressing the question of the applicability of MFN clauses 
to dispute settlement arrangement, but the tribunals have been divided over the issue.107  
Furthermore, it has been shown by some academics that certain rules such as rules on 
the minimum standard for the treatment of aliens and rules on nationalisation and 
expropriation are beginning to develop in contemporary international law as custom.108 But 
due to the persistent mutual distrust between developed and developing states, state practice in 
this area of law continues to differ in significant ways. Yet, for validity of customary 
international law, it is important that rules and principles have to be uniformly accepted by 
states as obligatory.109 
Since the mid-nineteen-fifties, there has been a tension between the competing norms 
in the normative content of international minimum standard as a result of a newly emerging 
                                                                                                                                                    
host State and, failing the settlement of the dispute after the expiration of a period of eighteen months, to 
international arbitration, whereas the Chile-Spain BIT did not provide for the settlement of disputes through 
domestic courts for a period of 18 months, but rather for international arbitration after a six-month negotiation 
period. The Maffezini tribunal held: 
 “… if a third-party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of disputes that are more favorable to the 
protection of the investor’s rights and interests than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended 
to the beneficiary of the most favored nation clause…”.  Ibid, para 52-56.  
107 There have been at least six ICSID tribunals: four of them supported the Maffezini ruling (Siemens AG v Argentine 
Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction) (3 August 2004), 44 ILM 138 (2005); Camuzzi Int’l SA v Argentine Republic 
(Decision on Jurisdiction) (10 June 2005) <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Camuzzi2jurisdiction.pdf > at 21 
November 2007; Gas Natural SDG, SA v Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction) (17 June 2005) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/GasNaturalSDG-DecisiononPreliminaryQuestionsonJurisdiction.pdf > at 21 
November 2007 and Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA and Vivendi Universal, SA v Argentine Republic 
(Decision on Jurisdiction) (3 August 2006) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SuezVivendiAWGjurisdiction.pdf> at 21 November 2007) and two tribunals 
rejected it (Salini Costruttori SpA v The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Decision on Jurisdiction) (29 November 2004), 
44 ILM 573 (2005) and Plama Consortium Ltd v Republic of Bulgaria (Decision on Jurisdiction) (8 February 2005) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/plamavbulgaria.pdf > at 21 November 2007). 
 Non- ICSID tribunals also split over the issue. In Rosinvestco UK Ltd v Russian Federation (Award on Jurisdiction), 
SCC Case No V079/2005) the tribunal supported the Maffezini approach, while in Berschader & Berschader v Russian 
Federation (Award on Jurisdiction), SCC Case No 080/2004 and National Grid PLC v Argentine Republic (Decision on 
Jurisdiction) (20 June 2006), UNCITRAL Arbitration, the tribunals refused to extend the MFN standard to the 
dispute settlement procedure.  
108 Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001) 612. 
109As  acknowledged by distinguished jurist, Jennings, “It is vital above all to keep constantly in mind that the first 
and essential general principle of public international law is its quality of universality; that is to say, that it be 
recognised as a valid and applicable law in all countries, whatever their cultural, economic, socio-political, or 
religious histories and traditions.” See Robert Jennings, ‘Universal International Law in a Multicultural World‘ in 







values and moral standards concerning, inter alia, developmental needs or developmental 
prerogatives of developing countries.110 Even the rapidly increasing practice of bilateral 
investment treaties cannot help in this regard. Though the structure of the different bilateral 
investment treaties has a basic similarity, there is no consistency in the solutions adopted by 
them that could give rise to any uniform principle.  
Meanwhile, it is argued that some principles contained in of the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions endorse a customary international law standard.111 Particularly, developing 
states with a majority in the UN GA have called, mainly in the 1970s for the acceptance of the 
1962 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources112 as a customary rule. Other legal and 
political declarations of this period such as the Declaration on the New International Economic Order113 
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States114 also may be regarded as customary law, as 
these resolutions represent voices of a large number of states compare with its rejection by 
individual arbitrators or publicists.   
Lastly, one should note another weakness of customary rule. From the positivist view 
of international law, not all custom binds states. The recognition of custom as a binding rule 
depends on the will of the state concerned. In this sense, if a state expressly refused for certain 
duration to accept certain customs, those customs do not reflect a sense of duty in relation to 
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that state.115 Then, every practice of state does not become a rule of international law merely 
because it is widely followed. It must be deemed by states to be obligatory as a matter of law.116 
5.2.3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
The third significant source of international law, though its content is difficult to reveal, 
is general principles of law. First of all, it is difficult to draw boundaries of general principles of 
law. It refers to any rules beyond national law such as generally accepted principles, principles 
common to several or all legal systems, rules or principles of public international law, trade 
usages or lex mercatoria, which are in whole often termed “transnational rules”.117 Therefore, in 
this extremely broad context, a choice of international law based on general principles of law may 
lead to vagueness and blindness. 
Another potential weakness of general principles of law derives from the fact that norms 
which are said to be general principles of law are often inconsistent with each other. As a result, a 
very limited number of principles such as pacta sunt servanda and the duty to act in good faith are 
found as general rules accepted in most legal systems. Thus, they were often pointed out in a 
number of cases, where the application of international law is supported.118  
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117 Masood stated: 
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something distinct from international law, or transnational law or the new law merchant”. Archad Masood, ‘Law 
Applicable in Arbitration of Investment Disputes under the World Bank Convention’ (1973)15 Journal of Indian 
Law Institute 311, 317.  
118 See Adriano Cardella SpA v Government of Cote d’Ivoire (Arbitral Award) (29 August 1977), 1 ICSID Rep 283; Klockner 







It is true that general principles of law were one of the foundations upon which the 
theory of internationalisation was built. Particularly, the three arbitral decisions on petroleum 
concessions that created the idea of internationalisation were based on the general principles of 
law as the proper law of the contract. In the Abu Dhabi case, after declaring that the Islamic law is 
not sophisticated enough to deal with the matter, Lord Asquith then proceeded to apply “the 
principles rooted in good sense and common practice of the generality of civilized nations- a sort 
of modern law of the nature.”119 In the Qatar case, the tribunal relied on “the principle of justice, 
equity and good conscience”.120 Similar views were stated in third case, the Aramco Arbitration121.  
Several other rules also were extracted as general principles in certain arbitral awards 
and academic works and were used to support the necessary application of international law to 
state contracts. Among them are “the doctrine of acquired rights” 122 which is said to protect 
property rights and “the doctrine of estoppel” 123 which is said to prevent a state denying the 
validity of the contract once the work has commenced on its basis. Though the applicability of 
such claims have been advanced by the supporters of the theory of internationalization, their 
status as general principles of law have been disputed by other academics.124 
Furthermore, because public international law contains no rule dealing with contracts, 
arbitrators, when resorting to international law, frequently fall back on principles traditionally 
used in private international law.125 Thus, commercial law rules including the choice of law rules 
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and party autonomy are widely utilised by international investment arbitration in settling disputes 
between a state and a foreign investor. But from a legal point of a view, a state should not be 
bound by such rules of commercial law without its consent. Moreover, for quite long time there 
have been criticisms regarding the existence of general principles of law or lex mercatoria.126 
However, now one may not deny the existence of the system, rather may question its validity and 
effect on the particular case.   
Given the evidences on the general principles of law, the application of general principles 
of law to contracts is deemed to be unsatisfactory option. As Chukwumerije summed up the 
situation, 
“The truth is that despite the attraction of the concept of general principles of law to 
academic writers and some arbitrators, these principles do not constitute a readily 
identifiable and comprehensive system of rules to regulate the complex contractual 
relations that are often involved in State contracts. It would seem that any principle that 
is indeed general to a genuinely representative selection of legal systems would often be 
too broad as to be unhelpful in specific cases.”127 
5.2.4. JUDICIAL DOCTRINES AND WRITINGS OF PUBLICISTS 
In developed legal systems, the formal sources of law which are expressly stated in rules 
and adopted by high legislative organs create valid legal norms. However, due to the absence of 
central law making authority, international law lacks such formal sources which can readily apply. 
Accordingly, to supplement the scarcity of rules of international law, judicial decisions and 
writings of highly qualified publicists are sometimes referred to as a means of interpreting the law 
established in other sources. They are therefore, regarded as subsidiary sources of the law.  
                                                 
126 Kubn wrote: 
 “The dispute over the question of whether such international trade law [lex mercatoria or transnational law] exists 
started in the 1960s and the literature on this is endless.” Wolfgang Kubn, ‘Express and Implied Choice of 
Substantive Law in the Practice of International Arbitration’ in Albert Berg (ed), Planning Efficient Arbitration 
Proceedings: The Law Applicable in International Arbitration (1994) 382.  







In the practice of ICSID arbitration, the tribunals often rely on previous ICSID 
decisions128as well as decisions of other arbitral tribunals such as the Permanent Court of Justice 
and of the of the International Court of Justice,129and the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.130 Recently, 
one researcher who analysed 207 publicly available decisions, awards and orders issued by ICSID 
tribunals has revealed that the tribunals increasingly cite them in much the same manner that 
common law courts do.131 Since 2001, the frequency of citation to ICSID case-law has increased 
significantly ranging in average from six to nine.132 
But it should be acknowledged that the case law is not such reliable source of law 
because the application of case law depends on one’s view of the prior case. In this sense, 
decisions of previous arbitral tribunals themselves are not always considered to be binding 
sources of law. Notably, the three oil arbitrations which gave birth to the theory of 
internationalisation departed from the previously accepted principle in prior cases that a contract 
between a state and a foreign private party is governed only by the municipal law of that state. 
Instead, the arbitrators relied on own individual opinions.  
                                                 
128 In recent years it has become very common for ICSID tribunals to cite previous decisions. Eg, the criteria used in 
the Salini (Salini Construtorri SpA and Italstrade SpA v Morocco (Decision on Jurisdiction) (23 July 2001), 42 ILM 609 
(2003)) for defining whether foreign investment contract can be considered as investment have been followed in a 
number of recent cases such as Bayindir Insaat Turism Ticaret Ve Sanyi AS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Decision on 
Jurisdiction) (14 November 2005) <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Bayindr-jurisdiction.pdf > at 22 December 
2007 and Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v The Government of Malaysia (Decision on Jurisdiction) (17 May 2007), 
paras 66-68 <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MHS-jurisdiction.pdf > at 23 November 2007.  
129 See Amco v Indonesia (Award) (20 November 1984), 1 ICSID Rep 413, 500; (Decision on Annulment) (16 May 
1986), 1 ICSID Rep 509, 520; Klockner v Cameroon (Award) (21 October 1983), 2 ICSID Rep 9, 63; SPP v Egypt 
(Decision on Jurisdiction II) (14 April 1988), 3 ICSID Rep 131, 142/3; (Award) (20 May 1992), 3 ICSID Rep 228, 
234;  Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Sri Lanka (Award) (27 June 1990), 4 ICSID Rep 256, 265, 271 (‘AAPL v Sri 
Lanka’); Tradex v Albania (Award) (29 April 1999) 14 ICSID Review- Foreign Investment Law Journal 197, 247 (1999).  
130 For example, Amco v Indonesia (Award) (20 November 1984) 1 ICSID Rep 413; SPP v Egypt (Award) (20 May 
1992), 3 ICSID Rep 229; Tradex v Albania (Award) (29 April 1999), 14 ICSID Review- Foreign Investment Law Journal 
197, 232, 241, 247 (1999).  
131 Jeffrey Commission, ‘Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Empirical Backing’ (2007) 24 (2) Journal of 
International Arbitration 148.  
132 Ibid, 150, Table 4.  




Meanwhile, there have been many incidents of resolving this kind of disputes involving a 
consideration of public international law by private commercial arbitrators, whose decisions have 
little or doubtful value to accept as a precedent.133 On the other hand, there is a danger that the 
establishment of different tribunals under different treaties may lead to inconsistent decisions 
interpreting the same standard and same situations differently.134 Owing to these defects, it may 
be impossible to speak of international investment jurisprudence.  
The writings of recognised publicists may provide persuasive evidence of current and 
prospective international law on the investigation of theories and expansive researches.135 But, 
because of the politicization of the issue of foreign investment, most writing on the issue is one-
sided either presenting a Western perspective or that of developing states. Such politically-biased 
and inaccurate publications are quite dangerous and should not be accepted as a source of law. 
Even so, it is not unusual for an ICSID tribunal to cite scholarly writings to support its 
position.136 
5.3. Summary of  Findings  
This chapter examined sources of international law developed in the context of the 
theory of internationalisation. Conventional international law not only lacked generally accepted 
rules to resolve investment disputes, it could not offer foreign investors much protection. 
Therefore, developed states felt the need to establish a regime of protections for their nationals 
                                                 
133 Eg, Berschader & Berschader v The Russian Federation (Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce). About this award see Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Russia prevails in Stockholm arbitration with Belgian 
construction firm owners’ Investment Treaty News (ITN) (August 23, 2006) 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_aug23_2006.pdf> at 21 December 2007. 
134 Franck describes three major sets of inconsistent decisions that have caused uncertainty about the meaning of 
rights in investment treaties. See Susan Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis in investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 1521. 
135 Currently, there is a tendency that the writings of highly qualified publicists include treatises, draft conventions 
and reports of the International Law Commission of the United Nations, and the reports and resolutions of non-
governmental groups such as the American Society of International Law, the International Law Association, the 
Institute de Droit International and the American Law Institute.  
136Eg, in Salini case, arbitrators often referred to E. Gaillard. See Salini Construtorri SpA and Italstrade SpA v Morocco 







undertaking direct foreign investment in other countries. A whole set of rules concerning the 
foreign investment thus was formulated mainly through arbitral practices and treaty negotiations 
to provide protection for foreign investors.  
Since 1960s, western capital-exporting states started to conclude BITs with individual 
capital-importing states to ensure the stability of the operating structure of investments made by 
their nationals. The legal framework that emerged in the context of BITs does not adequately 
address environmental and social aspects linked to foreign investment.  As a result, many rights 
and privileges of states under international law such as states’ ability to regulate in areas such as 
environmental protection and human health have been constrained by participation in such 
investment agreements. This is especially the case for developing or capital importing states as 
they are main recipients of foreign investment.  
However, the US and Canada’s experience under NAFTA made the governments to 
realize that excessive protections granted to TNCs may require host countries to pay 
compensation for adopting environmental, health and social measures. Concerned by such 
negative results, some developed states who traditionally have championed liberalisation and 
better protection of foreign investment have now sought to limit to a certain extent the rights of 
foreign investors. The FTA between the US and Australia which abandoned the investor-state 
dispute settlement provisions is the best example. The trend is also reflected in modern types of 
BITs as many new BITs now recognise the right of the host country to exercise regulatory 
powers with respect to environmental concerns of foreign investment.  
In the area of foreign investment, there have not been many definite and precise 
customary rules apart from the rule of diplomatic protection, the rule of exhaustion of local 
remedies and the theory of incorporation. However, these old rules of customary international 
law have been excluded in the light of efforts to internationalise foreign investment contracts. 




Besides, the recommendations and standards proposed by one group of states are often seen as 
politically-biased by other group and not adequate for accepting as international custom. As a 
result, there has been developed no new custom applicable to foreign investment disputes. 
General principles of commercial law have been extensively applied to foreign 
investment disputes as international law has not elaborated special rules designed for such 
disputes. Since international law lacks primary sources that could apply to foreign investment 
contracts, international investment arbitrators often rely on subsidiary sources such as judicial 
and arbitral decisions and writings of highly qualified publicists. But it seems hard to make 
selection of such sources, because of the divergence of views in scholarly writings. Arbitral 
jurisprudence also lacks consistency.  
CHAPTER SIX: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
CONCERNING ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT  
6.1. Development of  New Principles Reflecting Sovereign Power  
The struggle of developing countries for the right to enjoy benefits of natural resource 
exploitation has caused the development of new principles and rules of international law such as 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, self-determination and right to development.  
These principles and norms, whose status has increasingly been recognised in international law 
have weakened the further progress of the internationalisation.  These norms must now be 
examined. 
6.1.1. CALVO DOCTRINE OR NATIONAL TREATMENT RULE 
One of the earliest doctrines that was built up by developing states to fully protect their 
economic right to exploit their own natural resources and wealth is the so-called Calvo doctrine.137 
                                                 







Primarily, the doctrine was developed and supported by Latin American countries at the 
beginning of 20th century. To respond to abuses in the nineteenth century by western states of 
the right of diplomatic protection of their citizens abroad, these countries claimed that foreign 
investment operations are matters of domestic jurisdiction.  
In this context of the Calvo doctrine, two requirements were imposed in relation to 
foreigners entering into foreign investment contracts with a host state.138 First, a foreigner is 
required to waive the diplomatic protection of his home state and rights under international law, 
and rely solely on local remedies. Second, foreigners are not to be afforded greater rights than 
locals and that domestic law apply to, and local courts adjudicate, investment disputes.  
Thus, the doctrine was not the mere product of competing socio-political or economic 
struggles in an international society, but rather it was a legal concept based on at least two rules 
of customary international law. In first instance, there has been a customary rule according to 
which a foreigner is obliged to exhaust local remedies as a prerequisite to international redress.139 
In addition, the central core of international law on foreign investment was to provide national 
treatment under which foreigners may be treated as favourably as nationals but are not entitled 
to better treatment.  
The validity of the Calvo Clause was never fully denied in judicial decisions. The leading 
arbitral decision addressing the issue of validity of the clause in contracts between an alien and 
the host state is the North American Dredging Company Case.140  In that case in order to secure the 
award of the contract, the claimant agreed to the inclusion of the Calvo Clause which reads:  
“The contractor and all persons who, as employees or in any other capacity, may be 
engaged in the execution of the work under this contract either directly or indirectly, 
shall be considered as Mexicans in all matters, within the Republic of Mexico, 
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concerning the execution of such work and the fulfilment of this contract. They shall 
not claim, nor shall they have, with regard to the interests and the business connected 
with this contract, any other rights or means to enforce the same than those granted 
by the laws of the Republic to Mexicans, nor shall they enjoy any other rights than 
those established in favour of Mexicans. They are consequently deprived of any rights 
as aliens, and under no conditions shall the intervention of foreign diplomatic agents 
be permitted, in any matter related to this contract."141 
The US-Mexican Claims Commission accorded to the Calvo Clause what has been 
referred to as a “rule of limited validity”.142 More specifically, the Commission held that as a 
part of contractual undertakings, the clause must be upheld.143 At the same time, the 
Commission held that the right of diplomatic protection belongs not to a national, but to  a 
home state, so an alien cannot deprive its government of the right of protection against 
breaches of international law.144 Accordingly, the claimant was free to apply to its government 
for protection if the claimant’s resort to Mexican tribunals resulted in a denial or delay of 
justice.145 Applying these principles, the Commission found that the claimant was precluded by 
the Calvo Clause from presenting its claim to its government for a breach of contract, and 
dismissed its claim.146  
However, over the last few decades the Calvo doctrine was rejected in light of efforts 
internationalising state contracts. The establishment of the ICSID arbitration as specialized 
investor-state arbitration made the use of local courts unnecessary.  Besides, the acceptance of 
the Hull formula of “prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation147 in a large number of 
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144 Ibid, para 11.  
145 Ibid, para 15.  
146 Ibid, para. 20-21.  
147 Initially, the rule was advocated by the US Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 1932. He insisted that the 







BITs in the 1970s and the 1980s has become a blow for the Calvo doctrine which recognises 
the equality of nationals and aliens.  
In addition, the effect of the Calvo doctrine has lessened within Latin America itself 
because the traditionally hostile attitude of Latin American countries towards international 
arbitration has changed significantly in the past twenty years. Mexico, a long-time proponent of 
the Calvo doctrine, for example has accepted Chapter XI of the NAFTA. Many other countries 
in Latin America have entered into bilateral investment treaties (BITs) taking approaches that 
also dramatically depart from the Calvo doctrine.148 
Nevertheless, the strength of the Calvo doctrine may be superseded, but its ideas 
continued.  The doctrine served as a foundation of the efforts of developing states to assert their 
right to control over their economies. A number of new principles and doctrines of international 
law further have advanced the Calvo doctrine and claimed for host states the right to control 
foreign investment operations. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States for instance, states 
that disputes over compensation arising from the expropriation of foreign property “shall be 
settled under the domestic law of the nationalising State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely 
and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of 
the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.” 149 
Meanwhile, Schreuer recently observed that the Calvo style rule of local remedies is reappearing 
in modern international law in a number of ways.150  
                                                 
148 United States-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, which entered into force in 1994, has been hailed as a model 
investment treaty for Latin America. The BIT represents Argentina’s final abandonment of the Calvo doctrine 
because it provides for the settlement of investment disputes through international arbitration without prior 
exhaustion of local remedies See Edward Snyder,  ‘The Menem Revolution in Argentina: Progress towards a 
Hemispheric Free Trade Area’ (1994) 29 Texas International Law Journal 95, 113.  
149 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Art 2, para 2 (c), GA Res 3281 (XXIX), UN GAOR, 29th secc, UN 
Doc A/Res/3281 (XXIX) (1974). 
150 First, some BITs require that domestic remedies must be utilized for certain period of time before the claim is 
brought to an international arbitration. Second, some investment contracts contain the domestic forum selection 
clause. Third, some tribunals have held that they have jurisdiction, but an investor should make an attempt at local 




6.1.2. DOCTRINE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 
When ex-colonial territories got their independence, the natural resources within their 
territories were the only means of existence of the states economically. In this respect, it was 
essential to manage and control their resources and wealth by themselves. Therefore, since the 
early 1950s, developing countries have claimed the right of previously-colonized people to 
benefit from the natural resources within their territories. 
This right was expressed through the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources as reflected in the United Nations Resolution.151 As the first democratic international 
organisation that unites all states regardless of the size of their territories, civilisation, economic 
and political situation, the UN was the main forum for the progressive development of 
international law rules and their implementation. In 1958 the Commission on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources was established by the General Assembly Resolution 1314 
(XIII) which was responsible for making sessions and drafting the resolutions. 152 
However, the process of adopting this historical document was not easy and it was 
delayed for a certain time because of ideological struggles of developed and developing states 
originating from the so called north-south debate. The western world was interested in adopting 
mechanisms which can give foreign investors much more freedom, while developing states 
wanted more rights to manage their economy.153 After all, the long debate was ended by enacting 
                                                                                                                                                    
remedies for a violation substantive international standards. For detail see Christoph Schreuer, ‘Calvo’s 
Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration’ (2005) 4 (1) The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 1.  In this regard, also see n 107 and accompanying text.  
151 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA Res 1803 (XVII), UN GAOR, 17th secc, 1194th plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/Res/1803 (XVII) (1962).  
152 The new Commission had nine member States chosen by the President of the UN GA on the basis of 
geographical distribution: Afghanistan, Chile, Guatemala, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Sweden, the USSR, 
the United Arab Republic (UAR) and the USA. For a report on the background and adoption of GA Res. 1314 
(XIII) of 12 December 1958, see UN Doc A/AC.97/1, 12 May 1959 and UNYB 1958, at 212–14. 
153 On 5 May 1961, USSR submitted an extensive draft resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources. Its operative paragraph 1 spelled out in detail the discretionary rights of peoples and nations arising 







the historical document that gave the principle momentum under international law in the 
decolonisation process.  
The principle of permanent sovereignty implies the formulation of a set of rights aimed 
at protecting the legal capacity of sovereign states to dispose freely of natural resources. The 
original scope and content of the principle is very much seen in the provisions of the GA 
Resolution. In this resolution the GA declared:  
"The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth 
and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of 
the well-being of the people of the State-concerned. The exploration, development 
and disposition of such resources, as well as the import of the foreign capital for these 
purposes, should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples 
and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the 
authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities”.154  
What is more important is that the GA Resolution tried to link the right of people of 
the host state to fully control their resources with the responsibility of states and the 
international community as well. Thus, it further declares that: 
“Violation of the right of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth 
and resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and hinders the development of international cooperation and the 
maintenance of peace." 155 
Therefore, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural recourses implies that 
people of every country have a right to control fully their resources and their economies, while 
                                                                                                                                                    
exploitation of resources; to control foreign investors in their territory, including the distribution and transfer of 
profits; and to carry out nationalization and expropriation measures ‘without let or hindrance’. Such approach was 
heavily criticized by the USA and the Netherlands as being a one-sided document which disregarded the 
importance of international economic co-operation for development and the need of respect for rules of 
international law. Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Report of the Third Session in 
UN Doc A/AC.97/L.2, 5 May 1961; UN Doc A/AC.97/SR.25, 15 May 1961, at 3 and SR.26, 16 May 1961, at 
4–5.  
154 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, ss 1 and 2, GA Res 1803 (XVII), UN GAOR, 17th secc, 1194th plen mtg, 
UN Doc A/Res/1803 (XVII) (1962).  
155 Ibid, s 7.  




their governments have a primary legal obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the people’s 
right. In other words, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a 
concept of rights as well as a concept of duties. 156 
The ideas of free control of natural resources and economic activities by a state were 
further reaffirmed in a series of more radical Resolutions.157 Notably, the UN Charter on 
Economic Rights and Duties of States which objective is to establish generally accepted principles 
and norms of international economic relations proclaims:  
“Each State has the right: To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign 
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State 
adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all 
circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of 
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of 
the nationalizing State and by its tribunals…”158 
According to Schachter, 159 the concept of permanent sovereignty justifies states’ right 
to exercise control over production and distribution arrangements ‘without being hampered by 
the international law of state responsibility’. Therefore, it would be a mistake to consider the 
idea of permanent sovereignty over resources as ‘anachronistic nationalistic rhetoric’. Rather, it 
should be viewed as ‘a fresh manifestation of present aspirations for self-rule and greater 
equality’. 
 
                                                 
156 Dr Shrijver analysing what kind of duties the principle of permanent sovereignty may give rise found the duties 
such as the exercise of permanent sovereignty for national development and the well-being of people, respect for 
the rights and interests of indigenous peoples, duty to cooperate for international development, sustainable use of 
natural resources, the equitable sharing of transboundary natural resources, respect for international law and fair 
treatment of foreign investors and obligations related to the right to take foreign property. Nico Shrijver, Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources- Balancing Rights and Duties (1997) 306-344. 
157 See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, GA Res 3201 (S-VI), UN GAOR, 6th secc, 
2229th plen mtg, UN Doc A/Res/3201 (S-VI) (1974); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res 3281 
(XXIX), UN GAOR, 29th secc, UN Doc A/Res/3281 (XXIX) (1974). 
158 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Art 2 (2) (c), GA Res 3281 (XXIX), UN GAOR, 29th secc, UN Doc 
A/Res/3281 (XXIX) (1974). 







6.1.3. PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION  
The next principle that supports the host state’s right to control the entry and activity of 
aliens is the principle of self-determination. In the beginning of the new era of international law 
or in 1945, it was proclaimed by the UN Charter that peoples of a whole territory have a right to 
determine their political status, in particular against colonial, racist or occupying regimes. The 
primary goal of the proposed principle was indeed to revolt against colonial rule. It arises in the 
de-colonization process when the people of the area are not control of their own governance.  
However, it should be noted that the idea of self-determination was not a new concept. 
It has historically arisen much earlier, particularly in about the fifteenth or sixteenth century 
when the law of nations was beginning to be thought of as law of separate entities representing 
nations.160 Certainly, throughout the history of international law, the content of the notion of 
self-determination has been changed.161 But the concept remains a foundation of the existence 
of an independent State.   
In the contemporary globalising world, the principle is a fundamental human right of 
people freely to determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development because independence is meaningless without self-determination.  When a non-
self governing territory like Tibet regards the principle as a way to achieve independence, for 
the independent states it means that people or nation of that state can determine their political 
and economic policies and have full and complete sovereignty over all their natural wealth and 
resources.  
Compared to the principle of permanent sovereignty, self-determination has a higher 
legal status, which means the principle of self-determination now figures among the purposes 
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of the United Nations Charter and a number of other UN documents, which have an obligatory 
nature. Particularly, the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights affirm the principle declaring that: 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.  
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence. 162 
Most importantly, in the context of the self determination principle, the human rights 
covenants squarely recognised the right of developing states to determine status of foreign 
investors who operate within their territories. As the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights states; 
“Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, 
may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in 
the present Covenant to non-nationals.”163  
Furthermore, the realisation of the right of self-determination is interconnected with the 
concept of permanent sovereignty over natural recourses. Both principles support economic 
independence as a basic right of peoples and nations. As the former UN Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali indicated, both sovereignty and self-determination are principles of great value 
and importance and should not be in conflict, but should be complementary to and in balance 
                                                 
162 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), opened for signature 19 December1966, 999 UNTS 171, 
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(CESCR), opened for signature 19 December 1966,  993 UNTS 3,  Art 1 (1) and (2) (entered into force 3 January 
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with each other.164 But the proposals of developing states to link the provisions on the right of 
people to self-determination with the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
were also faced with strong opposition from the Western world.165 
6.1.4. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT  
The "right to development" is a more contested concept, which has sharpened the 
controversy between developed and developing world. Though the issue is extensively studied 
elsewhere there is still no consensus on the content, nature and status of the concept.166 So far 
Russel Barsh noted, “Jurists from the South enumerated the possible subjects and objects of this 
right, while jurists from the North questioned whether it existed at all.”167  
However, in the light of considerations of international human rights, it has now 
widely been recognised that development is a vital step towards ensuring human rights 
because, when people are in poverty, it often results in denial of basic human rights. The UN 
Declaration on the Right to Development168 characterizes development as a comprehensive 
economic, social, cultural and political process that aims at the constant improvement of the 
well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and 
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting 
there from.169  
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Development, London, 2002). 
167 Russel Barsh, ‘The Right to Development as a Human Right: Results of the Global Consultation’ (1991) 13 
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Indeed, other important international legal documents also emphasize respect for 
human rights, better standards of living, full employment, social and economic progress as key 
factors in keeping peace. Notably, this was clearly expressed in Article 55 of the UN Charter:  
“With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations...the United Nations shall 
promote : (a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic 
and social progress and development; (b) solutions of international economic, social, 
health, and related problems....(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion.” 
The concept of development is constantly changing reflecting some new trends in the 
international arena. One important line of the argument was that whether the right creates an 
international obligation on the part of developed states to provide development assistance to 
developing states. Such an interpretation of the concept has been resisted by the developed 
nations.  
In fact, the Declaration suggests that ensuring sustainable development is already a part 
of general international law. In other words, both developed and developing countries should 
be equally responsible for it. In this regard, as the Declaration specified,  
“States have the ... duty to formulate ... national development policies that aim at the 
constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population.... States have the 
duty to take steps ... to formulate international development policies with a view to 
facilitating the full realization of the right to development.... States should take steps to 
eliminate obstacles to development resulting from failure to observe civil and political 
rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights.... All states should promote ... 
international peace and ... should do their utmost to achieve ... disarmament ... [and] to 
ensure that ... resources released by ... disarmament ... are used for ... development.... 
States ... shall ensure... equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, 
education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of 
income...."170 
                                                 







6.2. Emerging International Economic Development Law  
Almost half century ago some academics promoted an idea of a specific legal system 
which deals with foreign investment contracts.171 However, it was unclear what the content of 
the new branch of legal system is, and on what principles it must be rest on. There was even a 
controversy how the law can be termed. Many versions were suggested such as public 
international economic law or transnational law or international commercial law.  
Much of the international law on foreign investment that has emerged over the last few 
decades is a reflection of the theory of internationalisation emphasising the protection of foreign 
investors. But in parallel with this development, another set of legal rules have been developed 
setting a dualistic normative standard in international economic relations. In other words, 
international law of economic development which focuses on the rights of other party of foreign 
investment contracts also has emerged.  
Thus, it is important to examine the status of these principles and also the nature of the 
new branch of international law, ie the law on economic development. 
6.2.1. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEW PRINCIPLES: ARE THEY CUSTOM? 
To be sure whether the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and 
other new principles reflect obligatory rules, it is important to look at the legal effects of those 
principles. As regards the international instruments that proposed the principles, it is often 
claimed that a series of GA Resolutions signifies the existence of a rule of international 
customary law despite its non-binding nature. The claim is not just related to those resolutions 
                                                 
171 For example, Prof Dupuy in Texaco case stated “Contracts between States and private persons, under certain 
conditions, come within the ambit of a particular and a new branch of international law: the international law of 
contracts.” Texaco v Libya 53 ILR 309, 389 (1977).  At the same time, another author claimed “the commercial law 
of nations which, admittedly, is in stati nascendi also applies to the relationship between states and private parties.” F 
A Mann, ‘Reflections on a Commercial Law of Nations’ (1957) 33 British  Year Book of International Law 20, 22-23.  




on natural resources, but it also involves other important resolutions which deal with 
international cooperation.172 The assurance is derived from many arguments. 
Firstly, the rules contained in these resolutions were not novel concepts. The principle 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, for instance, was based on the traditional 
ideology of sovereign statehood.  Under conventional international law, sovereign states are 
entitled to exercise exclusive internal jurisdiction. In the Texaco Award the tribunal recognised:  
“… The right of a State to nationalise is unquestionable today. It results from 
international customary law, established as the result of general practices considered by 
the international community as being the law. The exercise of the national sovereignty 
to nationalise is regarded as the expression of the State’s territorial sovereignty. 
Territorial Sovereignty confers upon the State an exclusive competence to organise as 
it wishes the economic structures of its territory and to introduce therein any reforms 
which may seem desirable to it.  It is an essential prerogative of sovereignty for the 
constitutionally authorized authorities of the State to choose and build freely an 
economic and social system. International law recognises that a State has this 
prerogative just as it has the prerogative to determine freely its political regime and its 
constitutional institutions”.173    
Subsequently, it was not surprising that main elements and parts of the principles of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and self-determination were also included in a 
number of legally binding multilateral treaties such as the two Human Rights Covenants (1966),174 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981),175 the two Vienna Conventions on Succession of 
                                                 
172 For instance, it is argued that the Resolution 1653(XVI) of 24 November 1961 on the prohibition of nuclear 
weapons demonstrates certain pre-existing customary rules of international law. See, Lord Advocate's Reference, 
Transcript of Day Two Tuesday (10 October 2000) <http://www.tridentploughshares.org/lar/larday2.php > at 18 
August, 2004. 
173 Texaco v Libyan Arab Republic reprinted in 17 ILM (1978), 3-37, para. 59. 
174 See above n 162 and accompanying text.  
175 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul), opened for signature 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. 







States (1978 and 1983),176 the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)177 and the Climate Change 
and Biodiversity Conventions (1992).178 Particularly, Article 13 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of 
States in Respect of Treaties indicates the importance of the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources in international law. The article states:  
“Nothing in the present Convention shall affect the principles of international law 
affirming the permanent sovereignty of every people and every State over its natural 
wealth and resources.”  
One of the main tasks of the GA is to explain and specify principles and rules of the 
UN Charter. The Charter of the UN empowers the GA to initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the progressive development of 
international law and its codification.179 Representing different states and offering equal 
opportunities for creation of a consensus on the new rules, the GA provides a global forum 
for multilateral discussion of important international issues. Thus, as being drafted uniformly 
the resolutions enacted by the GA should be granted a legitimate status and be respected.  
It is noteworthy that the significance of the GA Resolutions in development and 
codification of international legal sources is often highlighted by international bodies. 
Particularly, the ICJ pointed out: 
“General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have 
normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for 
establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. To establish 
                                                 
176 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, opened for signature 22 August 1978, 1946 UNTS 3, Art 
13 (entered into force 6 November 1996); Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of States Property, Archives 
and Debts, opened for signature 8 April 1983, UN Doc A/CONF.117/14 (1983), the Preamble (not yet in force).  
177 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, Part II, ss 1-2, 
(entered into force 16 November 1994). 
178 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79, the Preamble (entered into force 
29 December 1993); Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 165, the Preamble 
(entered into force 21 March 1994).  
179 Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature 26 June 1945, 70 UNTS 238, Art 13 (entered into force 24 
October 1945). 
 




whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at 
its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an 
opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the 
gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule.” 180 
Furthermore, the long lasting struggle of developing states to regard those principles as 
their approach towards regulation of natural resources have contributed to formation of these 
principles as custom.181 No matter how developed states reject the acceptance of those rules as 
obligatory, for developing states, the principles reflect state practice. Under international law, if 
a state consistently takes a particular position on the content or meaning of international law, 
and acts commensurate with that position, that position or action can have a very important 
impact on the law's development. 
Finally, in the view of some scholars182 and also as developing states have insisted, 183 the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and other principles embodied in the 
UN GA resolutions can be accorded the status of jus cogens. In principle, jus cogens norms 
constitute the higher law which can override other principles of international law. Such a view 
however, has been vigorously rejected by developed states. For example, the representative of 
the US stressed that 'instant declarations and paper resolutions did not establish customary 
international law, much less did they give it a peremptory character”.184 
                                                 
 180 The Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ, para 70.  
181 In South West Africa Case, Tanaka J stated: 
  "the accumulation of authoritative pronouncements such as resolutions, declarations, decisions, etc., concerning 
the interpretation of the Charter by the competent organs of the international community can be characterized as 
evidence of the international custom referred to in Article 38, paragraph 1 (b)." South West Africa (Liberia v South 
Africa) [1966] ICJ Rep 6, 292. 
182 See, eg, Ian Brownlie, ‘Legal Status of Natural Resourses in International Law’ (1979) 163 Hague Recueil 25, 271.  
183 At the Vienna Conference on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, representatives of some 
developing states expressed their support for the jus cogens character of the principle of the permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources. See UN Doc A/Conf. 1171C. 1/SR 13 (1983).  
184 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Eleventh Session (1969) at 102. See also the 







It can be concluded that even though the principles proclaimed in a number of the UN 
General Assembly resolutions may not have gained their jus cogens status, the principles of self-
determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources are definitely one of the widely-
accepted and recognised principles of international law. Moreover, neither the significance nor 
the impact of the Resolutions on the evolution international legal norms is deniable.   
6.2.2. MOVE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
The building up of new rules in relation to economic sovereignty, developmental goals 
of host states and the applicable standards in international economic relations have changed 
the very nature of international law on foreign investment. Since this new body of legal rules 
absorbs policy considerations for economic developments of nation states, it could 
appropriately be named as international law on economic development. The law has been seen 
as a law that creates a reasonable and equitable balance between the protection of investors’ 
interests and the special developmental needs of developing states in order to ensure 
distributive justice internationally.185 It provides contextually different normative standards 
based on the GA Resolutions emphasising the right of states to control their economies.186 
The subject matter of the international law of economic development concerns many 
aspects of development. First of all, the humanitarian concern of economic development has 
certainly been the most powerful driving force in the evolution of the law of economic 
development.  In the field of foreign investment, the humanitarian concern originally appeared 
in the face of conditions of human rights abuses committed by multinationals.  Human rights 
                                                 
185 Maniruzzaman, above n 110, 44. 
186 These resolutions have undermined the theory of internationalisation.  See Oscar Schachter, ‘The Evolving 
International Law of Development’ (1976) 15 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1; Milan Bulajic, Principles of 
International Development Law: Progressive Development of the Principles of International Law relating to the New International 
Economic Order (1986). 




violated by TNCs include violation of accepted labour standards such as those that endanger 
the health and safety of workers or other citizens, child labour or slave labour.187 
To make the transnationals fully accountable for their activities, various mechanisms 
have been proposed by human rights activists. The first achievement was the adoption on both 
the regional and international levels of measures to hold multinationals accountable to 
democratic control. Recently, the European Parliament has passed a new resolution on the 
corporate social responsibility.188 The Parliament was convinced that the increase of social and 
environmental responsibility by corporations, linked to the principle of corporate 
accountability, represented an essential element of the European social model, the EU’s 
strategy for sustainable development, and for the purposes of meeting the social challenges of 
economic globalisation.  
On the global level, in 2003 the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva 
adopted the first set of comprehensive international human rights norms specifically applying 
to companies.189 As a result, the issue of human rights in which historically only states had 
primary responsibilities now also have become central to good corporate citizenship. The 
norms require firms to report on their compliance with human rights, labour, environmental, 
consumer protection and anti-corruption laws. Companies would also be subject to periodic 
monitoring by UN representatives and would be held accountable for violations of these 
principles. 
                                                 
187 Examples of the most publicized cases involving major violations of human rights have been reported by human 
rights activists. For example, Human Rights Watch reported that a subsidiary enterprise of Enron in India has 
engaged in the violent and unlawful repression of local protestors against the undertaking of a hydro-electric 
project. See Human Rights Watch, “The Enron Corporation:  Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Violation” 
(1999) <www.hrw.org/reoprts/1999/enron/index.htm> at 17 January 2003.  
188 European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2007 on Corporate Social Responsibility: a New Partnership (2006/2133(INI)), 
OJ No C 301 E /46, 13 December 2007.  
189 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (the 







The next concern of the law of economic development is the issue of environmental 
standards. The last few decades have witnessed growing environmental destruction mainly 
caused by the increased economic activities of companies and individuals. Especially foreign 
direct investment has been seen as a significant contributor to environment pollution such as 
greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation and loss of biodiversity.  Therefore, environmentalists 
have argued for the need to introduce specific environmental clauses into international investor 
protection and liberalisation treaties. As a result, a number of international instruments have 
begun to address the linkage between the environment and FDI. Notably, Article XX of GATT 
(1994)190 allows broad exceptions for environmental policies that would otherwise constitute 
violations of GATT principles: 
 “[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures...necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health...[or]...relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources....” 
Another important international instrument which is more environmentally conscious is 
NAFTA. Environmental groups of the participating three countries demanded that the NAFTA 
architects incorporate environmental standards into the agreement. Subsequently, NAFTA 
makes a broad commitment to trade policies consistent with sustainable development and 
environmental protection explicitly addressing environmental issues in its preamble and in five of 
its 22 chapters.  In the preamble of the agreement, the three signatory states agree to ``undertake 
[trade liberalisation] in a manner consistent with environmental protection; ... promote 
sustainable development; [and] strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental 
laws and regulations.''  
                                                 
190 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1197 
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However, there has not yet developed a general consensus on these environmental 
standards. Various formulations have been adopted in various investment treaties, guidelines 
and other programmes, each depending on the scope of a given instrument and the purposes 
and objectives of its drafters. However, one may find several environmental standards and 
norms as generally applicable. First, the protection of the environment is generally referred to 
with respect to the responsibility of both Governments and TNCs.191 Second, host 
governments retain their right to take measures to protect the environment.192 Third, there is a 
set of rules that encourage multinationals to transfer environmentally sound technology and 
management practices to host countries.193 
The third focus of international economic development law is the wellbeing of people. It 
has often been stressed that foreign investment does not automatically ensure economic and 
social progress.194 Thus socio-economic development of a host state has become another 
important concern of international development law alongside with the human rights and 
environment protection. In this regard, it is now accepted that investment protection can be 
accorded to those investors whose activities benefit the host country. 
More specifically, in ICSID case law, the requirement of a contribution to the economic 
development of the host state has become one of the essential characteristics of investment 
                                                 
191 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (the 
Norms) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992, 
adopted on 14 June 1992 by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
A/CONF.151/26(Vol.1).  
192 See above n 190 and the accompanying text. Also see NAFTA, Arts 905 and 1114; the 2003 US-Singapore FTA, 
Art15.10.  
193 Agenda 21 devoted a whole chapter to the transfer of technology, and numerous initiatives were launched to 
facilitate technology co-operation and transfer between developed and developing countries. See Agenda 21, 
adopted on 14 June 1992 by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
A.CONF/151/26 (Vol. III), Ch 34.  
194 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), for example pointed out that “Not all 
FDI is in the best interests of host countries. Some can have an adverse effect on development.” UNCTAD, 







qualifying under the ICSID jurisdiction.195 This rule was first applied in the Salini case.196 The 
tribunal here held that in order to qualify as an investment, the concerned activity should have 
the following elements: (a) a contribution, (b) a certain duration over which the project is 
implemented, (c) sharing of the operational risks and (d) a contribution to the host State’s 
development.197 Later cases extended the “Salini criteria”. The tribunal in Joy Mining for example, 
took the view that, to qualify as an “investment,” the contribution the contract made to the 
economic development of the host State must be “significant.”198  
Furthermore, it should be noted these concerns of international economic 
development law are all interrelated with each other and often implemented in one context. 
Consequently, some scholars have indicated a broader social, environmental and cultural 
conception of development.199 In particular, Muchlinski stressed the importance of integrating 
economic and social issues in technology transfer instruments.  
According to him, apart from the inclusion of environmental concerns in technology 
transfer provisions, other social issues such as “corporate social responsibility” and “human 
rights impact assessments” should be included in the future. One possible new area concerns 
the reform of the technology transfer provisions in the light of the emergent principles of 
corporate social responsibility, which may include respect for the development objectives of 
developing countries in which firms operate, as suggested by the OECD Guidelines. Another 
                                                 
195 There is a series of consistent cases that had developed a test to define a variety of activities to be considered as 
investment.  The latest one is Malaysian Historical Salvors, Sdn, Bhd v Malaysia, where the tribunal considered seven 
previous cases determining the meaning of investment. See Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, Bhd v The Government of 
Malaysia (Decision on Jurisdiction) (17 May 2007) <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MHS-jurisdiction.pdf > at 
23 November 2007. 
196 Salini Construtorri SpA and Italstrade SpA v Morocco (Decision on Jurisdiction) (23 July 2001), 42 ILM 609 (2003).  
197 Ibid, para. 53-58.  
198 Joy Mining Machinery Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt (Award on Jurisdiction) (6 August 2004), 44 ILM 73 (2005), 
para. 53  
199 See generally Oscar Schachter, ‘Human Rights and Economic Development’ in Emmanuel Bello and Bola Ajibola 
(eds), Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim Olawale Elias (1992) 389-98.  




possible issue relates to the use of human rights impact assessments in the examination of 
technology transfer transactions, aimed at determining whether the transaction in question 
enhances or detracts from the human rights concerns of the people affected by it.200 
On the other hand, the growing importance of transnational business in the late 
decades of the 20th century and the increasing emphasis on international human rights law in 
the same time period led to some apparent conflicts between human rights of whole nation to 
development and property rights of individuals in defining which one prevails over other. 
International law itself does not provide a clear answer to solve the conflict.  
However, the fundamental principles and norms of international law, particularly some 
specific rights of a peremptory nature suggest that human rights should be given more weight 
than property rights. For instance, Cullet, who dealt with the debate on the specific tension 
between intellectual property rights over drugs and the human right to health, observed that  
where intellectual property rights and the right to health conflict, ‘international law indicates 
that human rights should generally take precedence”. He further concluded that, “the solution 
giving primacy to human rights is unlikely to meet with the approval of states, and would 
probably not stand if it came for adjudication in a WTO context; it nevertheless seems 
adequate from a legal and ethical point of a view”.201 
It also has been argued by NGOs that human rights law should play an important role 
as applicable law in investment disputes. For instance, in amicus curiae brief submitted to the 
Vivendi tribunal, it was pointed out that since the primacy of human rights has been 
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internationally recognised, human rights law could displace investment law in two situations 
namely a situation of conflict of norms and a situation of necessity.202 
6.3. Summary of  Findings  
The analysis within this chapter (Chapter Six) illustrates that, alongside the regime of 
protections for foreign investors which has been established over the last fifty years, another set 
of norms has been advocated by developing states and NGOs to enhance the power of capital-
importing states in the international arena. This means that within the development of 
international law on foreign investment there have been two contrasting approaches. One 
emphasises the protection of investment, another emphasises the development needs of host 
states.    
The very nature of international law became a source of serious controversy since the 
1970s. Developing states and non-governmental organizations have advanced credible 
arguments to elaborate new approaches towards maintaining balance between the protection of 
investors and the developmental needs of developing states. In this respect, the UN GA adopted 
several resolutions designed to create a so-called “new international economic order”. These 
resolutions, though having a declarative nature have resulted in the elaboration of a new set of 
rules and principles that assert each country’s sovereign right to choose own economic system 
and national policies and to control over foreign investments in their territories.   
The emergence of the new principles, particularly, the permanent sovereignty over 
natural recourses and the principle of economic self-determination, right to development as well 
as the enactment of code of conduct for multinationals has brought about a reversal in the 
nature of international law on foreign investment which once was criticized as being biased on 
                                                 
202 Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), Amicus Curiae Brief in ICSID Case No ARB/03/19 Suez, 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA and Vivendi Universal, SA v The Republic of Argentina, 4 April 2007 
<http://www.ciel.org/Publications/SUEZ_Amicus_English_4Apr07.pdf> at 23 September 2007.  




the side of foreign investors.  In other words, as the legal recognition of the new doctrines 
grows, international investment law could strike a healthy balance between the legitimate 
commercial expectations of an investor party and the right of a host country party to pursue own 
economic and social development policies. Indeed, that is one of the main objectives of the law 
on foreign investment. 
In these days, the concept of development no longer means just the adjustment of 
developing states’ economies to economic growth of the North. Conversely it broadly refers to 
the promotion of human rights and protection of global environment for the welfare of people 
all over the world. The issue of development is thus not just a problem of developing states, 
but it is a major concern of the contemporary world including the developed states. Economic 







P a r t  F i v e :  T H E  A U T O N O M Y  O F  T H E  P A R T I E S  I N  
F O R E I G N  I N V E S T M E N T  D I S P U T E S – M Y T H  O R  
F A C T ?  
The concept of autonomy means different things in different contexts. As far as the law 
applicable to international contractual relations is concerned, business people are left free to 
choose the tribunal that will hear the dispute and also the law that will govern the merits of the 
dispute. In the context of state contracts, however it is unlikely that a state in its contractual 
relations with private persons will choose some other system of law rather than its own system 
of law. More than fifty years have passed since the ICSID Convention formally accepted the 
principle of party autonomy in the relationship between a state and foreign private party. The 
question today is whether a state or its organ can enjoy the same degree of autonomy as private 
parties do?   
It is true that, at the time of the adoption of the convention, the drafters were 
challenged to grant to foreign investors rights and privileges as much as they could. The legal 
reality faced by arbitrators in the mid 20th century was the question of how to protect foreign 
investors against unilateral actions of the host state. In this sense, the principle of party 
autonomy served as a device to defuse the host state’s interventions. However, the problem is 
that public agencies lack the ability to freely and voluntarily engage in economic activities and 
relationships as they are bound by a large number of commitments and duties. Law prescribes 
the manner and conditions under which a state organ operates.  
The analysis undertaken within this part of the thesis (PART V) is to evaluate the notion 
of party autonomy in situations where a state itself is a party to the contract. It forcefully argues 
against the belief that state contracts in the field of foreign investment are subject to party 
autonomy. The first chapter of this part (Chapter Seven) examines the role and function of the 
party autonomy rule in the traditional context of conflict of laws. In doing so, it explores its 




origin in the economic liberalism of the 19th century, and later its universal acceptance with the 
development of contractual freedom. Then, it discusses the traditional limitations imposed on 
party autonomy. The final section of the chapter is devoted to the alleged decline of party 
autonomy in considerations of social justice showing the new developments in both domestic 
law and international law. 
The next chapter (Chapter Eight) analyses the choice of law approaches that have been 
applied by ICSID tribunals, and doctrines that impact on the choice of law issue in state 
contracts. First of all, it shows that the prevailing theory in ICSID arbitration towards conflict of 
laws is based on the view that international law must control the applicable law of state contracts. 
Thus the theory has significantly eroded the parties’ choice of applicable law. In the next part of 
the section, it explores a new twist to established practice of the ICSID arbitrations by reviewing 
some recent cases. The final section of Chapter Eight reveals theoretical barriers jeopardising the 
chances of exercising party autonomy by a state or state organ in its contractual relationship with 
private parties.  
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE ROLE AND 
FUNCTION OF PARTY AUTONOMY 
7.1. The Origin and Validation of  the Principle of  Party Autonomy 
There is no general consensus on the rise of the principle of party autonomy.1 The actual 
freedom of choice of law however, came only in the early nineteenth century with the 
development of the notion of contractual freedom emerged from the liberal economic theories 
                                                 
1 Some claim that was first articulated in the writings of the sixteenth century French jurist, Dumoulin (1501-1566). 
See Peter North, Private International Law Problems in Common Law Jurisdictions (1986) 104, n. 4.  Also see Edith 
Friedler, ‘Party Autonomy Revised: A Statutory Solution to A Choice of Law Problem’ 37 University of Kansas Law 
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doctrine of party autonomy. Peter Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts (1999) 4-7. Also see Ole Lando who 
shares the same opinion. Ole Lando, ‘Contracts’ in Lipstein (ed), International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (1976) 







in which contract, property, and individual will played a major role. Thus, party autonomy is an 
extension of the notion of freedom of contract.  
One must however, to focus on the foundations upon which the principle of party 
autonomy is based before determining the suitability of the principle to state contracts. Also, 
restrictions that apply to the party autonomy principle should be examined.   
7.1.1. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PARTY AUTONOMY 
The ideology of economic liberalism promotes freedom assuming that in a free society 
every citizen is able to make free and rational choices according to his or her own assessment. To 
express and pursue their interests, individuals must be granted freedom of contract as to whether 
at all, with whom, and on what terms they wish to contract. A state has to protect and enforce 
such expressions of freedom. 
From this phenomenon of freedom of contract, it follows that the parties are also able to 
choose a legal scheme that would suit their goals and interests. In the 1860s the English courts 
stated that the law applicable to a contract is the law by which the parties intended the contract 
to be governed.2 The rule also was adopted by French and German legal systems.3 Though the 
limits in scope of party autonomy varied in these countries, there was one common trend that 
the law chosen by the parties was applied.  
Later, the principle was recognised by regional4 and international5 instruments. 
Understanding the need to develop rules and principles that eliminate legal barriers exist in legal 
                                                 
2 See, eg, P&O SN Co v Shand (1865) 3 Moo NS 272; Lloyd v Guibert (1865) LR 1 QB 115. 
3 For the development of this rule in France see French (Napoleonic) Civil Code (1804), ss 1107-34.  Also for the 
development of choice of law rules in Germany, see Volker Triebel, ‘The Choice of Law in Commercial 
Relations: A German Perspective’ (1988) 37 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 935.  
4 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for signature 19 June 1980, 1457 UNTS 6, Art 
3 (entered into force 1 April 1991) [hereinafter Rome Convention]; Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable 
International Contracts, opened for signature 17 March 1994, OAS Treaty Ser. 78, OEA/Ser. A/53, Art 7 (entered 
into force 15 December 1996) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention].  
5 Hague Convention on Law Applicable to Contracts International Sale of Goods, opened for signature 22 December 1986, 24 
ILM 1575 (1987) (not yet in force).  




systems and to support international trade and investment, most domestic legal systems now 
accept the principle of party autonomy as a general choice of law rule of contract law.6 Thus, this 
is an undoubtedly universal principle. 
The objective of party autonomy is to ensure greater efficiency, stability and 
predictability in international business transactions by eliminating legal uncertainty brought about 
by the crossing of numerous legal systems whose rules are unknown to commercial men. Party 
autonomy is thus a market-driven concept. It allows the parties in international commerce to 
select their own law and the means of dispute settlement that can provide them with the greatest 
utility. 7 
Though the rule of party autonomy in the choice of proper law has been widely 
favoured, the party choice is not totally unrestrained.8 Historically, in attempting to balance the 
rights of individuals against the interests and needs of a society, states have adopted certain 
limitations and exceptions on the party autonomy as a way of maintaining the tension. The 
exceptions to party autonomy may vary from one legal system to another depending on the 
attitudes of relevant legal systems towards the rule. However, due to the harmonisation effect of 
multilateral mechanisms on private international law, the existing rules on party autonomy are 
                                                 
6 Apart from the European and American systems, this principle is also manifestly embodied in private international 
law of several non-European countries, for example some eastern nations, ie, China (General Principles of the Civil 
Law of the People's Republic of China 1987, Art 145), Japan (Japanese Private International Law 1990, Art 7) and Thailand 
(Act on Conflict of Laws B.E. 2481 1939, Art 13).  In August 2007, China’s Supreme Peoples Court issued new rules 
interpreting governing law of contracts.  The new rules reaffirm the principle of party autonomy and the close 
connection method in the absence of a choice of law by parties. However, as regards foreign investment contracts, 
the rules require a mandatory application of Chinese law. For more see Chinese Supreme Court Issues New Rules on 
Governing Laws of Contracts (2008) Moulislegal  <http://www.moulislegal.com/ChinaGoverningLaw.html at 23 
March 2008. 
7 In practice, autonomy often appears in the form of a clause or agreement expressly demonstrating the choice of 
substantive law. In some cases, however it can be inferred from the terms of the contract or the circumstances of 
the case.  
8 As a general rule, party autonomy is allowed only in matters that raise no public interest or do not affect third 








basically the same in most countries. Three major exceptions have been developed in legal 
systems and these should be considered. 
7.1.2. PARTY AUTONOMY IN TRADITIONAL CONTEXT: THREE MAJOR 
EXCEPTIONS 
Exception One: Substantial or Close Connection Requirement  
In the first instance, there is a logical proposition that the chosen law must have some 
points of contact with the contract. This limitation is based on the conventional application of 
conflict of law doctrines that locate the proper law of contract via its close connection to the 
contract.9 Under the conventional private international law of contract, thus it was long held that 
the parties’ choice of law could be invalid unless there was no connection between the chosen 
law and the relationship from which the dispute arises.10 
However, in order to provide greater autonomy and flexibility in business-to-business 
transactions, that restrictive approach of traditional conflict of laws now has been abandoned. 
Therefore, the parties to a contract may expressly select the system of law by which it is to be 
governed, even to the point where they select a system of law which appears totally unconnected 
with the transaction giving rise to the dispute.11 
 Especially, arbitral practice tends to favour this trend, as in arbitrators’ eyes an 
unrelated ‘neutral’ legal system may be more desirable and rational.12 Also, it might be because 
of its consistency with emerging international norms. Both the Inter-American Convention and the 
Rome Convention which determine the law applicable to international contracts do not require 
                                                 
9 The close connection method of determining applicable laws has been the basic legal theory of private international 
law. The method has its roots in the theory of a great German scholar, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861).  
10  Courts, not long ago, refused to enforce a choice of law clause selected with no connection with the transaction. 
See, eg, Whitworth Streets Estates Ltd v James Miller and Partners (1970) AC 583; Campagnie Tunissienne de Navigation SA v 
Campagnie d’Armement Maritime SA (1971) AC 572; Amin Rasheed Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co (1984) AC 50.  
11 See, eg, Klaus Berger, The Creeping Codification of Lex Mercatoria (1999) 76. 
12 D J Branson and R E Wallace, ‘Choosing the Substantive Law to Apply in International Commercial Arbitration’ 
(1986) 27 Virginia Journal of International Law 39 at 53 et seq.  




that the transaction has to bear a relation to the State or country whose law is selected.13 
According to the Rome II Regulation, parties are free to submit non-contractual claims to the law 
of their choice, so long as the chosen law is not prejudice the application of provisions of the 
lex loci delicti which cannot be derogated from by an agreement.14  
Following the international trend, some countries are now also removing the close 
connection or substantial connection requirements. Particularly, the revised UCC of US has 
deleted the old requirement that the transaction bear a "reasonable relation" to the jurisdiction 
designated in non-consumer context.15 Two American states, namely Oregon and Louisiana have 
enacted statutes that do not require any connection to the chosen law.16  
In the practice of state/alien arbitration, the commentators believe that the ICSID 
Convention also provides no requirement of a reasonable connection of the transaction to the law 
chosen by the parties.17 But in practice it is a very rare for parties to submit their dispute to 
unrelated law.18 On the other hand, the fact that certain aspects of state/alien contractual 
relationship must fall within boundaries of the law of the host state because of the mandatory 
nature of relevant legislation impairs the assumption that the parties to state contracts are able to 
choose a law unrelated to their transaction. Most government contracts, especially those cases 
                                                 
13 The Conventions are actually silent about the issue, so commentators interpret it differently. See Richard Plender 
and Michael Wilderson, The European Contracts Convention: The Rome Convention on the Choice of Law for Contracts (2nd ed, 
2001). They authors interpret it as the Convention does not require a substantial relationship. Other authors 
suggested that an absence of reasonable basis for the choice could invalidate the choice made by parties. See D A 
Lasoc and P A Stone, Conflict of laws in the European Community (1987) 358.  
14 Council Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations, (Rome II) OJ 
L199/40 31/07/2007, Arts 14 (1), (2) and (3).    
15 Revised UCC Section 1-301.  
16 Louisiana Civil Code, Art 3540; Oregon Revised Statutes, s 81.120 
17 Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001) 567.  
18 Loan contracts are usually governed by the law of a country of an international financial centre such as England or 
New York. See Michael Pearce, ‘The ‘Internationalisation’ of Sovereign Loan Agreements’ (1986) 3 Journal of 
International Business and Law 165. In Oil Basins Case, a royalty agreement concluded between BHB Ltd and Oil 
Basins Ltd in 1960 relating to the production of hydrocarbons from the "Blackback" field in Victoria was 







involving vulnerable economic issues of the host economy such as natural resources reflect the 
legitimate national interest of the host state.  
Therefore, it would be theoretically unrealistic to detach those contracts from the host 
country’s legal system. On the other hand, minerals and other natural resources are traditionally 
classified as immovables.  Thus, it can be argued that only lex situs (the law of a state where the 
immovable is located) is applied to immovables. 
Exception Two: Choice of National Law 
The next limitation to party autonomy relates to the subject matter of choice of law 
clauses. Historically, conflicts rules must only refer to some national law. This exception is a 
remainder of the static position of legal positivism that nothing is legal except what the State 
permits. Proponents of positivism argued that a volition of contracting parties submitting 
themselves to the chosen law could not, and should not, be above positive law.19 Subsequently, 
courts do not allow the parties to “make their own lex contractus”. The prevailing view is that, 
while the parties of course, can regulate any conceivable detail of their business relationship in 
their contract, but their contract is not a self-sufficient regulatory scheme.20 Every contract thus, 
must belong to some system of law.  
However, at present such a restricted approach is in the process of changing as a number 
of national laws21 and some international instruments22 have begun to allow parties to 
                                                 
19 Nygh observed: “Party autonomy can only operate through the choice of law rule a national legal system which is 
that of the forum which has to consider the effectiveness of the choice. Consequently, the permissibility and the 
conditions of a choice of a-national law depend on the law of the forum. This provides the ‘minimal link’ with 
national law through which the parties derive their mandate to choose the applicable law.”  Peter Nygh, Autonomy 
in International Contracts (1999) 175.  
20 The theory of ‘contracts with no governing law’ has not been accepted in arbitral practice. It also raises 
considerable debate in theory. See Emmanual Gailard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration (1999) 799.  
21 See French (New Code of Civil Procedure 1975, Art 1496), the Netherlands (Code of Civil Procedure 1986, Art 14), Swiss 
(Swiss Private International Law Statute 1987, Art 187), Egypt (Egyptian Law No. 27 of 1994, Art 39), Mexico (Law on 
Arbitration 1992, Art 1445 (2)) and Germany (ZPO 1998, Art 1051). Two American states, Oregon and Louisiana 
have recently enacted choice of law provisions allowing the parties to choose the governing law rather than the 




international transactions to choose general principles of law and international commercial 
practices. When the parties have agreed upon its application, national courts may apply lex 
mercatoria as the governing law even though they traditionally do not honour a choice of a-
national law. For instance, in Deutsche Schachtbau v Shell international Petroleum Co Ltd,23 the House 
of Lords accepted as valid an arbitration award based solely on ‘internationally accepted 
principles of law governing contractual relations’.24   
One must admit that the concept of general principles of law or transnational rules is a 
subject of heavy criticism, which makes the applicability of such principles and rules makes less 
effective and doubtful. In most cases, it has been attacked as being vague and not sufficiently 
organized to satisfy the criteria of a defined legal system.25 In addition to this, it has been argued 
that the application of transnational rules may undermine interests of weaker parties or third 
parties as it will allow the parties to seek general principles that protect their interest.26  
Despite such criticism, long before the adoption of the ICSID Convention, international 
arbitral tribunals of investment disputes accepted general principles of law as a possible source of 
                                                                                                                                                    
law of state.  In Oregon parties to international contracts may choose the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts. See, eg, Oregon Revised Statute, s 81.120.  
22 Article 28 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration provides that “the tribunal shall 
decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties”. See UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration, as adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
on 21 June 1985, UN Doc A/40/17. Also see Inter-American Convention, Arts 2 and 10.  Unlike the Rome Convention 
and the Hague Convention, the Inter-American Convention explicitly permits for both the parties and the courts to select 
the lex mercatoria as the applicable law to international contracts. 
23 Deutsche Schachtbau v Shell international Petroleum Co Ltd [1990] 1 AC 295. 
24 It was stated that, by choosing the arbitration to settle their dispute, the parties “have left proper law to be decided 
by the arbitrators and have not in terms confined the choice to national systems of law”.  Ibid, at 315.  
25 Goode wrote that a more serious objection against the use of lex mercatoria as the governing law is its 
indeterminacy. See Roy Goode, ‘Rule, Practice, and Pragmatism in International Commercial Law’ (2005) 54 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 552.  
26 See Gaillard and Savage, above n 20, 810 [citing Paul Lagarde, Approche critique de la lex mercatoria [Critical 
approach to lex mercatoria - in French], in: Le droit des relations économiques internationales: Études offertes à 







the governing law of foreign investment transactions.27 The Convention contains a provision 
stating that “the tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be 
agreed by the parties.” Such broad expression of “rules of law” has been interpreted as greater 
party autonomy which scope is not limited to one or more national legal systems but also could 
be extended to general principles of law or transnational rules.28  
The use of lex mercatoria or any other non-binding commercial law principles such as the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts of course, would ensure neutrality and 
protect the interests of foreign investors from the perceived shackles of national law. But as far 
as contracts made by a state or a state agency are concerned, general principles of law or the lex 
mercatoria is highly unsuitable for selection as the applicable law. From the theoretical standpoint, 
lex mercatoria is not such a system that can make the state contract binding because of the position 
of the state party as a sovereign. Practically, it is unthinkable that the state could avoid its own 
rules of ordre public by choosing some dispositive provisions like the UNIDROIT Principles.  
Exception Three: Public Policy  
The third traditional restriction imposed on the rule of party autonomy is the public 
policy doctrine. It is generally recognised that the law chosen by parties to international contracts 
will not be given effect to the extent that application of the designated law would be contrary to 
a fundamental policy of the State or country whose law would otherwise govern.29  The prime 
objective of this rule is the protection of the justified expectations of the parties or the 
prevention of negative third party effects.   
                                                 
27 Refer to the Ch One for the decisions of the early arbitral tribunals where arbitrators heavily relied on a-national 
legal rules. The theory of internationalization based on lex mercatoria has led to serious scholarly debate.  See 
generally, Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalized Property (1986) Ch 2; Georges Delaume, ‘The 
Proper Law of State Contracts and the Lex Mercatoria: A Reappraised’ (1988) 3 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment 
Law Journal 79; A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: A Challenge for 
International Commercial Arbitration?’ (1999) 14 (3) American University International Law Review 657-734.  
28 Archad Masood, ‘Law Applicable in Arbitration of Investment Disputes under the World Bank Convention’ 
(1973) 15 Journal of Indian Law Institute 311, 317.  
29 See, eg, Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws (1971), s 187.  




The public policy doctrine, as one of the key concepts in private international law, has 
been accepted by all major legal systems, and also some regional and international conventions, 
thus influencing the functioning of conflict of law rules. In private international law, the 
fundamental policy requirement, which legitimately restricts the free choice of law, can be 
expressed in the form of either public policy or mandatory rules.  
There are significant differences between the public policy exception to conflicts analysis 
and the mandatory rules’ separation of conflicts analysis. Although both public policy and 
mandatory rules (public law) are enforced irrespective of contrary private party agreements, they 
are two different conceptions. The public policy exception exclusively applies to private law and 
thus is one aspect of conflict analysis. On the contrary, public law regardless of whether it is 
mandatory or not is simply outside the scope of the traditional contractual conflict of laws.30  
The Concept of Public Policy  
There is no a precise definition of public policy. Noting a ‘lack of a consensus 
definition of public policy’ Birkland, a political scientist specializing in the study of public 
policy, summarized the common traits of all definitions of public policy as follows: 
• The policy is made in the "public's" name; 
• Policy is generally made or initiated by government; 
• Policy is interpreted and implemented by public and private actors; 
• Policy is what the government intends to do; 
• Policy is what the government chooses not to do; 31 
Some judicial cases also address the definition of public policy. An attempt to define 
the public policy concept is best made in the words of Judge Goodrich, who writes that when a 
judge rejects the application of foreign law on public policy grounds,  
                                                 
30 As Prof McConnaughay rightly defined, “the public law taboo demarcates the boundaries of conflicts analysis; the 
public policy exception operates within conflicts analysis”. Philip McConnaughay, ‘Reviving the "Public Law 
Taboo" in International Conflict of Laws’ (1999) 35 Stanford Journal of International Law 255, 265.  







“[I]t is not that the foreign law does not seem so reasonable to the judge as his own 
good homemade precedent, but it must appear ‘pernicious and detestable’ or, to 
borrow Mr Justice Cardozo’s always effective language, ‘violate some fundamental 
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted 
tradition of the common weal”.32 
On the other hand, public policy characterizes those mandatory rules (ie jus cogens) 
which are considered as fundamental to a State and whose application may not be excluded by 
personal volition.33 Thus, on the domestic level, it designates a set of fundamental perceptions 
of a social, cultural, moral or economic nature which are embodied in mandatory laws.  
Generally, courts reject the application of foreign law, if they assert that the content of that 
foreign law somehow violates good moral.34 
In an international context, the notion of public policy is narrower in its scope. It 
primarily refers to the common interest of the international community of States.35Although 
there is no general agreement on the definition of the term "international public policy", there 
has been a considerable convergence of content among the various domestic expressions of 
international public policy.36 In the Tamil case,37 it was held that the expression of public policy 
                                                 
32 Nerbert Goodrich, ‘Foreign Facts and Local Fancies’ (1938) 25 Virginia Law Review 26, 33-34. 
33 Justice Byron White has said that public policy constitutes the social, economic, or political goals of a statute and 
regulations. See United States v Gaubert, 499 US 315, 323 (1981). He also said that public policy is fashioned in the 
legislative forum. See Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124, 157 (1971). 
34 One of the examples of cases where the court refused the enforcement of a contractual claim on public policy 
grounds is Continental Supply Co v Syndicate Trust Co, in which the Supreme Court of North Dakota refused to 
enforce a stipulation in a note providing for the payment of ten percent of interest and principal for attorney’s fees 
in the event that an attorney’s services were necessary for collection. The note had been issued in Texas, ‘where 
such stipulations are lawful, but North Dakota had a statute expressly declaring stipulations for attorney’s fees “to 
be against public policy and void.” 52 ND 209, 202 NW 404 (1924).  
35 Günther Jaenicke, ‘International Public Order’ in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol 
2 (1995) 1349.  
36 To clarify and harmonise  the understanding of the notion of international public policy, the Committee on 
International Commercial Arbitration of the International Law Association recommended international public 
policy and listed a number of principles which commonly belong to international public policy such as the 
principle of good faith, the prohibitions against abuse of rights and discrimination, piracy, terrorism, genocide,  
slavery, smuggling, drag trafficking, pacta sunt servanda, no expropriation without confiscation,  currency controls, 
price fixing rules, environmental laws, tax laws, consumer protection and other laws protecting weaker parties. See 
International Law Association, Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, Final Report on Public Policy as 
a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, (New Deli Conference, 2002).   




in the Indian Arbitration Act must be interpreted in the sense that the doctrine of public policy 
applied in the field of private international law. Thus, the enforcement of award would be 
refused if such enforcement would be contrary to (i) fundamental policy of Indian law or (ii) 
the interests of India or (iii) justice or morality.38 The tribunal was of a view that a mere 
violation of the law of India does not constitute the violation of public policy.39  
The Theory of Mandatory Rules 
It is not easy to draw a clear distinction between the public policy principle and the 
theory of mandatory rules, because they may overlap. As it is previously said, public policy 
normally takes the form of a statute of the forum in ways of prohibitions and bans forbidding 
certain practices. Every nation has mandatory rules that govern particular transactions or 
relationships, which demand to be applied notwithstanding the choice of a foreign legal system. 
"It is the essence of mandatory rules that they defeat [any contrary] agreement of the parties."40 
Thus, it is generally accepted that a mandatory law applies irrespective of or despite the proper 
                                                                                                                                                    
37 In that case, a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) was made between Tamil Nadu, the State Electricity Board for 
the State of Tamil Nadu and ST-CMS, an Indian incorporated company owned by investors from the US, 
Switzerland, and the Netherlands.  The parties also entered into a separate arbitration agreement which is 
governed by the laws of England and the New York Convention. The question arose whether Indian law prohibiting 
the arbitration of the dispute is relevant, whether it is a matter of Indian public policy. The Tribunal held that the 
arbitration agreement is governed by the laws of England, thus the Indian law has no relevance and also the 
inarbitrability of the dispute under the Indian law is not an issue of Indian public policy. See Tamil Nadu Electricity 
Board v ST-CMS Electronic Company Private Limited, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL, 16 of July 
2007.  
38 Ibid, para. 43.  
39 Ibid.  
40 A J E Jaffey, ‘Choice of Law in Relation to Ius Dispositivum with Particular Reference to the EEC Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ in P M North (ed), Contract Conflicts (1982) 33, 41. Also see judicial cases eg, Akai 
Case, in which the insurance contract between disputing parties had clauses selecting English law as governing law 
and selecting the English courts to adjudicate the dispute. However, the High Court of Australia refused to 
enforce the clauses on the ground that would be contrary to a mandatory statutory provision of Insurance 
Contracts Act intended to protect interests of parties. Akai Pty Ltd v The Peoples Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 
374, 164. Also see analogous case the Hollandia  (1983) 1 AC 565, where the House of Lords refused to give effect 
to a foreign jurisdiction on the ground that it will amount to evasion of the Hague-Visby rules which the English 







law of a contract, whether determined by a contractual choice of law clause or the conflicts rules 
that apply in the absence of a contractual designation.41  
The concept of mandatory laws, therefore, has been the counterpart to the principally 
unlimited freedom of choice conferred to the parties by the current international mechanisms. 
As general rule, it is widely recognised that the courts must always apply the mandatory rules of 
the forum and the mandatory rules of the governing law of the contract.42 As regards the Rome 
Convention, it provides for the application of the mandatory provisions of the law of forum 
country as well as the law another country with which the situation has a close connection.43 
Under the New York Convention, the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards can be refused on the 
basis that the award is contrary to public policy of the enforcement state.44 
Most mandatory rules are usually found in public law. This subordinating aspect of 
public law also made most public laws mandatory. The displacement of these laws by a 
contractual choice is traditionally banned in both domestic and international levels because of the 
greater public interest reflected in the mandatory public laws. In this connection, one might need 
                                                 
41 Michael Pryles, ‘Reflections on the EEC Contractual Obligations Convention - An Australian Perspective’ in P M 
North (ed), Contract Conflicts (1982) 323, 331.  
42 In some cases a judge will already have several laws to consider, as well as the potential applicability of several 
mandatory rules. For instance, in the case of depecage, mandatory rules of all laws applicable to the contract must be 
considered. 
43 It stipulates that:  
 (1). When applying under this Convention the law of the country, effect may be given to the mandatory rules of 
the law of another country with which the situation has a close connection, if and in so far, under the law of the 
latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. 
 (2). Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of the rules of the law of the forum in a situation 
where they are mandatory, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract. (Art 7).  
44 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature 10 June 1958, 330 
UNTS 38, Art V. 2 (b) (entered into force 7 June 1959). The Convention actually provides seven exceptions 
(including the public policy exception) to the general rule of enforceability.  Also, to clarify the public policy 
grounds on which courts may refuse foreign arbitral awards, the International Commercial Arbitration Committee 
of the International Law Association adopted Resolution on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards 2002. See ‘Resolution on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International 
Arbitral Awards’ (2003) 19 Arbitration international 213-215.  




to distinguish mandatory public law laws from mandatory rules of private law.45 Unlike 
mandatory public law rules, mandatory rules of private law are eligible for possible displacement 
by contractual election in a transnational context.46 They retain their mandatory character only in 
a domestic setting.  
In addition to the traditionally recognised exceptions to party autonomy rules, recent 
years have witnessed the growth of regulation of a public law nature as an additional limit of 
contractual freedom. Since the beginning of the last century, states promoted the welfare state 
policies for their citizens to shape the direction of economic activities through the use of 
regulation. Nowadays, the notion of social justice has become an important argument against a 
private legal order granting unsupervised economic relationships. 
7.2. Evolution of  Principles Limiting Free Choice  
In domestic legal systems, the erosion of party autonomy coincides with the erosion of 
the general notion of freedom of contract. The basic scope of freedom of contract was quite 
changeable in light of discussions on the regulatory aspects of contract law in different periods of 
history, so did the extent of the party autonomy rule.  The principle of party autonomy of 
contracting parties, therefore, is entirely a matter of how much a society allows private 
individuals the liberty and freedom to construct their relationship.  
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the key milestones in the evolutionary development 
of individual freedom.  
7.2.1. TRANSITION FROM FREE CONTRACT TO LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 
                                                 
45 Nygh wrote, mandatory rules either represent the interest of a state itself (for example, exchange control laws) or 
private interests which the state wishes to protect (for example, in the insurance, consumption and employment 
contexts).  See Peter Nygh, ‘Reasonable Expectations of Parties in Choice of Law’ (1995) 251 Recueil des Cours 268, 
380-381.  
46 McConnaughay observed that even if private laws are mandatory in a domestic setting, the public interest in their 
enforcement in an international transaction is insufficient to insist on application of the law without regard for the 
expectations of the parties, the impact on cross-border commerce, and the comparative interests of other nations. 







Until the late nineteenth century economic activities were subject to few constraints. The 
free contract ideology primarily concerned the protection of private property presumed that 
individuals ought to be free to contract and own property without interference from the state. 
Thus it placed most bargaining beyond the purview of government.47 Then, since the late 
nineteenth century, the industrialized states of the world began to move beyond laissez-faire 
liberalism towards a modern welfare state.  Reforms have been adopted by the legislatures and 
exceptions elaborated by jurists. Textbooks also began to reflect emerging concepts of the 
welfare state. Nineteenth-century individualism and economic freedom that favour private rights 
were thus, redefined as something no longer “static”, but “dynamic”. 48 
What is most important to recognise, in terms of how the framework of economic 
liberty has been affected by the reforms, is the introduction of a comprehensive set of 
regulations and procedures which has precluded to some extent free bargaining between private 
parties.49 Many aspects of nineteenth century private contract, therefore ‘were moved over into 
aegis of public law’.50 Such reforms were justified by the proponents of “positive liberty” on the 
                                                 
47 About the history of the principle of freedom of contract, see Harry Scheiber (ed), The State and Freedom (1998), 
where authors analysed the development of conceptions of economic liberty that are strongly influenced by a 
variety of legal principles, commercial realties, and social norms.  
48 From this period, there have been rumours of free contract’s demise. Atiyah wrote in 1979 of the “decline of free 
choice and consent” in English law over the previous hundred years.  P S Atylah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of 
Contract (1979) 726.  
49 Especially such areas as employment, consumer purchases and tenancy were affected by the reforms. Lord Action 
wrote in 1881 that: 
“…in open market, between capital and labour, it cannot be right that one of two contracting parties 
should have the making of the laws, the management of conditions, the keeping of the peace, the 
administration of justice, the distribution of taxes, the control of expenditure, in its own hands, 
exclusively… Justice required that property should-not abdicate, but-share its political supremacy. Without 
this partition, free contract was … illusory. See Lord Acton, ‘Letter to Mary Gladstone Apr. 24, 1881’ in 
Alan Bullock and Maurice Shock (eds), The Liberal Tradition from Fox to Keynes (1956) 125-26.  
50 Harry Scheiber, ‘Economic Liberty and the Modern State’ in Harry Scheiber (ed), The State and Freedom of Contract 
(1998) 153.  




grounds that the legislative intervention is necessary to correct the social ill and distribute wealth 
and goods for the benefit of all. 51  
After World War II, the concept of the “welfare state’ moved to the next stage.  Systems 
of social provision and social regulation have come to be the principal domestic undertaking of 
states in the Western capitalist societies leading to the expansion of regulatory controls over the 
markets and at the same time to more generous social spending.  The primary goal of the welfare 
state policies was “to establish social security for all from the cradle to the grave”.52  
But in the early 1970s, the liberal policies of the growing internationalisation of the 
market economy have made the protectionist objectives of the welfare state increasingly 
incompatible with them. In the domestic context, the system of social provision came under 
attack as the reformers sought a system that encourages the expansion of the market economy. 
Particularly, the emergence of neo-liberalism and anti-welfare policies, such as the ones 
introduced by the Thatcher and Reagan governments after 1979 have reduced many social 
controls over the markets. Therefore, some argue for the fall of the welfare state.53 
Nonetheless, the alleged decline of welfare state anyway, does not imply that the 
regulatory role of the state has diminished or totally disappeared. On the contrary, the idea of the 
welfare state traditionally dealt with providing social services to the public, has expanded because 
of the growth of state responsibility in other areas such as economic development and 
                                                 
51 The idea of positive liberty is often emphasized by those on the left-wing of the political spectrum. Proponents of 
‘positive liberty’ claim that any democratic government would not be in a position to ignore the wishes of people 
or societies.   
52 UK, Social Insurance and Allied Services (The Beveridge Report), Cmd. 6404 (London: HMSO, 1942). 
53 Takis Fotopoulos argued that the welfare state is no longer viable in the context of economic globalization. The 
current discourse of 'empowering' the citizen through ending the dependency culture functions as part of the 
ideology of marketisation. See Takis Fotopoulos, ‘Welfare State or Economic Democracy?‘ (1999) 5 (3) 







environment management. As a result, the welfare state continues to exist in modern democratic 
societies.54  
7.2.2. INCREASING CONCERNS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN MODERN NATIONAL 
CONTRACT LAWS 
The ideas of the welfare state persisted and have returned in force in later part of the 
twentieth century in the wave of social justice ideologies. The concept of “social justice” 
however, is not new. It is rather an extended variation of the traditional distributive model of 
social cooperation that opposes both inefficient and unjust allocation of resources. As John 
Rawls, the great advocate of the theory stated, social and economic inequality can only be 
justified when it offers the greatest possible benefit to “the worst-off in society”.55 
Today, the ideas of social justice have become an important objective behind social and 
economic policies of modern welfare states. Many areas of socio-economic activities are 
nowadays reflecting a scheme of social justice. Such trend is more notable in European legal 
systems. For instance, a group of scholars from various European states that worked on the 
construction of model principles for the regulation of contract law has proposed a manifesto for 
enacting social justice approaches in European contract law. 56  
In addressing fundamental questions such as how far private ordering should be 
permitted to regulate social and economic issues, the group put forward the following important 
themes.57 First, the market order has to express a distributive objective that ensures fair treatment 
                                                 
54 The significance of this is stated by Bodo Lipple: 
“The welfare state is the historical answer to complex problems facing industrialized societies trying to 
achieve greater socioeconomic equality. It is a special form of state intervention which guarantees stability, 
certainty and reliability, conveying  feeling of trust and safety to  population.”54 See Bodo Lipple, ‘Justice 
Evolution and the Welfare State in Europe’ (Research Network ‘European Social Policy’, Amsterdam, 18-
21 August 1999).  
55 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).  
56 Gert Brüggemeier et al (ed), ‘Social Justice in European Contract Law: Manifesto’ (2004) 10 (6) European Law 
Journal 653.  
57 Ibid, 664. 




for every European citizen. Second, the scheme of distributive justice must be consistent with 
constitutional principles that establish and protect the rights of citizen. Third, these principles of 
social justice must acquire their legitimacy through legislation or other forms of norm creation.  
Furthermore, the aforementioned manifesto reveals that modern national laws have 
experimented with novel solutions to ensure social justice in contract law. Particularly in national 
private laws, now one can discover innovations in market relations such as obligations to 
negotiate in good faith, to co-operate in performance, to inform the other party about material 
circumstances surrounding the transaction and to treat other party’s interests with care.58 Also, 
protection based upon social needs rather than equal opportunities and concerns of the 
distributive consequences of legal rules between groups are also can be found in modern private 
law.59 
The so-called 'constitutionalization of private law' is another example of   how European 
private law systems began to formulate principles of fairness in transactions.60 The idea behind 
this development is that a party should no longer be guided only by his or her own interests, but 
also by the justified interests of the other party. 61 In this sense, a constitutionally protected right 
to party autonomy should be guaranteed only when it is consistent with the principle of social 
justice. It started when the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the German Constitutional Court) begun to 
allow the direct invocation of human rights in disputes of private rights. 
                                                 
58 Ibid, 666.  
59 Ibid.  
60 For a discussion about the trend see Olha Cherednychenko, ‘The Constitutionalization of Contract Law: 
Something New under the Sun?’ (2004) 8 (1) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law <http://www.ejcl.org/> at 23 
January 2005; Basil Markesinis, Hannes Unberath, and Angus Johnston (eds), The German Law of Contract : a 
Comparative Treatise (2006) 37-43; Olha Cherednychenko, ‘Harmonising Contract Law through Fundamental 
Rights?’ (2007) 1 (1) Erasmus Law Review 37. 
61 In other words, it suggests “that private law is not in itself a closed system for the regulation of private 
relationships, but that it is totally subordinate to the value system of constitutional rights.” See Cherednychenko, 







In the German Bürgschaft case,62 a daughter who was 21, unemployed and owned no 
property had acted a surety for her father’s loan of DM 100,000. The Bundesverfassungsgericht held 
that the freedom of contract, which enjoys protection as a basic right, can only justify the 
conclusion of risky and yet unilaterally burdensome contracts if both parties are in a position to 
decide freely in favour of or against being bound by a contract. This was not the case in the 
Bürgschaft situation because the bank did not inform the daughter about the inherent risks of 
providing surety. Accordingly, the Bundesverfassungsgericht ruled that the contract was contrary to 
general clauses of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (the German Civil Code) concerning good morals and 
good faith and was therefore void. 
It is evident, therefore that modern welfare states use not only regulatory public law, but 
also private law as a vehicle for furthering welfare objectives to reduce gross inequalities in 
income and raise the standard of living of their citizens. As they seek to achieve particular social 
and economic goals through contract law rules, national private laws that were traditionally only 
concerned with doing justice between private litigants, now must pursue a new goal that is to 
establish distributive fairness in society. Subsequently, the individual choice and freedom which 
are central features of contract law are no longer an absolute value. 
As far as disputes where public and private interests are mixed, such as foreign 
investment disputes are concerned, there is even greater concern for social justice. The adoption 
of corporate social responsibility policies is a perfect example of how distributive and welfare 
concerns have influenced the legal environment. Under such policies, companies often have 
obligations to minimize the environment, health and safety impact of their activities and 
products, to respect people and communities and refrain from engaging in fraud.  
                                                 
62 See BVerfG 19 October 1993, BVerfGE 89, 214.  




It is now necessary to examine the extent to which notions of social justice and fairness 
operate in the sphere of international law. 
7.2.3. INTERNATIONAL LAW MOVING TOWARD SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Social justice is the central organising principle of any modern national legal and 
economic system. However, it is a relatively new topic in the domain of international law. This 
absence of concepts of social justice in international law emerges from at least two factors. 
Firstly, the traditional international legal system was never arranged in terms of the internal 
affairs of sovereign states. It was responsive to the issues of peace and security of sovereign 
states contemplating relations among states. Second, because of the primary aim of international 
commercial law to reduce legal barriers for the promotion of international trade and investment, 
it much more secures the ideals of freedom of contract than the ideals of social justice.  
However, international law today has been increasingly involved in matters that were 
viewed in the past as purely domestic questions.63 More and more relations between a state and 
its nationals have acceded to the international legal sphere. The emergence of human rights as a 
subject of concern in international law in the mid-twentieth century is the example of such 
evolution. But the subject matter of contemporary international law is not only the protection of 
human rights. Far beyond that it encompasses the total well-being of human individuals. Since 
the early seventies, global society began to speak of economic development as a means of the 
eradication of poverty and the improvement of basic human dignity. Therefore, the construction 
of legal principles and normative standards governing issues such as socio-economic 
development and environmental protection became ultimately important along with the norms 
on protection of human rights.  
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One of the areas that has been and continues to be influenced by the new developments 
of international law is the field of foreign investment. In today’s global economy not only 
developing governments, but also transnational and international financial institutions are 
responsible for promoting human-centred sustainable development. Under international rules 
regulating the behaviour of transnational corporations, corporations conducting business 
activities are responsible for the social and environmental impact of their activities.64 The 
international financial institutions that traditionally operated in isolation from social issues also 
have been evaluating the social and environmental impacts of economic issues in their decision 
making process.65  
This picture becomes more apparent when it comes to the field of private international 
law. Particularly rules of private international law, as being based on domestic law concepts, are 
more conscious of protecting weaker parties or third parties in contractual relationship. This is 
evidenced by the special protection for consumers in the Brussels I Regulation66, Lugano Convention67 
                                                 
64 See for detail the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to 
Human Rights (the Norms) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).  
65 Between 1990 and 1991 the World Bank first adopted two directives to stem the human rights abuses most cited 
in connection with the development projects in which it was involved. Similarly, the IMF acknowledged in 1995 
that “the importance of social issues for sustainable economic and social development has become increasingly 
evident”.  For more about this practice see Christiana Ochoa, ‘Advancing Language of Human Rights in a Global 
Economic Order: An Analysis of a Discourse’ (2003) 23 Boston College Third World Law Journal 57. 
66 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels I Regulation), OJ No L 012, 16/01/2001, Art 18 (entered into force on 1 March 
1 2002).  It applies among all the EU Member States except Denmark and replaces the Brussels Convention (n 68) in 
the mutual relations between those States to which it applies. 
67 Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, opened for signature 16 
September 1988, OJ No L 319, 25/11/1988, Art 13 (entered into force 1 January 1992) [hereinafter the Lugano 
Convention]. The Lugano Convention will not apply to relations among the EU Member States, but will apply 
where one of the 15 “old” EU Member States and certain other States in Europe is involved. 




and the Brussels Convention68 and the several provisions for choice of law in respect to certain 
consumer and employment contracts in the Rome Convention.69 
Moreover, the latest developments and reconstruction in theory and practice of private 
international law indicate attempts to formulate new conflict of law approaches that are more 
responsive and suitable to the changing needs and realties of the modern economic system. For 
instance, the Hague Securities Convention70 has established a new choice of law rule for securities 
held through intermediaries. The basic principle of the Convention is that where securities are 
held through an intermediary, the law applicable to holdings of securities is the one stated in the 
account agreement with intermediary.71 The selected law will govern not only the contractual 
issues relating to the account agreement, but also govern proprietary issues in the absence of a 
provision in the agreement to the contrary. 
This approach of the Hague Convention has been applauded and held up as a workable 
solution to the conflict of laws issues surrounding securities transactions held through 
intermediaries. Goode, for example has remarked that the approach adopted in the Hague 
Convention is a good example of a special rule which is not tied to the traditional conflicts 
approach and rather highly fact-specific.72 The new approach that is founded on neither party 
autonomy nor traditional territorial connections73 may be an indication that international law has 
                                                 
68 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, opened for signature 27 
September 1968, OJ No L 299, 31/12/1972, Art 13 (entered into force 1 February 1973) [hereinafter the Brussels 
Convention]. Today, it has been largely superseded by the “Brussels Regulation” (n 66). It now applies only between 
Denmark and the other 14 old EU Member States. 
69 Rome Convention (n 4), Arts 5 and 6. The Convention will be replaced by Regulation of the European Parliament and the of 
the Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 1), which has not been officially published yet.  
70 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities, opened for signature 5 July 2006 available 
at <http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=72 > at 23 December 2007 [hereinafter the 
Hague Securities Convention]. 
71 Ibid, Art 4.  
72 Goode, above n 25, 543.  
73 Rogers argues that it would be misunderstanding to describe that the approach taken in the Hague Convention is 







acknowledged the impracticality of conventional choice of law techniques to these kind of 
complicated disputes which have multiple jurisdictional issues and also balancing interests of 
regulatory laws. The Hague approach thus makes a significant advance in thinking about conflict 
of laws.74 
Furthermore, a number of international arbitral sources illustrate that the regulatory 
measures motivated by the public good such as the environment protection should be allowed in 
international investment law. In this regard, the Methanex award is worth highlighting. In this 
case, a Canadian producer of methanol brought a claim against the United States government 
under NAFTA's Chapter 11, seeking compensation of US$970 million for business lost due to 
"indirect expropriation."75 The decision of this case has made two significant contributions to 
evolution of international investment law. Firstly, the arbitration tribunal accepted a modern 
regulatory approach which reflects the old police powers concept76, an approach long argued for 
by civil society groups. Thus, the tribunal rejected the Methanex claim on the ground that the 
California ban was a public health measure, and regulatory measures that are for a public purpose 
are protected from being considered an expropriation.77 
Another significance of the Methanex Award is its contribution to procedural 
developments of international investment arbitration.78 The tribunal placed emphasis on the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Rogers, ‘Conflict of Laws for Transactions in Securities Held through Intermediaries’ (2006) 39 Cornell International 
Law Journal 285. 
74 Ibid, 328.  
75 Methanex Corporation v United States of America (Final Award) (3 August 3 2005), 44 ILM 1345 (2005). 
76 The concept of police powers is an old international law term originated from English common law. Police power 
is the capacity of state to take regulatory measures in terms of public welfare, security, morality and safety. The 
status of the concept of police powers however, has not been firmly established in international law. 
77 The Tribunal held that:  
 “But as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is 
enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not 
deemed expropriatory and compensatory.” Methanex Corporation v United States of America (Final Award) (3 August 3 
2005), 44 ILM 1345 (2005), para 7.  
78 One author concluded: 




value of greater transparency for proceedings such as these due to the involvement of public 
interest. 79  Such proceedings are not now, if they ever were, to be equated to the standard run of 
international commercial arbitration between private parties. For the first time in the history of 
international investment arbitration, thus the Methanex tribunal allowed amicus submissions of 
civil society actors in investor-state arbitration. Public hearings were also permitted by the 
tribunal. 
The trends introduced with the Methanex Award already have significant implications for 
a treaty negotiation process. Some FTAs such as the US-Singapore FTA, the US-Chile FTA and 
Australia-US FTA include environment chapters which provide high environmental protection 
standards.80 Regulatory actions designed to protect public health and environment no longer 
constitute an expropriation.81 Meanwhile, to ensure greater transparency in proceedings of 
investment disputes, ICSID has made several amendments such as provisions for amicus 
submissions by third parties, public attendance at oral hearings, and publication of awards.82 This 
                                                                                                                                                    
 “… there is no doubt that the Methanex Case has been pivotal in beginning the transition of international 
investment arbitrations from a secret and secretive process into a more transparent, accessible and thus 
accountable process. There is much to be done yet in this regard,  but the starting line has been crossed, and it is 
self-evident that there is no turning back from this process in the post-Methanex era. That alone marks the 
Methanex arbitration as a seminal part of the evolution of international law in this field.” Howard Mann, The Final 
Decision in Methanex v United States: Some New Wine in Some New Bottles (2005) International Institute for Sustainable 
Development <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/commentary_methanex.pdf > at 23 July 2007. 
79 See Methanex Corporation v United States of America (Decision on Authority to Accept Amicus Submissions) (15 
January 2005) para 49 <http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_6.htm> 25 January 2007.  
80 US-Singapore FTA, Ch 18, available at <http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/USA-Singapore/text_e.asp#arti18.2 >; 
US-Singapore FTA, Ch 19, available at 
<http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file482_4013.
pdf >; Australia-US FTA, Ch 19, available at 
<http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/asset_upload_file819_51
64.pdf > at 23 December 2007.  
81 Eg, Annex 11-B (4) (b) of the Australia-US FTA states:   
 “Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to 
achieve legitimate public welfare objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, and the environment, 
does not constitute indirect expropriations.” Australia-US FTA, ibid.  









means that for the first time, international arbitral tribunals that used to protect the superior 
interests of international trade are now expected to take the public interests such as 
environmental or other public policy issues into account. 
7.3. Summary of  Findings  
This chapter endeavoured to show the role and function of the principle of party 
autonomy in modern legal systems. It would be pertinent to reflect the origins of the principle 
when ideas of freedom of contract and private autonomy were warmly embraced in European 
society as a motivator of economic growth. As modern societies become more complex with its 
wide variety of perspectives, the legal atmosphere which guarantees economic liberalism has 
changed too.   
Thus, since the late nineteenth century regulatory measures designed to establish an 
appropriate balance between various conflicting interests of individuals, have significantly eroded 
the notion of freedom. To give credibility to the necessity of these interventionist mechanisms, 
various theories had been developed.  For instance, the legal traditions on public policy and 
mandatory rules were formulated to demarcate the boundaries between those matters that are 
subject matter of freedom of contract and those matters that are never subject to private 
lawmaking.  
Today, in the modern market economy, the domain of individual autonomy has shrunk 
even more than it in the previous periods. As the discussions show, European private law 
systems have enacted the scheme of social justice in furthering welfare objectives. As a result, 
there has been a shift from private law rules that allow private parties to make their own 
contracts in their own terms to rules with distributive objectives. For example, the theory of 
'constitutionalization of private law' that invalidates unilaterally burdensome contracts prohibits 




parties from taking advantage of superior economic strength or from ignoring the justified claims 
of others.  
The expansion of regulatory public laws into the contract regime in domestic legal 
systems has also resulted in the formulation of similar approaches at international law. As the 
study shows, both public international law and private international law have begun to accept the 
important role of sophisticated theories of justice in dealing with social problems. Under the 
influence of international human rights law, the international financial institutions that generally 
promote the ideology of the free market are now introducing some reforms responding to 
human development needs. As a result, global trade rules often served the interests of 
multinationals are to be changed to the benefit of poverty reduction, sustainable development 
and human rights.  
On the other hand, there are new developments in private international law too. Most 
notably, in the Methanex case arbitrators put the public health issue before commercial interests 
and financial profits, and also allowed the third party participation. These could be seen as small 
steps towards introducing reforms to the current international law on foreign investment.  
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE REALITY OF 
AUTONOMY IN STATE CONTRACTS 
8.1. The Rule of  Free Choice in the ICSID Arbitrations 
As already discussed in the previous chapter,83 the ICSID Convention gives primary 
importance to the choice of law made by the parties themselves. Thus, the principle of party 
autonomy that used to apply only to private law relationships was formally welcomed in 
complex and dichotomous disputes, which intertwines aspects of both public and private law. 
It is necessary to examine how investor/state tribunals tackle the issues.  
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8.1.2. “SUPPLEMENTED” AND “CORRECTED” PARTY AUTONOMY  
During the drafting of the World Bank’s Convention, a role for international law was 
seen both in the case of a lacuna in national law and in the case of inconsistencies between the 
two laws.84  Under this direction, on a number of occasions the international arbitral tribunals set 
up by the ICSID eroded the principle of free choice of law by either supplementing the parties’ 
choice of law or correcting the choice.  
The awards of two ICSID tribunals of the 1980s and the early 1990s, the ones 
constituted in Letco v. Liberia85 and SPP v Egypt,86 took the view that the parties’ agreement on the 
applicable law has little value when it comes to the investment dispute. In both of those cases, 
the underlying investment agreements contained statements to the effect that they had been 
made “under’ or ‘in accordance with” certain specified legislation of the host state.87 The 
Tribunal therefore was led to believe that such a reference indicated a choice by parties of 
national law as the law governing the concession agreement.  
However, in both Letco v Liberia and SPP v Egypt the tribunals ultimately found that they 
did not have to decide whether or not there was any agreement between the parties on applicable 
law and proceeded to invoke international law, either to supplement or to correct the chosen 
national law. In Letco v Liberia, the tribunal agreed that the role of international law was to 
“control” or serve as a “regulator” of the applicable national law.88 However in the case at hand, 
                                                 
84 Schreuer, above n 17, 623.  
85 Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v Government of the Republic of Liberia (Award on Merits) (31 March 1986) 
26 ILM 647 (1987) (‘Letco v Liberia’). 
86 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt (Award on Merits) (20 May 1992) 32 ILM 933 
(1993) (‘SPP v Egypt’). 
87 In Letco v Liberia, the parties had entered into a concession agreement which stated that the contract had been 
executed under the provisions of title 15 of the Liberian Code of Laws of 1956 (26 ILM 647 (1987), at 658). In the 
SPP v Egypt, the preamble of the relevant contract made reference to three pieces of Egyptian legislation (32 ILM 
933 (1993), para 75).  
88 The tribunal did not doubt as to the applicability of Liberian law as the law chosen by the parties. But instead of 
applying the law, it made enquires as to the applicability of international law to the current situation as if there was 
no choice of law made. See Letco v Liberia, (Award) (31 March 1986) 26 ILM 647 (1987) 658.  




the tribunal declared itself satisfied that the relevant rules of Liberian Law were in conformity 
with those of international law.89  
Similarly, in SPP v Egypt, the tribunal took the view that even when the parties had made 
a choice of national law, there would, because all national legal systems have gaps, always be 
some measure of absence of agreement between the parties on applicable law.90 In the tribunal’s 
view, the question whether the was choice of Egyptian law had ‘very little, if any, practical 
significance’91 as such a choice could not in any event ‘entirely exclude the direct applicability of 
international law’ under the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 42 of the 
Convention.92 
In another case, in Amco v Indonesia, the tribunal stated that, whatever the applicable 
national law, “applicable norms of international law must be complied with since the ICSID 
award has to be recognized and pecuniary obligations imposed by such award enforced, by every 
Contracting State of the Convention”.93 Thus, the prevalent trend of the ICSID awards suggests 
that international law is relevant to investment disputes as the overriding governing law even in 
situations where foreign investments were not made subject to it.94 The concept has been put 
forward to support so-called theory of supplemental and corrective function of international 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 The tribunal stated:  
 “Even accepting the Respondent’s view that the Parties had implicitly agreed to apply Egyptian law, such an 
agreement cannot entirely exclude the direct applicability of international law in certain situations. The law of the 
ARE [Arab Republic of Egypt], like all municipal legal systems, is not complete or exhaustive, and where a lacunae 
[sic] occurs it cannot be said that there is agreement as to the application of a rule of law which, ex hypothesi, does 
not exist. In such a case, it must be said that there is ‘absence of agreement’ and, consequently, the second 
sentence of Art 42 (1) [the one that provides the application of international law] would come to play.” SPP v 
Egypt (Award on Merits) (20 May 1992), 32 ILM 933 (1993), para 80. 
91 Ibid, para 78. 
92 Ibid, para 80. 
93 Amco Asia Corporation and Others v Republic of Indonesia (Decision on Annulment) (16 May 1986), 1 ICSID Rep 513, 
515 (‘Amco v Indonesia’). 







law.95 Under this doctrine, the parties’ choice of a particular domestic law could be excluded if 
the chosen law contradicts international rules or has gaps and relevant rules of international law 
would apply instead overriding the choice.  
However, the adoption of the theory of supplemental and corrective effects of 
international law by international arbitrations other than ICSID arbitration is unlikely, primarily 
due to the controversies arising from the relationship between international law and municipal 
law. In the international context, the debate of monism versus dualism of public international has 
not been settled theoretically as well as practically. Thus, by simply admitting that international 
law controls and checks the validity of municipal law, one cannot resolve the issue and impose 
international law over municipal law. 
From another viewpoint, the application of international law where it has not been 
included in the choice of law clause stipulated by the parties is very controversial. By virtue of 
universal private international law, a failure to mention a particular legal system in agreement 
amounts to a negative choice of law effectively excluding its applicability. Thus, several scholars 
have criticized the approach of the investment arbitrations as violating the parties’ declared will.96 
Except for certain mandatory rules from which there is no escape, there is nothing that subverts 
or modifies the choice.  
                                                 
95 The formula is more expressly stated in the Klockner v Cameroon Case.  Here, the Ad hoc committee held: 
“Article 42 of the Washington Convention certainly provides that “in the absence of agreement between 
parties, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute …and such principles 
of international law as may be applicable. “This gives these principles (perhaps omitting cases in which it 
should be ascertained whether the domestic law conforms to international law) a dual role, that is, 
complementary (in the case of a “lacuna’ in the law of the state), or corrective, should be the State’s law not 
conform on all points to the principles of international law. In both cases, the arbitrators may have 
recourse to the “principles of international law” only after having inquired into and established the content 
of the law of the State party to the dispute… and after having applied the relevant rules of the State’s law. 
Article 42 (1) therefore clearly does not allow the arbitrator to base his decision solely on the “rules” or 
“principles of international law” Klockner Belge, SA and Klochner Handlesmaatschappij BV v Republic of Cameroon 
(Decision on Annulment) (3 May 1985), 2 ICSID Rep 122.  
96 Stephen Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and Private Persons (1990) 238-239; 
Nagla Nassar, ‘Internationalization of State Contracts: ICSID, The Last Citadel’ (1997) 14 Journal of International 
Arbitration 185, 196; Georges Delaume, ‘The Pyramids Stand: the Pharaohs can Rest in Peace’ (1993) 8 ICSID 
Review- Foreign Investment Law Journal 248; A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘State Contracts in Contemporary International 
Law: Monist versus Dualist Controversies’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 309. 




Some commentators also argue that that the doctrine of supplemental and corrective 
effects of international law adopted by ICSID tribunals is inconsistent with the Convention itself. 
Notably, Maniruzzaman commented that the tribunals' approaches that suggest international law 
applies either as a controlling system or as performing the gap-filling function are quite 
dangerous and contrary to the spirit of the ICSID Convention. It may be expected that 
international law would apply regardless of parties’ choice of law making the first sentence of 
Article 42 (1) meaningless.97 Gaillard and Banifatemi also argue that the history of the 
negotiations leading to the conclusion of the ICSID Convention does not support the 
supplemental and corrective approach to international law.98 
As a matter of fact, there are more lacunae in international law than in national law.99 It is 
true today that many developing countries are enacting laws regarding natural recourses sector or 
investment policies, while there are no such transnational rules adopted at multilateral level due 
to divergent views of participants of international community. Thus, it was commented that 
ICSID tribunals that have been authorized to apply both national and international law have 
often found the application of national law alone is satisfactory without being supplemented or 
corrected by international law.100 
As noted earlier, nowadays ICSID arbitrations mostly administer disputes arising out of 
the obligations of BITs as a majority of them mandate the resolution of disputes pursuant to the 
                                                 
97 Maniruzzaman, above n 96, 327.  
98 According to them, the intention of the negotiators was that international law should be an option available to the 
arbitral tribunal in the absence of an agreement between the parties. Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi, ‘The 
Meaning of "and" in Article 42 (1), Second Sentence, of the Washington Convention: The Role of International 
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rules, that is unsound.” Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Thirty years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the Discriminating 
Application of Transnational Rules’ in Albert Van Den Berg (ed), Planning Efficient Arbitration Proceedings: The Law 
Applicable in International Arbitration (1994) 571, 576. 
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BITs by means of arbitration.  It has meant that the disputes are governed by public international 
law regardless of the existence of a choice of law clause in the contract. In MTD Equity Sdn Bhd, 
the tribunal interpreted the existence of the BIT as an agreement to apply international law. 101 
Such an interpretation suggests that the party autonomy principle would become less important 
in Bilateral Investment Treaty arbitration.  
8.1.2. A SHIFT TO ISSUE SPECIFIC APPROACH - CONTRACT V TREATY CLAIMS  
In the context of the ICSID arbitration the most recent tendency seems to be the 
emergence of a new approach that deals with issues of the applicable law of investment disputes. 
This approach which could be termed as “an issue-specific approach” first identifies each legal 
issue in its proper context, then decides which law should apply to the issue.102 The application 
of this approach was much clearer in Maffezini v Spain where the tribunal did not enter into a 
theoretical discussion on the law applicable to the case concerned and applied international law 
to matters concerning State responsibility for the question of attribution and the Spanish law to 
the structure and functions of an entity.103 
The rationale for the issue specific approach is founded on the recognition of two 
different types of claims in investment disputes, ie contract claims and treaty claims. The trend 
towards the conceptual separation between contract claims and treaty claims is now found in a 
number of cases of the ICSID arbitration decided in 2000s. Specifically, it was first introduced in 
the Vivendi I case (2000).104 
                                                 
101 In that case, the tribunal found, "[t]his being a dispute under the BIT, the parties have agreed that the merits of 
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Chile (Award on Merits) (25 May 2004), 44 ILM 91 (2005), para 86. 
102 Christoph Schreuer, ‘The Relevance of Public International Law in International Commercial Arbitration: 
Investment Disputes‘ (Paper presented at 71st Biennial Conference of the International Law Association (ILA), 
Berlin, 16-21 August 2004).  
103 Maffezini (Emilio Agustin) v Kingdom of Spain (Award) (13 November 2000), 5 ICSID Rep 419.  
104 Compania de Aguas des Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic, (Award) (21 November 2000), 40 ILM 
426 (2001). 




 The proceedings in the Vivendi arose from a dispute over the terms of a concession 
contract between a French company and its subsidiary in Argentine (CGA and CGE), on the 
one hand, and the Argentine Province of Tucuman, on the other hand.  In the first award, the 
ICSID dismissed CGA and CGE’s claims finding that the claims were closely linked to the 
performance of the concession contract, which has a forum selection clause referring to the 
administrative courts of Tucuman. In the tribunal’s view, such claims should have been litigated 
before the local Tucuman courts.  Also, the tribunal held that it had not been proved that there 
were violations of the BIT by the Argentine Republic.  
In 2002 the Ad Hoc committee, which had to decide the on the request of CGA and 
CGE for the annulment of the Vivendi I Award, even though it found that the tribunal had 
exceeded its powers, also held that the tribunals’ decision as to jurisdiction had been correct.105 
The committee here thus, emphasised the existence two different categories of claims which 
have different legal grounds and described this as follows:  
“… whether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of 
contract are different questions. Each of these claims will be determined by reference to 
its own proper or applicable law- in the case of the BIT, by international law; in the case 
of the Concession Contract, by the proper law of the contract, in other words, the law of 
Tucuman.”106 
The precedent of the Vivendi Tribunal now has been followed in a number of awards 
made by the ICSID arbitration in recent years. In some of these cases, the legal questions arising 
from the relations between contract and treaty claims had been discussed even though the 
                                                 
105 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija, S A & Compagnie (Decision on Annulment) (3 July 2002) 6 ICSID Rep 340, para 
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discussions show major inconsistencies among the arbitral awards.107 In other cases, the ICSID 
tribunal simply pointed out the separation of treaty claims and contractual claims.108 
Subsequently, one may say that the principle is now well established. In CMS v 
Argentina,109 it was acknowledged that a more pragmatic and less doctrinaire approach has 
emerged allowing for the application of both domestic law and international law if specific facts 
of the dispute so justifies. On this point, the tribunal in the case emphasized that there should no 
longer be any need to argue as to which of the two systems of law, namely international and 
domestic law superimposes one over the other, when their application depends on the particular 
circumstances of the case.110 
Although the categorization of claims into treaty and contract was initially made for 
purposes of determining the tribunal’s jurisdiction, it is equally important in determining the 
governing law of the issue. The categorization would classify issues as contractual or that of 
treaty according to their legal grounds. If the issue is based on a claim for breach of contract, it is 
identified as a contractual one, and then the host state’s law applies. If the issue in question 
concerns a violation of international law standards, it is regarded as one of treaty obligations, and 
international law applies. 
                                                 
107 In the following cases, issues determining jurisdictions of international arbitral tribunal and domestic courts were 
discussed. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Decision on Jurisdiction) (6 August 
2003), 8 ICSID Rep 406; SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Philippines (Decision on Jurisdiction) (29 January 
2004), 8 ICSID Rep 518; Joy Mining Machinery Ltd v Egypt  (Decision on Jurisdiction) (6 August 2004), 19 ICSID 
Rev 486, 44 ILM 73 (2005); Salini Construttori SpA v Jordan (Decision on Jurisdiction) (9 November 2004), 44 ILM 
573 (2005).  
 For a scholarly debate on this approach see Christoph Schreuer, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction 
over Contract Claims- the Vivendi I Case Considered’ in Todd Weiler (ed), International Investment Law and 
Arbitration: Leading cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (2005); Yuval 
Shany, ‘Contract Claims vs Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts between ICSID Decisions on Multi-sourced 
Investment Claims’  (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 835.  
108 Bayindir Insaat Turism Ticaret Ve Sanyi AS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Decision on Jurisdiction) (14 November 
2005) <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Bayindr-jurisdiction.pdf > at 22 December 2007; Telenor Mobile 
Communications AS v Republic of Hungary (Award) (13 September 2006) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Telenorv.HungaryAward_001.pdf > at 22 December 2007. 
109 CMS GAS Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic (Award on Merits) (12 May 2005), 44 ILM 1205 (2005). 
110  Ibid, para 116. 




On the other hand, the issue-specific approach of ICSID arbitration may introduce new 
uncertainties into international investment law, as some critics argue.111 But, as far as the law 
applicable to investment disputes is concerned, the method may rather lessen many uncertainties 
that exist in the theory of internationalization. First, the method recognises that different issues 
might have different legal basis and therefore subject to different legal systems. Specifically, the 
distinctiveness of different legal domains such as domain of domestic law, domain of public 
international law and domain of private international law have been reaccepted. As a result, there 
is no point of subjecting a private contract to the rules of public international law alone.  
Second, the conceptual separation between treaty and contract claims identifies those 
questions that should be answered by reference to public international law or treaty law and 
those questions that are governed by domestic law. Thus, it would assist in drawing lines 
between those issues within the scope of the parties’ contractual autonomy and those that are 
not. Consequently, uncertainties related to rules of private international law such as party 
autonomy can be cleared up. 
Furthermore, unlike the dogmatic approach based on the supplemental and corrective 
functions of international law, the method of the issue-specific analysis does not assign a 
particular role to international law in relation to domestic law. Rather, respective roles of both 
legal systems in resolving foreign investment disputes are of equal importance in the context of 
the new approach. Thus, controversies arising out of the theory of internationalization in relation 
to the relationship between international law and domestic law might be lessened. Meanwhile, 
the issue-specific approach might be deemed far more theoretically convenient than the one 
based on the supplementary and corrective roles of international law and even legitimate, if 
                                                 







formally speaking. To this extent, the shift occurred with the recent decisions was a major one 
and should be welcomed. 
While the problem of applying party autonomy to state contracts has not been fully 
settled in the practice of arbitration tribunals of investment disputes, certain doctrines also have 
provided obstacles to the autonomy of parties to state contracts to make free and rational 
choices including the choice of law that will govern the merits of their future disputes. Especially 
the actual freedom of a state party to the contract is constrained within the boundaries of these 
doctrines. It is thus necessary to discuss the application of these doctrines in state contracts. 
8.2. Barriers to the Parties’ Freedom of  Choice of  Law  
Although the party autonomy rule has been considered now to be the basic choice of law 
rule in investment agreements, in reality it is applied only to a limited extent for a variety of 
reasons arising mostly from theoretical problems. The main reason of its limited application to 
state contracts lies in the presence of public law features of the contracts, which had been 
neglected to a large extent by the earlier arbitrators of investment disputes.  Yet, in the area of 
foreign investment contracts, the fact that a state is a party to the transaction does have 
important consequences significantly limiting the scope of the free choice. 
To examine the nature and extent of the possible application of party autonomy to cases, 
where a foreign sovereign is involved, related legal doctrines that impact on the choice of law 
issue must be identified. 
8.2.1. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
One of the doctrines that bear on choice of law questions is the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.  According to the doctrine, a state or its agency who is acting in exercise of sovereign 
authority of the state enjoys immunity that prevents it from being sued in courts of other states. 




Thus, in so far being primarily a jurisdictional rule, the doctrine restrains the freedom of parties 
to state contracts to bring suits in a suitable foreign state.  
Initially based on the equality of states, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has 
undergone considerable transformations through the centuries responding to the changing 
priorities of society.112 Historically, states enjoyed absolute immunity from foreign suit meaning 
that courts automatically dismissed suits against foreign states in respect of both their sovereign 
and non-sovereign actions.113 However, by the end of the 19th century, as with US and English 
law, French and other civil law systems departed from the practice of granting absolute immunity 
and moved to a new approach which has become known as the “restrictive theory of 
sovereignty”. This shift was motivated in large extent by the emerging role of nation-states as 
participants in commercial affairs.114 
The theory of restrictive sovereignty now has been increasingly adopted in most states’ 
court practice as well as in international practice. A regional convention, the 1972 European 
Convention on State Immunity (ECSI) and statutory enactments by both the USA115 and the UK116 in 
the late 1970s recognized exceptions to immunity. Each of these Acts provide variations but the 
basis is that the immunity does not apply to acts regarded as commercial acts, or acts which 
                                                 
112 Hazel Fox has revealed three distinct stages in the development of the doctrine: the absolute doctrine, the 
restrictive doctrine and the post-modern stage. Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (2002) 2.  
113 This position was well summarised by Lord Atkin in the Cristina Case:  
 “The foundation for the application to set aside the writ and arrest of the ship is to be found in two propositions 
of international law engrafted into our domestic law which seems to me to be well established and to be beyond 
dispute. The first is that the courts of a country will not implead a foreign sovereign, that is, they will not by their 
process make him against his will a party to legal proceedings whether the proceedings involve process against his 
person or seek to recover from him specific property or damages. The second is that they will not by their process, 
whether the sovereign a party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain property of which he is in possession or 
control.” Cristina (1938) AC 485 at 491.  
114 Sornarajah noted that it would be unjust that states in their dealings with foreign private persons were able to take 
refuge behind the principle of sovereign immunity. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, International Commercial 
Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts (1990) 200. 
115 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 







could be performed by a private person, or acts that have a close connection with the jurisdiction 
of the forum state.  
It is now recognised by all countries which adhere to the restrictive theory of immunity 
that commercial and private law acts of foreign states are not entitled to immunity.  But drawing 
lines between immune transactions and non-immune transactions has proved more difficult 
because national laws classify public and private acts differently and in international law it is also 
not fully settled.117 In attempting to distinguish commercial activities of a state from its public or 
sovereign acts, it is now agreed at least in the Europe and US that the commercial character of 
activities carried on by a foreign government is to be determined by reference to its "nature," 
rather than its "purpose."118 
In the context of state contracts, it is accepted that the presence of an arbitration clause 
submitting disputes to ICSID arbitration amounts to a waiver of immunity.119 In Liamco, the US 
district court held that by submitting arbitration, Libya waived its immunity.120 Thus, many 
immunity issues, which may have an adverse effect on the conduct of the proceedings and the 
outcome of the award in the context of non-ICSID arbitration, may not cause much trouble 
when they are considered in an ICSID arbitration.  
However, in practice the consent to arbitration does not automatically grant the full 
waiver of all types of immunity. Thus, the state involved still may raise immunity from 
preliminary seizure, immunity from forced execution and immunity from execution of assets. 
                                                 
117 James Crawford, ‘International Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune Transactions’ (1983) 54 
British Year Book of International Law 75, 91.  
118 The application of these tests is discussed previously in Ch Two, Subsection 2.1.1 (The Methods of Determining 
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119 For purposes of the ICSID Convention, consent to ICSID arbitration once it is given cannot be unilaterally 
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This means a state may give consent to the consideration of an action brought against it in 
international arbitration or foreign court, but it may not permit to take provisional measures 
securing the action or to compulsory execute a judgment of the award issued against the state.121 
Even in countries that pioneered the doctrine of restrictive sovereignty, immunity from 
suit and immunity from execution are left separate making the scope of immunity from 
execution narrower than that of jurisdictional immunity. Particularly, Subsection 1610 (a) of the 
FSIA, regarding property belonging directly to a foreign state, permits execution only narrowly, 
when a foreign sovereign waives its immunity from execution and the property is "in the United 
States" and "used for a commercial purpose in the United States".122 Under the SIA of the UK, 
the immunity from attachment or execution is subject to two exceptions. First, the written 
consent of the state concerned is required and second, the property sought to be attached is ‘in 
use or intended for use for commercial purposes.” 123  
The fact that the legislation on sovereign immunity varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and some countries do not even have such legislation causes considerable difficulties 
in enforcing awards of international arbitral tribunals rendered against a defendant state. This 
difficulty may arise even in the case of ICSID arbitration. Delaume noted that “…in contrast 
with its daring approach to issues of immunity from suit, the Convention does not alter or 
supersede the rules of immunity from execution in Contracting States”.124 
                                                 
121 Referring to abundant case-law authors concluded that: 
“Even where a sovereign State is properly subject to the jurisdiction of local courts [one may add the 
jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals], execution of any judgement against the State may not as a rule be 
levied against its property, unless it has separately waived its immunity from execution.” See Robert 
Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed, 1992) 350. 
122 See Connecticut Bank of Commerce v The Republic of Congo, 309 F 3d 240, 256 (5th Cir, 2002), where the court 
acknowledged that the very structure of the FSIA creates broader jurisdiction to adjudicate than to enforce, so 
judgments may be rendered that are not enforceable. Also see similar decision, De Letelier v The Republic of Chile, 
748 F 2d 790, 798-99 (2d Cir, 1984).   
123 SIA, ss 13 (2) (b) and 13 (3) and (4).  







Therefore, the issues of executing the final award against particular assets of the losing 
sovereign party still remain controversial even in the case of ICSID arbitration, although 
significant progress has been made in overcoming jurisdictional immunity. In other words, even 
if a plaintiff-foreign investor successfully obtained a final judgment against a foreign sovereign, 
he still may need to rely on the foreign state to pay the judgment voluntarily.125 In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that the Argentine government facing with the possibility of losing in the 
majority of cases filed before ICSID has declared certain awards rendered under the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment disputes invalid and unenforceable.126 
8.2.2. ACT OF STATE  
The next doctrine which impedes the exercise of party autonomy by parties to state 
contracts is the Act of State doctrine and its variations. Generally, as with the immunity principle, 
the Act of State doctrine never features in arbitrations between private traders. But it is not 
peculiar to arbitrations involving disputes arising from the administrative actions of a state. The 
Act of State doctrine provides that out of the respect for equality of states courts should dismiss 
cases that would interfere with the acts of the foreign governments done within their states’ 
respective sovereign territory.  
The Act of State doctrine has been well developed in the US and UK court practices 
though other jurisdictions recognise strikingly similar doctrines. Underhill v Hernandez was the 
case where the US Supreme Court first applied the Act of State doctrine.  In this case the court 
refused to examine the legality of detention of the plaintiff, Underhill, an American citizen, by 
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Arbitration 23.  
126 Carlos Alfaro, Argentina: ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged by the Argentine Government (2004) Alfaro –Abogados 
<www.mondaq.com> at 17 June 2006.  




General Hernandez, a military commander of an insurrectionist movement which was later 
recognised as the government of Venezuela. 
The Court reasoned:  
“[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign 
state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the 
government of another, done within its own territory.”127 
In the US, the Act of State doctrine often applies in cases where a foreign sovereign 
expropriated the property of an American national located in that foreign state’s territory. In 
1964, the US Supreme Court applied the doctrine in the famous Sabbatino Case.128 The dispute 
arose when Cuba nationalised its sugar industry predominantly owned by US residents without 
compensation. The issue raised by the court was whether the doctrine is applicable in situations 
where an official act of another country violates international law. The court, however found that 
it could not question the validity of the taking of sugar by the Cuban Government even the 
taking was contrary to international law. It reasoned that the Executive had exclusive authority to 
conduct foreign affairs with other nations on behalf of the US and the Judiciary should not 
interfere in affairs of state. 129  
It is noteworthy that the Act of State doctrine is a more dangerous hurdle to the exercise 
of party autonomy by parties to state contracts than sovereign immunity for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the act of state doctrine does not depend for its validity on the rules of sovereign 
immunity and exists independently. In other words, even if a foreign state waives its immunity by 
agreeing to arbitration or lawsuit in another country or a case in hand falls within any such 
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exception, on the ground of the Act of State doctrine courts of one country have no power to 
adjudicate the validity of transactions of foreign states.130 
Although the Act of State doctrine is statutorily abrogated in a few countries in a few 
narrow circumstances, the courts are still reluctant to accept such statutory limitations.131 The 
basic idea is that for respect of separation of powers, the courts should refrain from making 
judgments that could seriously embarrass or disrupt their own country’s foreign relations, 
relations for which its political rather than judicial branch is chiefly responsible.  Thus, courts 
do not risk offence to foreign states.132 
In the US jurisdictions three exceptions to this doctrine now have been recognised. 
The first exception applies when the executive relieves courts from any restraint upon the 
exercise of their jurisdiction to enquiry about the validity of the acts of a foreign state.133 Then, 
Congress introduced another exception declaring that the Act of State doctrine is not 
applicable in case in which a taking of property violates the principles of international law.134A 
                                                 
130 In Brako v Bancomer, SNC, the court held that it has jurisdiction over the Mexican Bank pursuant to commercial 
activity exception; however it dismissed the plaintiff’s claim because of the act of state doctrine. 762 F 2d 222 (2nd 
Cir, 1985). Similarly, in a English case, Maclaine Watson v International Tin Council it was emphasised that two 
principles of immunity and non-justificiability [one aspect of the act of state doctrine] had to be kept separate and 
concern was expressed that the Buttes non-justiciability principle could be used to prevent proceedings being 
brought against states in commercial matters, contrary to the UK State Immunity Act 1978. See [1988] 3 WLR 1169, 
1188 per Kerr LJ.  
131 After Sabbatino, American Congress moved swiftly to limit the Act of State doctrine, but the judiciary has 
undermined the effort by narrowly interpreting the amendment and continuing to apply the doctrine wherever it 
does not conflict with a constrained reading of the Hickenlooper Amendment. See David Currie, Herma Kay and 
Larry Kramer, Conflict of Laws:  Cases, Comments, Questions (2001) 811.  
132 After investigating expropriation cases decided by US Courts, Mok came to conclusion that despite the apparently 
illegal and injustice taking in most instances, and despite the statutory limitations, the US judiciary rarely grant 
relief to expropriation victims basing their decisions either on sovereign immunity or act of state doctrine. Ronald 
Mok, ‘Expropriation Cases in United States Courts: The Act of State Doctrine, the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 
and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Road Map for the Expropriated Victims’ (1996) 8 Pace International 
Law Review 199, 235.  
133 This rule is known as the ‘Bernstein letter’.  Bernstein v NV Nederlandsichre- Amerkaaniche Stoomvart Maatschappij, 210 
F 2d 375 (2nd Cir, 1954), 20 ILR 24. 
134 See 22 USC, s 2170 (e) (2). Cf. exception to State Immunity for takings in violation of international law in the 
FSIA, s. 1605 (a) (3). This exception also was introduced in response to the Sabbatino Case.  




third exception, a treaty exception, is applied in cases, where the confiscating state is a party to 
a Treaty with the US prohibiting expropriation without compensation.135 
As US law, English courts adopted the doctrine of Act of State. The first well known 
case is Luther v Sagor, where the High Court of England recognised the confiscatory decree of 
the Soviet government as an Act of State, thus refused to go into enquiry on the legality of the 
decree.136 However, the English courts also have accepted two exceptions to the Act of State 
doctrine. The court will not enforce a foreign government act first, if a foreign government act 
is contrary to public policy of English law,137 and second, if the foreign government act clearly 
violates principles of international law.138 As regards the latter exception, the Pinochet case is 
an illustration of how courts may become powerless to adjudicate a foreign sovereign.139  
Augusto Pinochet, the Chilean dictator overthrew a democratically elected socialist 
government led by President Salvador Allende in 1973 and took power in Chile. For seventeen 
years of his military dictatorship, he killed and tortured thousands of people. In 1998, at the 
age of 82 he was arrested in Britain on charges of torture and crimes against humanity. The 
High Court decided that General Pinochet was immune from any legal action in the England 
                                                 
135 See Kalmazoo Spice Extraction Co v Provisional Military Govt of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F 2d 422 (6th Cir, 1984).  
136 Luther v Sagor [1921] 3 KB 532, 558.  
137 In India v Taylor, an English company operating in India voluntarily went into bankrupt in England. The English 
court refused tax claims of Indian Government in the winding-up the company on the ground that the 
enforcement of penal and fiscal laws of another country is unacceptable conduct. See Government of India, Minister of 
Defense (Revenue) Division v Taylor (1955) 1 AII ER 292, 295.  
138 In Oppenheimer v Cattermole, judges did not recognise the enforceability of a Nazi decree of 1941 which deprived all 
Jews outside Germany of German nationality on the ground that an English court will not recognise foreign 
legislation that constitutes a grave infringement of human rights. See Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249, 278; 
In the Kuwait Airways case, Kuwait Airlines (KAC) brought proceedings in the English court against Iraqi Airlines 
(IAC) for the removal and detention of aircrafts of KAC by Iraqi just after the military invasion of Kuwait by 
Iraqi. The English court held that Iraqi’s occupation was a gross violation of international law prohibiting the use 
of force, thus they did not recognise the validity of Iraqi’s law expropriating Kuwait’s aircrafts. See Kuwait Airways 
Co v Iraqi Airways Co (No 2) [2002] UKHL 19, 16 May 2002, 114 and 138.   
139 For more about the case see Andrea Bianchi, ‘The Immunity Versus Human Rights: Pinochet Case’ (1999) 10 (2) 







regarding the allegations against him.140 The House of Lords overturned the High court’s 
judgement, but its judgement was carried by three judges to two.141 The House of Lords’ 
finding against sovereign immunity and the Act of State doctrine was based on the view that 
the Torture Convention,142 which is ratified by both the UK and Chile, enables domestic courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over foreign governments.143 Thus, the Act of State doctrine has very 
narrow limits and it is not applicable only, where the state conduct constitutes violation of jus 
cogens principles of international law. 
It should be noted that the abovementioned exceptions have not been acted upon 
outside the US and the UK jurisdictions. In addition, the Act of State doctrine is based upon 
another strong ground which has internal constitutional roots. It arises out of the basic 
relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers.144 Under 
the doctrine of separation of powers, the judicial branch of the government does not 
embarrass the political branch by questioning the validity of its acts. The act of state defence 
thus, justifies the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds 
of decisions in the area of international relations.  
                                                 
140 Regina v Evans and another Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte Regina v Bartle, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte In re Pinochet Ugarte, High 
Court Decision, QB, 28.10.98.  
141 Regina v Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others Ex parte Pinochet, Regina v Evans and another and 
the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others Ex parte Pinochet , I Judgement of Lords of Appeal, 25.11.98, 37 
ILM (1998) 1302. However, the first decision of the House of Lords was set aside on the ground that Lord 
Hoffman, who cast the deciding vote, was an unpaid director of a charity arm of Amnesty International.  
142 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 4 
February 1985, 1465 UNTS 112 (entered into force 26 June 1987) [hereinafter the Torture Convention]. 
143 See both decisions of House of Lords concerning Pinochet's extradition. Regina v Bartle and the Commissioner of Police 
for the Metropolis and others Ex parte Pinochet, Regina v Evans and another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and 
others Ex parte Pinochet, Judgment of Lords of Appeal, 25.11.98, 37 ILM (1998) 1302; R v Bow street Stipendiary 
Magistrate and other, ex  parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and others intertwining) (No 3) in [1999] 2 ALL 
ER 97.  
144 In South Australia v The Commonwealth (Railway Agreement Case) Windeyer J observed: 
“Undertakings that are political in character-using the word “political” as referring to promises and 
undertakings of governments, either to their citizens or to other states or governments- are … often not 
enforceable by processes of law”. See South Australia v Commonwealth (1962) 108 CLR 130, 154.  




Furthermore, unlike sovereignty principle, the Act of State doctrine is not a 
jurisdictional rule; rather it is a special choice of law doctrine that applies to the domain of 
public law.145 The doctrine restrains courts when a transaction takes place in another 
jurisdiction, to dismiss an action of foreign government in relation to this transaction and 
merely apply the law chosen in the contract.  Particularly, Prof Henkin stated:  
“If there were no act of state doctrine, a domestic court in a case like Sabbatino would 
decide it on "conflicts" principles. It would first decide what law "governed" the issues. 
If under accepted choice of law principles the foreign law should govern, the court could 
still refuse to apply that law if it were found to be contrary to the public policy of the 
forum. The act of state doctrine, however, says that the foreign "law" (i.e., the act of 
state) must govern certain transactions and that no public policy of the forum may stand 
in the way.” 146   
Because the doctrine constitutes a prudential doctrine of domestic law, it is commonly 
said that the Act of State doctrine is not mandated by public international law.147 This cannot be 
true. The Act of State doctrine arose from state practice and it is a prerequisite for international 
peace and security. Not surprisingly, in Sabbatino Case, the Court held:  
 “However offensive to the public policy of this country and its constituent States an 
expropriation of this kind may be, we conclude that both the national interest and 
progress toward the goal of establishing the rule of law among nations are best served by 
maintaining intact the act of state doctrine in this realm of its application.”148   
With respect to disputes arising out of foreign investment between states and foreign 
entities or corporations, the Act of State doctrine has been broadly applied by courts everywhere 
to expropriation of private property by a foreign government. In American law, courts generally 
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International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (1991) vol III, 27.  
146 Louis Henkin, ‘Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility’ (1967) 6 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 175, 
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consider acts of nationalisation as an act of state, therefore justifiable.149 In French courts, the 
examination of the validity of decrees canceling existing contracts is excluded.150 In Italy, courts 
recognise a decree of a foreign state terminating a concession agreement.151 In Petrotimor Case, the 
Australian court refused to question the validity of Petrotimor’s concession granted by the 
Portuguese government under Portuguese law because of the Act of State doctrine.152 
Non-western jurisdictions also accept a very similar doctrine to the question of a validity 
of foreign governments’ expropriation act. In Japan, the Tokyo High Court held that "there is no 
established principle under international law for a court of a state to hold invalid the effect of the 
law legislated properly by a foreign state." 153 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim for the crude oil 
expropriated by Iranian Government was dismissed.  
However, this important judiciary principle has become obsolete in the context of 
international investment arbitration. In most cases, disputes between the host state and a foreign 
private party arise from legislative measures and international arbitral tribunals in the field of 
foreign investment often find these measures are unlawful on the basis of some alleged standard 
of international law.154 The bulk of bilateral, regional and multilateral investment treaties 
nowadays prohibit the exercise of legislative or regulatory measures of the host state by their 
expropriation provisions.  
                                                 
149 Eg, Sabbatino Case, ibid.  Also see Hunt v Mobil Oil Corporation, (1977) 550 F 2d 68; Libyan American Oil Co 
(“LIAMCO”) v Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F Supp 1175 (DDC 1980).  
150 See Cohen v Credit du Nord (1967) 47 ILR 82.  
151 See Court of Syracusa decision rejecting BP claim of ownership of oil from oilfield nationalized by Libya. BP 
Exploration Company Ltd v Astro Protector Naviera SA, (1974) 13 ILM 106. 
152 Petrotimor Companhia de Petroleos Sarl v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 126 FCR 354, 369.  
153 The Tokyo High Court Judgment on 11 September 1953, Kosai Minshu, vol 6, No 11, 702. 
154 One of the earliest cases referred to this concept is the Schufeldt Claim, where arbitral tribunal rejected the 
legislative decree of the Guatemalan government abrogating the concession of American citizen by asserting that a 
sovereign cannot rely on his own municipal law to avoid arbitration. Shufeldt Claim (US v Guatemala), (1930) 2 
RIAA 1079.  




Finally, one should note that there are many variations of the act of state doctrine, and 
thus even if each of them is entirely convincing by itself, together they make an bundle of 
arguments preventing courts from adjudicating transactions of  foreign sovereign states or 
declaring invalid the official act of foreign sovereigns. The doctrines, which are relevant in the 
context of act of state, are the principle of non-justiciability, the state secrets doctrine, and the 
political question doctrine.155   
8.2.3. SEVERABILITY OF PUBLIC LAW  
Traditionally, only matters regulated by private law are subject to contractual autonomy, 
when the application of public law of state is mandatory in its geographical territory. Great 
international lawyers observed that “contractual freedom and mandatory national laws are 
different sides of the same coin; one begins where the other ends”.156 This is a well established 
and exceedingly comprehensive rule that is accepted by all legal systems.   
For centuries, choice of law has been viewed as a tool geared to the resolution of purely 
private disputes. If the dispute concerns the application of foreign public law, the forum 
dismisses the case. Similarly, courts refuse to enforce private contractual choice of law clauses if 
enforcement would result in the displacement of the forum’s applicable public law. The idea that 
public law is never amenable to conflict of laws is primarily rooted in the very nature of 
sovereignty.  
Like a sovereign state, its public law is independent of other public law rules of any state. 
The application of public law rules is always limited within their scope, ie in domestic jurisdiction 
of each sovereign state. “Territoriality” and “nationality” have been bases of the jurisdiction 
                                                 
155 In an Australian case, it was stated that provisions of the government act might not be cognizable by the courts 
having regard to the many “political” promises contained therein. Commonwealth Aluminium Ltd, v Attorney-General 
(1976) Qd R 231, 261. Also see recent cases of the US and the UK, eg, Schneider v Kissinger, 412 F 3d 190 (DC Cir, 
2005); Republic of Ecuador v Occidental Exploration and Production Co [2005] EWCA 1116, [2006] 2 WLR 70.  
156 Bernardo Cremades and Steven Plehn, ’The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonisation of the Laws of 







meaning that each sovereign state has the power or authority to regulate, control and govern all 
events and persons within its territorial limits and also its own nationals residing outside of the 
country.157 Since public law of one country does not apply in another country, there has never 
been an issue of conflicts of public laws.158 
On the other hand, concepts of political philosophy which deal with issues of the origin 
and the purpose of state support the political authority of state to make laws and enforce them 
over members of society.159 In different periods of history, such political concepts which purport 
to serve the interests of all people and ensure the safety and security of a society have led to 
overturning of various social and economic regulatory laws. Although the arguments about the 
tension between the economic liberty and the legality of state interventions took different forms 
in a variety of historical contexts, every time when private rights of contract and property conflict 
with regulatory public policy, the former has given way to the latter.160 
Furthermore, public law is, first and foremost, the realisation of social justice which is 
reflected in statutes and statutory rules passed by the state in the name of public interest. 
Precisely because the ultimate aim of public law in serving the public interest could be eroded, if 
                                                 
157 Mann wrote: “No one doubts that, except possibly in the case of infringement of fundamental human rights, the 
scope of a State’s jurisdiction within its own territory and over its subjects is unlimited.” F A Mann, ‘Doctrine of 
Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1964) 111 Recueil des Cours 1, 9.  
158 However, because of globalisation and the increase of transnational activities, traditional principles prescribing the 
limits of public law such territoriality and nationality have become insufficient. In increasing integrated global 
economy, there has been a need for some states to extend its legal authority to events beyond its normal 
boundaries. The US has been the obvious example of exercising of this extraterritorial jurisdiction. The US has 
applied its laws on competition, export controls, income tax and securities regulations to events outside its 
territory. For detail on this issue, see Mahmood Bagheri, International Contracts and National Economic Regulation 
(2000) Ch IV, Section 5.2 (Extraterritoriality: International Law in Crisis).  
159 The most important and influential theory justifying political authority is Social Contract Theory. In the sense of 
the social contract theory, government’s decision on political and social matters is a product of an agreement 
among individuals since these individuals consent to the governmental authority.  See generally P J Mccormick, 
Social Contract and Political Obligation (1987). 
160 Scheiber shows that any right  including those implicating private property and which are at the core of classic 
liberal thought  is subject to limits and increasing governmental regulation in any complex society. Even American 
society that cherished the axiom that ‘private property ought to remain secure from the government’ has 
supported the public interest notion. In constant tension between the individualistic property rights doctrine and 
public rights doctrine, the latter is given primacy. For more, see Scheiber, above n 50. 




the public law is displaced, nations demarcate the boundary between those matters within the 
scope of private autonomy and those that are not. Thus, the normal prerogative of mandatory 
public laws under the classical system for settling contractual conflict of laws is that they apply 
regardless of the choice of law made in the contract.  
In fact, by choosing the law of any state to govern the investment, the host state does 
not intend to completely renounce the application of its own law to the contract. Many aspects 
of the agreement which are immediately linked to the public law of the host state still continue to 
be governed by that law.161As regards economic development agreements, Maniruzzaman 
observed: 
“…issues arising out of such incidental matters as the protection of the environment, 
labour relations, taxation, foreign trade and exchange regulations are to be addressed 
by the law of the host State, even though that law may not be agreed by the parties to 
a contract as the applicable law. Such inevitable application of the law of the host 
States sounds paradoxical to the theory of internationalisation of State contracts which 
connotes the withdrawal of a contract completely from the impact of the host 
State.”162  
Nonetheless, in recent years American courts have extended the choice of law 
methodology to the field of public law authorizing the displacement of otherwise applicable US 
public law in a number of cases.163 The phenomenon that has been now only accepted in the 
USA practice,164 however is unlikely to be acted upon other jurisdictions because of some sharp 
                                                 
161 Philippe Kahn, ‘Law Applicable to State Contracts: The Contribution of the World Bank Convention’ (1968) 44 
Indiana Law Journal 1, 12.  
162 A F M Maniruzzaman, ‘International Development Law as Applicable Law to Economic Development 
Agreements: A Prognostic View’ (2001) 20 Wisconsin International Law Journal 1, 31.  
163 In American law, the tendency to extend contractual autonomy to public law has arisen since the Supreme Court 
of the US first authorised the displacement of otherwise applicable US public law in a number of recent cases. See 
Richards v Lloyd's of London, 135 F 3d 1289 (9th Cir, 1998); Lipcon v Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F 3d 1285 
(11th Cir, 1998); Haynsworth v The Corporation, 121 F 3d 956 (5th Cir, 1997); Allen v Lloyd's of London, 94 F 3d 923 
(4th Cir, 1996); Roby v Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F 2d 1353 (2d Cir, 1993); Bonny v Society of Lloyd's, 3 F 3d 156 (7th 
Cir, 1993); Riley v Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd, 969 F 2d 953 (10th Cir, 1992).  
164 McConnaughay observed: “I am not aware of any nation other than United States that has declared with equal 







differences between the common law and civil law traditions as well as differences in the political 
and social objectives of nations.   
The continental European countries’ commitment to social justice concerns has led to 
various interventionist social and economic programs. In these countries and other countries 
which pursue welfare objectives, the structure of law is based on the notions of “distributive 
justice”. On the contrary in the US, conflicts theories reflect and promote the Aristotelian notion 
of “corrective justice”. 165 Besides, the traditional legal divide between public and private is much 
clearer in civil law countries restricting the free choice of individuals only within the boundary of 
private law.  
If the American model is accepted by different legal systems, it would cause alarming 
consequences. McConnaughay has revealed enormous risks that can be expected from the 
American model. The biggest consequence of such unconventional mythology is a risk of 
diminished regulation. In principle, parties to international transactions clearly would prefer 
public law that will substitute less burdensome regulation than the otherwise applicable public 
law. Consequently, one reasonably might expect the occurrence of the public harm that the 
displaced public law was intended to prevent.166  
8.2.4. NON-ARBITRABILITY  
                                                                                                                                                    
by contractual  choice of law principles. Most nations, it seems, adhere to traditional assumptions that public law is 
neither arbitrable nor subject to contractual choice of law principles.” See Philip McConnaughay, ‘The Scope of 
Autonomy in International Contracts and its Relation to Economic Regulation and Development’ (2000) 39 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 595, n 73.  
165 William Tetley wrote that in the contemporary world, the difference between distributive and corrective justice is 
very evident in the principles underlying the social and legal systems of most industrialized democracies. In most 
of them (eg, the United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries, France, Germany), the legal and social systems 
tend to privilege distributive justice. On the other hand, in the social and legal systems of the United States, the 
rights of parties tend to be secured primarily through the pursuit of corrective justice. See William Tetley, ‘A 
Canadian Looks at American Conflict of Law Theory and Practice, Especially in the Light of American Social and 
Legal Systems (Corrective vs Distributive Justice)’ (1999) 38 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 299-373. 
166 As McConnaughay observed, when forum public law is displaced, the result is that it will be replaced by lesser 
regulation or a regulatory void, perhaps increasing the risk of precisely the harm that forum public law was 
intended to prevent. McConnaughay, above n 164, 636-639.  




The notions that keep public law out of the scope of conflict of law mythologies were 
accompanied by the development of the principle of inarbitrability of public law claims. The 
non-arbitrability concept is what the words mean the criterion to determine whether a 
particular dispute is subject to a private adjudication rather than being brought in state court. 
The primary justifications for such exclusion are paternalism and protection of third parties. 
The concept, then, is the recognition of the state’s regulatory intervention in terms of 
considerations for the protection of public interest.167  
The concept of arbitrability is generally agreed in various legal systems however, they 
use different methods and principles to identify arbitrable disputes and public bodies with 
capacity to arbitrate.168 Nations either prohibit settlement of certain categories of disputes 
outside its courts or prohibit certain individuals and entities which are in most cases public 
authorities to enter to arbitration agreement. The former is known as “objective arbitrability”, 
while the latter is termed “subjective arbitrability”.  
Nowadays, as it has been generally agreed most disputes concerning an economic 
interest that results from a financial legal relationship are arbitrable. Under objective 
arbitrability, however disputes arisen from some specific areas of law such as competition law, 
taxation law, bankruptcy law, family law, labour law, criminal law are never capable of 
                                                 
167 This public policy requirement is universally accepted. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, opened for signature 10 June 1958 and entered into force 7 June 1959 330 UNTS 38 
(hereinafter New York Convention). Art 5 (2) states:  
  Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country 
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:  
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that 
country; or  
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that 
country.  
168 When the statutory provisions of different countries conflict with each other, the issue whether a particular 
person can submit his dispute to arbitration is settled under that person’s personal law, whereas the issue whether 
a dispute is arbitrable is governed by the law of forum. For the choice of law methods in this area see Gaillard and 







settlement by arbitration.169 Subjective arbitrability checks the capacity of the contractual part 
to enter into an arbitration agreement. Under most domestic jurisdictions, states, local 
authorities and other public entities are typically incapable of submitting their disputes to 
arbitration.170 This is because public entities normally exercise a sovereign function that would 
be submitted to the jurisdiction of public courts but not private justice.  
However, it must be acknowledged that the issue of arbitrability is decided quite 
differently in case of international contracts. What is different is that the domestic law 
prohibitions to submit some disputes to arbitration have long been inapplicable to contracts 
which are international in nature. The principle was first established by the Paris Court of 
Appeals’ decision in the 1957 Myrtoon Steamship Case.171 Then, the position of French law has 
been followed in some other jurisdictions.172 This is the case especially in America, where the 
American Courts held in ongoing series of cases that both contractual and statutory claims are 
generally arbitrable.173 The justification for the rulings was to promote predictability in 
                                                 
169 Art 2060 of the French Code of Civil Procedure provides:  “disputes concerning public collectives and public 
establishments” cannot be referred to arbitration. However, some countries already have authorised the arbitration 
of public law claims in the international context. For American cases see n 173.  
170 Art 1676 of Belgian Judicial Code states that, “anyone, except public entities, with the power to enter into a 
settlement, may enter into an arbitration agreement.” Other countries also have similar prohibitions. For 
prohibitions in Islamic legal systems, see Abdul El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (2nd ed, 1999). Eg, in 
Saudi Arabia, the law prohibits any government agency to be party to arbitration, national or international: at 575.  
171 Myrtoon Steam Ship v Agent Judiciaire du Tresor, Corte de Apelação, Decision of 10 April 1957. 
172 There has been no an evidence found how many countries accept the rule.  Countries such as Greece, England, 
Italy and Tunis adopted the principle. See Gaillard and Savage, above n 20, 323. 
173 The trend of American law emerged with the decision of the Supreme Court in Bremen v Zapata Offshore Co, where 
the court held that the choice of forum clause was an “indispensable element of international trade” and that 
where it was included “in an arm’s length negotiation by experienced businessmen, it should be honoured by the 
parties and enforced by the courts”.  See Bremen v Zapata Offshore Co, 407 US 1 (1972). Then in Scherk v Alberto-
Culver, the US Supreme Court authorised the international arbitration of claims arising under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, in Mitsubishi v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth the Court authorised the international arbitration of 
claims Sherman Act. See respective cases Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co, 417 U S 506 (1974); Mitsubishi v Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U S 614 (1985).  




international trade. Also in the Ken-Ren decision,174 the English High Court departed from 
previous position not to order security for costs in an international arbitration.175 
The differences in attitudes of both laws towards the issue of arbitrability can be 
understood by the very nature of international law and that of municipal law. The primary 
objective of international commercial law is to contribute enormously to the efficiency of 
international commercial transactions. The liberal tradition of international economic relations 
either prevents parties to international contracts from being subject to multiple simultaneous 
lawsuits in several different jurisdictions or enables commercial parties to reliably select an 
applicable law and arbitral forum. National legal systems, on the other hand tend to restrict 
arbitrability to ensure the protection of the public interest which represents distributional and 
welfare values of a society.  
Even though arbitration derives from mutual consent of the parties, as far as state parties 
to contracts are concerned, the issues of capacity and authority are very important for 
determining the validity of the consent. Generally, the capacity of each party to enter into an 
arbitration agreement is established according to his national law.176 Especially, public 
administration organs must have authority to arbitrate under its national law. A problem of the 
invalidity of the agreement may arise in the absence of such authority of the signatory.177 On the 
                                                 
174 SA Coppee Lavalin NV v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd [1994] 2 All ER 449.  
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authority to order security for costs, even in the absence of prior agreement between the parties. See UK 
Arbitration Act (1996).  
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the territory of a State is necessarily subject to its jurisdiction even if the participants desire to remove themselves 
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granted by the country of the seat [of the arbitration].  See F A Mann, "'Lex Facit Arbitrum'," in Pieter Sanders 
(ed), International Arbitration Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke (1967) 157, 160-161. 
177 However, it should be noted that the issue whether arbitration clauses are invalid because they are concluded in 
contravention of laws denying capacity to arbitrate to a state or its agency has not been fully settled. Many 







other hand, the defence of non-arbitrability can be effectively invoked in cases where a foreign 
sovereign’s formal acts are concerned. In Liamco, the US district court refused to enforce the 
award against Libya on the grounds that Libya’s nationalisation, being an act of state, is a subject 
matter not capable of settlement by arbitration.178 
8.2.5. STATUTORY POWERS 
In most domestic legal systems it is well recognised that a state or a state agency cannot 
fetter the exercise of a statutory power by committing itself by contract. The concept, which is 
sometimes referred to as the doctrine of executive necessity, involves the idea that contracts or 
other agreements and promises are unenforceable in the public interest if they fetter or purport 
to fetter statutory executive discretions and powers. The rationale is that in the public interest, 
government is required to act at times to override existing private rights including those rights 
emanating from contract. Mason CJ noted in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin that: 
“… I am unable to perceive how a representation made or an impression created by 
the Executive can preclude the Crown or the Executive from adopting a new policy, 
or acting in accordance with such a policy, in relation to the appointment of 
magistrates, so long as the new policy is one that falls within the ambit of the relevant 
duty or discretion, as in this case the new policy unquestionably does. The Executive 
cannot by representation or promise disable itself from, or hinder itself in, performing 
a statutory duty or exercising a statutory discretion to be performed or exercised in the 
public interest, by binding itself not to perform the duty or exercise the discretion in a 
particular way in advance of the actual performance of the duty or exercise of the 
power.” 179 
                                                                                                                                                    
national law restrictions. See for example, Pierre Lalive, ‘Transnational (or truly International) Public Policy and 
International Arbitration’ in Peter Sanders (ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (1987) 
297. 
178 The court reasoned that:  
 “Had this question been brought before this court initially, the court could not have ordered the parties to submit 
to arbitration because in so doing it would have been compelled to rule on the validity of the Libyan 
nationalisation law.... [and therefore violate] the act of state doctrine.”  Libyan American Oil Co (“LIAMCO”) v 
Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F Supp 1175 (DDC 1980), at 1178-79.  
179 See Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, 17-18. 




However, as far as foreign investment contracts are concerned, this concept of 
executive necessity has been phased out by international investment arbitrations as it could 
enable the sovereign to alter foreign investment contracts through its legislation. Instead, the 
investment arbitrations have formulated a monist notion that a state party should be not 
permitted to plead its own law in order to escape from an obligation. A clear formulation of 
this view is to be found in the opinion of Lauterpacht J in the Norwegian Loans case in the 
following terms: 
“It is not enough for a state to bring a matter under the protective umbrella of its 
legislation, possibly of a predatory character, in order to shelter it effectively from any 
control by international law.”180 
In a further effort to control the municipal law, one technique has been to develop so-
called stabilisation clause by which the host state guarantees not to alter the contractual rights 
of foreign investors during some specified term of years.181 Stabilisation clauses were 
introduced in 1950s and 1960s contracting practice. However, after so any years there still 
remains a great controversy whether a government or a statutory authority has the power to 
commit itself by contract or otherwise to the future exercise in a particular manner of a 
statutory discretion or statutory duty.  
From a doctrinal point of a view, such clauses are unenforceable because an attempt to 
fetter the public powers of the state would constitute derogation from the principle of 
sovereignty.182 On the other hand, concepts such as the doctrine of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources183 have seriously eroded the continuity of the practice of “freezing the 
                                                 
180 Certain Norwegian Loans (France v Norway) [1957] ICJ Rep 9, 37.  
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182 Angelo Sereni, ‘International Economic Institutions and the Municipal Law of States’ (1959) 96 (1) Recueil des 
Cours 129, 210; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalized Property (1986) 2-51. 
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law of the host state”. The doctrine asserts exclusive national control over the foreign 
investment process.  
In international arbitration practice, no a uniform and clear approach to the 
stabilisation clauses has emerged so far, despite the efforts of international arbitral tribunals to 
give recognition and validity to stabilisation clauses under international law. One commentator 
who researched the arbitral awards involving the issue of stabilisation clauses noted that in two 
of three cases the arbitrators came to the conclusion that the stabilisation clauses cannot 
prevent a unilateral change of terms and conditions by the government.184 Thus, uncertainty as 
to the precise status of these clauses exists not only in scholarly writings but also in arbitral 
practice. 
Making matters even worse, recent arbitral awards have accepted the governments’ 
exercise of regulatory power to frequently change their laws and regulations in response to 
changing economic circumstances or changing political, economic or social considerations. 
Those changes may make certain activities less profitable or even uneconomic to continue.185 In 
that context, several arbitral decisions confirm the relevance of the police powers doctrine to the 
investment contracts.186  
The Feldman Award, for example, recognised a line separating a valid regulation from a 
compensable taking.187 On this ground, it came to the following conclusion: 
                                                 
184 Thomas Waelde and George N’Di, ‘Stabilising International Investment Commitments: International Law versus 
Contract Interpretation’ (1996) 31 Texas International Law Journal 215, 246. 
185 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States (Award) (16 December 2002), 42 ILM 625 (2003), para 112. 
186 The Saluka Tribunal interpreted the BIT taking into account relevant rules of general customary law, and under its 
light concluded: 
 “In the opinion of the Tribunal, the principle that a State does not commit an expropriation and is thus not liable 
to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien investor when it adopts general regulations that are “commonly 
accepted as within the police power of States” forms part of customary international law today. Saluka Investments 
BV v The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, UNCITRAL Arbitration, paras 254 and 262. Also see 
Methanex Corporation v United States of America (Final Award) (3 August 2005), 44 ILM 1345 (2005), para 7.  
187 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States (Award) (16 December 2002), 42 ILM 625 (2003), para 100. 




“The Tribunal notes that the ways in which governmental authorities may force a 
company out of business, or significantly reduce the economic benefits of its business, 
are many. In the past, confiscatory taxation, denial of access to infrastructure or 
necessary raw materials, imposition of unreasonable regulatory regimes, among others, 
have been considered to be expropriatory actions. At the same time, governments must 
be free to act in the broader public interest through protection of the environment, new 
or modified tax regimes, the granting or withdrawal of government subsidies, reductions 
or increases in tariff levels, imposition of zoning restrictions and the like. Reasonable 
governmental regulation of this type cannot be achieved if any business that is adversely 
affected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say that customary international law 
recognises this […].188 
Seemingly, the decisions of arbitral tribunals indicate that international arbitral tribunals 
begun to take into account the necessity of statuary powers of the host to modify the regulatory 
environment of the foreign investment projects for the public good. Indeed, one cannot deny 
the host state’s statutory power to make legislative changes in tune its social and economic 
policies. State contracts by virtue of their public interest component “cannot be insulated from 
the pressures which impinge on public institutions such as political changes in the country, 
changed economic conditions and general expectations of the public.”189 The expression of free 
will and the binding effect of contractual obligations in state contract are thus not the same as in 
ordinary contracts between private parties. 
8.2.6. ULTRA VIRES  
Technically, a state or its agency cannot be totally libertarian in entering into contractual 
arrangements. In most jurisdictions, government officials have to be explicitly empowered with 
regard to the nature, scope and procedure of contracts. For example, the rules of capacity of a 
state entity, the types of areas in which the state entity has the capacity to conclude are stated in 
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statutes and regulations. The contracting powers of government authorities thus, are restricted 
within such statutes.  
In that context, a state agency is permitted to conclude contract only in cases where the 
legislature authorises to do so. In Cudgen Rutile (No 2) Pty Ltd v Chalk,190 the Privy Council 
determined that whenever a statute prescribes a mode of exercise of the statutory power, that 
mode must be followed and observed. Their Lordships cited with approval the following 
observation of Rich J in New South Wales v Bardolph191: 
“When the administration of particular functions of government is regulated by statute 
and the regulation expressly or impliedly touches the power of contracting, all statutory 
conditions must be observed, and the power no doubt is no wider than the statute 
contemplates.” 
In domestic legal systems hence, it is well established that if government contracts are 
concluded by government authorities with insufficient authority or not all necessary steps were 
taken, these contracts are regarded as ultra vires and therefore void.192 The doctrine applies to 
foreign investors too. A private party domestic or foreign alike, thus, to prevent a contract from 
being voided as ultra vires, must be aware of the contractual capacity of a government employee 
with which he deals.193  
                                                 
190 Cudgen Rutile (No 2) Pty Ltd v Chalk [1975] AC 520; (1974) ALJR 22. 
191 New South Wales v Bardolph [1934] 52 CLR 455, 496. 
192 In Wool Tops case, the Australian Government entered into a contract with a company providing either for the 
giving of consent to the sale of wool tops by the company in return for a share in the profit thereby arising or 
alternatively that the Commonwealth should pay the company an annual sum in respect of the manufacture of the 
wool tops, or a combination of both. Knox C J and Gavan Duffy J held that the agreements were in any event 
invalid because they were neither authorised by the Constitution nor by statute. Commonwealth v Colonial Combing 
Spinning and Waving Co Ltd (1922) 31 CLR 421. 
193 See Morgan Guaranty Trust Co v Republic of Palau (1987) 657 F Supp. 1475. The case concerned a state contract made 
by the Republic of Palau. In Palau, there were constitutional limitations preventing state officials to bind the state 
in contract and the court stated that a foreign party seeking to enter into a contract with the state should be 
credited with the awareness of these limitations. 




In arbitral jurisprudence, however, the view of ultra vires has become obsolete.194 
International arbitral tribunals have formulated various defence principles to prevent the 
application of the ultra vires doctrine. In the Sapphire Award, for example Judge Gavin dismissed 
the arguments of contractual incapacity based on the host state’s laws with the extraordinary 
observation that a foreign corporation cannot be expected to know the host state’s laws.195 In 
another case, Company Z v State Organisation ABC, the contract was signed by an officer who had 
no approval. The ad hoc tribunal recognised that there was a duty on the part of the foreign 
corporation to acquaint itself and abide by local procedures and laws, however, it did not 
characterise the contract as invalid. Instead of applying the doctrine of ultra vires, the ad hoc 
tribunal was of the opinion that in view of the state corporation’s “habitual practice” of violation 
of law, the foreign contractor should not be blamed for its violation of law.196 
Furthermore, the doctrine of estoppel has been frequently used to prevent the defence 
of ultra vires once the transaction has been started,197 and to prevent changes being made to the 
legal regime in reliance of which the foreign investor entered.198 But the application of the 
principle of estoppel in the field of investment disputes is suspicious partly because of the lack of 
evidence showing the principle as a general principle199 and partly because generally the principle 
                                                 
194 Tinoco Arbitration which was held before the development of the theory of internationalisation supported the 
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197 Used in Company Z v State Organisation ABC (1983) 8 VCA 94.  
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59-65.  
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of estoppel is used in contract law to prevent contractual parties from relying upon a set of facts 
which is different from an earlier set of facts. 200 
However, one must admit that an attempt to borrow some peculiar principles from the 
area of private law and apply them to disputes involving the public interest should be made with 
caution. The same legal effect that attaches to the conduct of private parties in purely 
commercial transactions, which they are presumed to have considered with the utmost 
seriousness, cannot apply in transactions of a complex nature such as one on the exploitation of 
natural resources where important political and public interests are involved. It is undeniable that 
a state party may be able to bring about interruption of contracts under exceptional 
circumstances when the public interest aspects require it to act so.  
8.3. Summary of  Findings  
The discussions in this chapter establish that though party autonomy was formally 
recognised by the ICSID Convention a few decades ago as the primary choice of law method of 
settling disputes between a state and foreign private party, in reality, it hardly applies. First of all, 
ICSID arbitral tribunals have developed radically different approaches towards party autonomy. 
What used to be the practice in the free marketplace in which the parties choice is treated with 
ultimate respect and enforced unless it would vary mandatory rules of relevant legal systems, is 
no longer, in general, the case. The doctrine of supplemental and corrective function of 
international law developed by ICSID does not necessarily let the enforcement of the contractual 
choice of law because such chosen law may be subject to correction by arbitral tribunal in case of 
                                                 
200 Common law systems have been reluctant to apply the doctrine of estoppel by conduct to the state or state 
entities. As Gummow J observed in Minister for Immigration v Kurtovic (1990) 92 ALR 93, 111: 
 "in a case of a discretion, there is a duty under the statute to exercise a free and unhindered discretion and an 
estoppel cannot be raised (any more than a contract might be relied upon) to prevent or hinder the exercise of the 
discretion; the point is that the legislature intends the discretion to be exercised on the basis of a proper 
understanding of what is required by the statute, and that the repository of the discretion is not to be held to a 
decision which mistakes or forecloses that understanding." Also see Attorney General for Ceylon v Silva (1953) AC 
461; Smith v Attorney-General [1973] 2 NZLR 393; Meates v Attorney- General [1979] 1 NZLR 415; Society of Medical 
Officers of Health v Hope [1960] AC 551. 




inconsistency with international law. This may be demonstrated by two arbitrations: (a) the 
arbitration between Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation and Government of the Republic of 
Liberia and (b) the arbitration between Southern Pacific Properties Limited and Arab Republic 
of Egypt. 
However, some recent cases decided by ICSID tribunals show the emergence of a new 
model which is more practical than the aforementioned one. Rather than an attempt to apply 
international law in every circumstance declining the application of relevant domestic law, ICSID 
arbitration is applying both systems of law to respective issues by identifying the subject matter 
of dispute before it. The new approach, ie the issue-specific approach to conflict of law in the 
context of state contracts is generally consistent with conventional rules of private international 
law.  
On the other hand, it appears that because of the involvement of a state in the 
contractual disputes, various issues related to sovereignty could arise. For example, principles like 
the act of state doctrine, sovereign immunity and executive necessity, which never feature in 
ordinary contractual relationships between private parties, impede the adoption of party 
autonomy in situations where a state or a state agency is party to a contract with a foreign private 
party. Although these principles rest upon different grounds and their status and scope are 
different, they would produce the same result, which is not to allow the full vindication of private 
rights and a free choice of an applicable law in foreign investment contracts in which the state or 
its agency is a party. Thus, even though parties to a state contract when drafting their contract 
can choose any law as the law governing the contract, but they must expect that in the real world 
such a choice of law is very unlikely enforced.  
Furthermore, it must be admitted that conventional rules of conflict of law which are 







law issues primarily due to the territorial sense of public laws. The application of public law 
rules is always, explicitly or implicitly limited in their jurisdictions. It is not possible to enforce 
public law rules outside the territory of the enacting country. Accordingly, if one has to resolve 
conflict of public law rules, principles of jurisdiction such as nationality and territoriality could 
be better solutions rather than the conflict of law rules.  
It is also noteworthy that the theories that are discussed in the final section are not the 
only causes of the limited application of party autonomy in state contracts. Rather, this 
situation may be caused from the existing practice. In reality, in most foreign investment 
contracts, the law of the host state is chosen by the parties as the proper law201 and the 
references to the law of the investor’s home state or to the law of a third state are rare.202 
Meantime, legislative compliance will be greater in field of natural resources, as the area came 
to be perceived as of vital importance to the development of national economy and the 
wellbeing of its people. In many countries, laws concerning the exploitation of natural 
resources, foreign investments, technology transfers have been enacted clearly demonstrating 
obligations of the parties involved in the activities. This leaves party autonomy little room 
making the contractual solution to conflict of law in state contracts illusory and redundant. 
                                                 
201 Maniruzzaman, above n 96, 309. Also Delaume noted that in the late 1980s there has emerged a trend to depart 
from “internationalization” devices used in earlier decades and to “re-localize” the relationship under the law of 
the host state. Georges Delaume, Law and Practice of Transnational Contracts (1988)15.  
202 Schreuer, above n 17, 561.                                                                                                   




P a r t  S i x :  C O N C L U S I O N S  A N D  R E C O M E N D A T I O N S  
A. SUMMARY OF THE THESIS  
This thesis has attempted to show that, although the methodology for the resolution of 
conflict of laws in disputes between a host state and a foreign investor was adopted by the 
ICSID Convention more than a half century ago, in actual reality the issue of choice of law in 
foreign investment contracts has never been satisfactorily settled. Making the situation even 
worse, new developments within the field of international investment law require reconsideration 
of the questions on the applicable law of foreign investment contracts once again. Especially, the 
contractual freedom to choose the applicable law has become increasingly unsuitable for 
resolution of conflict of laws in investor /state contractual arrangements in light of a growing 
regulatory sphere. The same old problems caused by the expansion of this truly private law 
principle beyond individuals’ domain to regulatory matters are re-emerging.  
Prior to the presentation of the summary and conclusions, it is initially appropriate to 
re-state the research problem as previously presented in the Introduction to this thesis. 
• Is the party autonomy rule, which naturally deals with purely private law conflicts, also capable of being 
applied to disputes between a state and a national of another state and what is the outcome of applying 
party autonomy to disputes involving public interests?  
• How far may a government party to an economic development agreement choose the law of other country 
which has no relevance to its economic and developmental policies? 
The thesis summary is sub-divided in accordance with the preceding eight chapters of 
this thesis. Answers regarding the above research problem will be extracted from the 
discussion and highlighted.  
First and foremost, as it is shown in Chapter One, the roots of state/private party 







society forced upon government a multitude of administrative and managerial functions aimed to 
deliver a wide range of services to the public. The basic principle of this co-operation is that the 
state, ie the administration contracts on behalf of the society, for the necessities of the public 
service, for the common general interest. More advanced domestic legal systems thus have 
developed the concept of public law contract eg, "contrat administratif” the purpose of which is to 
maintain a contractual balance between the public interests of administration and the individual 
interests of a private contractor. While conferring special treatment upon the state party, the 
doctrine also protects the private party from any unilateral change of the contractual terms by the 
administration by granting the right to an indemnity.  In domestic systems, where the concept of 
public law contract is unknown, it is still well-accepted that the power of the administration 
entered into a contract is not dependent on the contractual terms; rather its prime duty is to act 
in the interests of the public.  In all domestic legal systems therefore it is assumed that every 
action that a government takes is purported to implement public’s goals and values embedded in 
national laws. For a government, thus the freedom to select a foreign state’s law as the governing 
law of its actions does not exist. Would it be seen as a betrayal of public trust if a government 
commits itself to rules of a foreign law?  
Chapter Two reviews the past and current international response to the issue of state 
contracts in the practice of international arbitration. In spite of the developments in municipal 
legal systems, the attitude of international investment arbitral tribunals so far does not differ in 
the case of foreign investment contracts from the case of mere commercial contracts. Although 
the theory of internationalisation of state contracts created by early arbitral jurisprudence as well 
as the writings by advocates for the theory required concession contracts to subject to rules of 
public international law, corresponding reflections were few and far between in the realm of 
public law. Obsessed with attempts to protect private interests of foreign investors against 




interventions by a host state, earlier international arbitral tribunals pushed commercial law 
principles too far while phasing out established practices in domestic legal systems with regard to 
the issues of government contracting.  However, the attitudes of international arbitral tribunals 
are changing. Certain trends now have been discerned in the case law that point to the need for a 
host country to regulate its economic activities including the matters of foreign investment in the 
national policy interest. Of the central importance of such trend is the recognition of the public 
or regulatory side of foreign investment contracts. In the light of the increasing public law 
considerations, party autonomy, and indeed any other choice of law rule would become less 
relevant in the context foreign investment contracts.  
Chapter Three examines the historical and theoretical foundations of theory of 
internationalisation of state contracts. The idea to subject foreign investment contracts to public 
international law emerged as a reaction to the waves of nationalisations of foreign owned 
properties carried out in newly independent states. Both party autonomy and arbitration served 
as an “escape device” in the interest of foreign investors enabling foreign investors to insulate 
foreign investment contracts from the orbit of the host state’s domestic legal system and the 
jurisdiction of its courts. Much controversy and confusion about the theory arose from the fact 
that there were no rules of public international law which directly regulate investor/state 
contractual relationships except for some general rules on state responsibility. Advocates for the 
theory of internationalisation thus utilised lex mercatoria or general principles of law as primary 
sources of international law. Yet, lex mercatoria or general principles of law are purely commercial 
principles which were originally created by international merchants to serve their needs. The 
rules are designed to fulfill private objectives, but not national social or economic objectives. 
In this sense, one should not apply private law principles alone in the case of state contracts. 







Chapter Four comprises a critical examination of the internationalisation theory. A key 
point in this chapter is that the theory of internationalisation did not solve choice of law 
problems in state contracts. Rather it has introduced new controversies. In particular, the early 
arbitral tribunals of oil cases took a view that a state contract will always be subject to 
international law despite any municipal law being chosen by the contracting parties as the sole 
proper law of the contract. Such assumption was somehow bizarre to the traditional function 
of party autonomy. Under conventional rules of private international law, nothing except for 
some mandatory rules of law can override the contractual choice of law. Yet, in the earlier 
arbitration cases, parties’ chosen law was replaced with general principles of law which have 
no a mandatory character. The application of international law by earlier arbitrators contrary to 
the choice of law clauses in concession contracts suggests that it is possible that the advocates 
for the theory of internationalisation meant to adopt mandatory choice of law rules not party 
autonomy.  
Chapter Five has demonstrated that the current rules of international investment law are 
biased towards TNCs.  Since the immediate post-colonial period, capital exporting states have 
sought to establish new rules protecting foreign investors. Most of these rules such as rights of 
admission and establishment, national and most favoured nation treatment, full compensation 
in the event of expropriation, rights of repatriation of profits and arbitration by the foreign 
investor in the event of disputes with the host states are embedded in various bilateral and 
regional treaties which now became a main source of international law on foreign investment. In 
light of these extensive private property-focused provisions of investment treaties, host state’s 
economic development issues have been ignored. What is worse is that the treaties with 
exclusive objective of investment protection have disabled host states from taking certain 
measures to protect public values. The NAFTA experiences, which have led the US and 




Canadian governments to pay billions of dollars to corporations for taking public policy 
measures, are making developed governments understand how far they have gone with 
investment protection. As a result, it is possible that developed states might lower the standards 
of investment protection. The absence of investor-state dispute settlement provisions in 
Australia-US FTA (AUSFTA) is a clear illustration of this possibility. It could mean that the 
same thing might happen to the provisions giving parties the freedom to choose the applicable 
law and one day they may be replaced with a mandatory choice of law rule. 
Chapter Six outlines the competing concepts of foreign investment stressing the right of 
people to development, environmental concern and human rights promotion. The notions that 
long have been advocated by developing states and global civil society organisations finally begun 
to have implications in treaty negotiations and arbitration practices. Recent investment treaties 
have put a greater emphasis on environmental concerns by exempting a host government’s 
measures related to the environment protection from the scope of treaty regulation. ICSID case 
law also has developed a test according to which only foreign investment that does contribute to 
the economic development of a host state is entitled to standards of protection. All these could 
mean gradual erosion of foreign investors’ extensive rights and privileges. Of these rights, the 
freedom to choose the governing law of the contract should be curtailed first. When investment 
protection was primary goal of the international law on foreign investment, the principle of party 
autonomy produced the desired effect effectively eliminating the application of the law of a host 
state which seemed to be disadvantageous to foreign investors. But now there is occurring a shift 
from international law emphasizing the protection of investment to international law stressing 
the rights of people to develop. Thus, the party autonomy rule has to be modified reflecting the 







development could be avoided by parties’ choice of law clause. Then, there will be less growth 
and less development or even could be nothing.  
In Chapter Seven the traditional functions of the party autonomy rule are assessed. It is 
submitted that the party autonomy principle is not without limits even in pure private law 
relationships. Like any other private rights, contractual freedom can be curtailed if, found to be 
incompatible with some regulatory norms. Due to the increasing concern of modern municipal 
private law systems on social justice, courts started to intrude upon private contractual 
relations more than ever before. One example is the concept 'constitutionalization of private 
law’. The notion entails that contract law is not an autonomous sphere for private actions, but an 
object of constitutional justice. The aim of the constitutionalization of private law is to make 
contract law society-oriented, so that contractual promises are enforced as long as they are not in 
conflict with society’s goals. The concept has broader application than traditional barriers to 
freedom such as mandatory rules and public policy exceptions. Accordingly, if the concept is 
accepted in the context of international law, the contractual freedom to choose the governing 
law in contracts in which a state is party is likely to be abolished. However, that might not 
happen in the near future, because national legal systems and international law have generated 
distinct notions of party autonomy. In contrast to national laws, international law magnifies the 
ideas of freedom of contract and private autonomy but is not committed to social justice.  
The last chapter of this thesis, Chapter Eight has investigated the extent to which parties 
to foreign investment contracts, ie the host state and a foreign investor are free to choose the law 
applicable to their contract. In first instance, it is revealed that, under the internationalisation 
theory, international arbitral tribunals have interfered with the parties’ choice of municipal law on 
the ground of the so-called doctrine of supplementary and corrective function of international 
law. In the view of investment arbitral panels, the parties’ choice has to be tested against 




applicable international rules.  If it passes the test it would apply. Otherwise, the parties’ chosen 
law is dismissed. In recent years, however a new trend has emerged separating claims arising 
from a same dispute into to categories: contract claims and treaty claims. Depending on the 
particular circumstances of the case, an arbitral tribunal applies either international law (in the 
case of treaty claims) or the host state’s law (in the case of a contractual claim). The development 
of this approach could mean in general the applicable law of foreign investment contracts is the 
law of the host state along its treaty rules. The new approach thus reduces the applicability of 
party autonomy in foreign investment contracts.  
Chapter Eight also discusses the possible restrictions that can be placed on the right of 
parties to state contracts to freely choose the governing law of the contract. It is one thing 
adopting the principle of party autonomy as the main choice of law rule but it is another thing 
exercising it in a real life and taking advantage of it. No matter how one chooses a legal system 
favorable to it, it always has to face numerous hurdles in the form of legal theories, substantive 
and procedural laws. This is particularly true when the case involves actions taken by, or at the 
direction of a foreign government which has sovereignty related privileges. In modern 
international law, immunity is pleaded only for acts performed in the exercise of sovereign power 
but withdrawn in respect of acts of a commercial or private law nature. With the trend towards 
the public law nature of foreign investment contracts, the issue on sovereign immunity could 
revive in state contracts at the stage of execution, especially with respect to attachment and 
execution on assets of a foreign sovereign. Even in cases where the enforcement of contractual 
choice of law can overcome the sovereign immunity hurdle, it may face other hurdles such the 
Act of State doctrine and the doctrine of executive necessity. As the Act of State doctrine 
enforces a public act of the foreign sovereign, the choice of law agreement of parties can be 







state enjoys administrative powers to conduct normal functioning of the state machinery. When 
the government concludes a foreign investment contract which is essential for its economic 
development, it is not driven by its own will, but by that of legislators. It acts an agent of its 
people only operating within the powers given to it by the constitution and other laws. No 
government officer has authority to deviate from the procedures and regulations, set forth by the 
laws.  
B. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
The major contributions of the thesis can be summarised as follows:  
• It has identified the fundamental characteristics of investor/state contractual relationship 
revealing that foreign investment contracts have their roots in the concept of public law 
contracts. In principle, a public law contract is a vehicle of realisation of society’s goals, and 
therefore it should be subject to the law of the state party but not to party autonomy. One of the 
main defects in the theory of internationalisation of state contracts has been the ignorance of the 
public law features of foreign investment contracts. A few international scholars (Sornarajah and 
Mannruzaman) have made concerns and comments about how the important public law features 
of the contracts have been disregarded by international arbitral tribunals. But there is no literature 
specifically dealing the issues how the private law approach to the nature of foreign investment 
contracts could affect the development of choice of law method and what consequences of 
applying such a method to the resolution of foreign investment disputes. 
• It has reviewed the choice of law issue in foreign investment contracts from historical, theoretical 
and empirical perspectives demonstrating that the issue which was first introduced by the theory 
of internationalisation of states contracts so far remains complicated. It is assumed that one of 
the foundations of internationalising the applicable law is the principle of party autonomy. 
Contrary to the belief, the thesis shows how the principle of party autonomy has never been 
applied correctly in the international arbitration jurisprudence. In the light of the corrective and 
supplemental functions of international law, the chosen law is subject to the correction and 
supplementation by international law.  
• It has explored the legal sources of international investment law considering them in the context 
emerging principles on economic development law. The inclusion of environmental, social and 
developmental aspects within the international law on foreign investment is about to change the 
way of establishing, applying and interpreting a rule of international law. In other words, the 




international law on foreign investment is no longer the law which is only concerned with the 
investment protection, but rather its focus on environmental and developmental policy 
considerations is increasing. The thesis argues that the party autonomy rule has been seen to be 
unsuitable because the host state’s law enacting the developmental policy objectives could be 
excluded by the contractual selection of the governing law.  
• It has proposed for the first time changes to the ICSID rules on the choice of law. Acceptance of 
the principle of party autonomy by the ICSID was based on the theory of internationalisation of 
state contracts which itself was created as a panic response to mass nationailsations of foreign-
owned properties by the newly independent states. It offered a “quick fix” for the choice of law 
problems in early oil disputes, but could not resolve root problems. The applicable law of foreign 
investment contracts was internationalised because national law was found inadequate from the 
point of view of investment protection. In recent years, the role of national law of a host state has 
assumed greater importance than ever before due to new concerns of international foreign 
investment law: social, developmental and environmental aspects of foreign investment. This 
thesis argues that the area of foreign investment deserves a more serious approach to the choice 
of law question.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RESEARCH   
On the basis of the analysis of issues discussed in this research, the general 
recommendations are in order for policy makers, international law scholars and national or 
international organisations involved with this matter in the hope of taking positive steps 
towards developing more balanced and effective international legal system on foreign 
investment. The recommendations are as follows: 
1. Immediate attention needs to be given to the importance and seriousness of reconsideration of 
the choice of law issues in foreign investment contracts. National policy makers, international 
forums, scholars and human rights and environmental advocates concerned with the regulation 
of the foreign investment should be talking about the unsuitability of conventional conflict of 
law rules such as party autonomy in foreign investment contracts.  
2. A Multilateral Foreign Investment Treaty needs to be drafted and negotiated. It will be 
impossible to control or direct foreign investment through domestic law alone. Public 
international law thus should be involved to provide general standards by which to judge 
actions of participants of foreign investment activities. Today, there are two tendencies on the 







engaged in the formulation of rules and regulations on the international investment should 
reconcile these two differing objectives. The UNCTAD will be a more appropriate venue for 
multilateral investment negotiations than the international financial institutions like the WTO 
and IMF which are almost exclusively concerned with the corporate commercial interests. For 
decades the UNCTAD has been the voice of developing countries, so it can give the 
negotiations a development perspective.  
3. A new conflict of laws approach needs to be developed. Like every individual has own private 
interests, every state has its own national political and economic interests. Economic regulations 
and policies are a means of advancing such national security and economic interests. One area 
which has been the focus of economic regulation of any country is foreign investment. Most 
disputes between a host state and a foreign investor therefore arise over the conflicts between a 
contract and economic regulation. The traditional approaches to the conflict of laws are highly 
unsuitable because they are designed to protect private rights but not the public interest. The 
new approach should not be based on the traditional conflict-of law rules alone, rather should 
be capable of promoting development by focusing on state interests embedded in economic 
regulations. There are areas where conventional choice of law rules have been modified and 
replaced by more workable approaches.  
4. Changes must be made to the text of the ICSID Convention. In order to give guidance for the 
difficult task of modifying the choice of law approach, this thesis proposes two versions of the 
wording for Article 42 (1). 
• Version One: “The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with the law of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute and its treaty rules. Other international rules that 
are not ratified by the host state are applicable to the extent they have a mandatory 
character”.   
• Version Two: “The tribunal will decide a dispute in accordance with parties’ chosen law. 
The following contracts which are naturally presumed to be important to the economic 
development of the host state are subject to the law of the host state despite the 
existence of choice of law clause opting for some other foreign law: 
 All contracts in the natural resources sector regardless of the form and type of 
the contract such as concession contracts, joint venture contracts, production-
sharing contracts; 
 Contracts in the public utilities sector, such as roads, telecommunication, 
water and energy; 
 Contracts for the purchase by a foreign party of the equity of in a state 
enterprise.   




D. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The outcome of any dispute such as disputes arising out from foreign investment 
contracts between a host state and a foreign investor depends on rules governing such a dispute. 
If the governing law is market-oriented and concerned with individual rights, then such law 
favours private parties like foreign investors at the expense of other parties involved in that 
dispute. Conversely, if the governing law is society-oriented and concerned with the protection 
of social values, then the public interest embedded in such law defeat private rights and 
autonomy rules. The central feature of a foreign investment state contract is that it is a matter of 
both contract law and public regulatory law. Any kind of a foreign investment project is meant to 
enhance the lives of people of a host state by stimulating economic growth. It greatly affects the 
interests of people, especially those of developing nations as they own natural wealth and other 
resources of their country. For the choice of law rule, to return to Brainerd Currie, “is an odd 
creature among laws, it never tells what the result would be”. The interests of people of developing states 
involved in the implementation of foreign investment projects should not be determined by such 
a blind fate. 
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A P P E N D I X  I  
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
MONGOLIA CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT 
AND RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT 
The United States of America and Mongolia (hereinafter the "Parties");  
Desiring to promote greater economic cooperation between them, with respect to investment 
by nationals and companies of one Party in the territory of the other Party;  
Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded in such investment will 
stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties;  
Agreeing that fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a 
stable framework for investment and maximum effective utilization of economic resources;  
Recognizing that the development of economic and business ties can contribute to the well-
being of workers in both Parties and promote respect for internationally recognized worker 
rights; and  
Having resolved to conclude a Treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection 
of investment;  
Have agreed as follows:  
ARTICLE I  
1. For the purposes of this Treaty,  
(a) "investment" means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as equity, 
debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes:  
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages, liens and pledges;  
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets 
thereof;  
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value, and associated with an 
investment;  
(iv) intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to:  
literary and artistic works,  
including sound recordings,  
inventions in all fields of human  
endeavor,  
industrial designs,  
semiconductor mask works,  
trade secrets, know-how, and  
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confidential business information, and  
trademarks, service marks, and trade  
names; and  
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pursuant to law;  
(b) "company" of a Party means any kind of corporation, company, association, partnership, or 
other organization, legally constituted under the laws and regulations of a Party or a political 
subdivision thereof whether or not organized for pecuniary gain, or privately or 
governmentally owned or controlled;  
(c) "national" of a Party means a natural person who is national of a Party under its applicable 
law;  
(d) "return" means an amount derived from or associated with an investment, including profit; 
dividend; interest; capital gain; royalty payment; management, technical assistance or other fee; 
or returns in kind;  
(e) "associated activities" include the organization, control, operation, maintenance and 
disposition of companies, branches, agencies, offices, factories or other facilities for the 
conduct of business; the making, performance and enforcement of contracts; the acquisition, 
use, protection and disposition of property of all kinds including intellectual property rights; 
the borrowing of funds; the purchase, issuance, and sale of equity shares and other securities; 
and the purchase of foreign exchange for imports;  
(f) "investment authorization" means an authorization granted by the foreign investment 
authority of a Party to an investment or a national or company of the other Party;  
(g) "investment agreement" means a written agreement between the national authorities of a 
Party and an investment or a national or company of the other Party that (i) grants rights with 
respect to natural resources or other assets controlled by the national authorities and (ii) the 
investment, national or company relies upon in establishing or acquiring an investment.  
2. Each Party reserves the right to deny to any company the advantages of this Treaty if 
nationals of any third country control such company and, in the case of a company of the 
other Party, that company has no substantial business activities in the territory of the other 
Party or is controlled by nationals of a third country with which the denying Party does not 
maintain normal economic relations.  
3. Any alteration of the form in which assets are invested or reinvested shall not affect their 
character as investment.  
ARTICLE II  
1. Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, on a basis 
no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or associated activities of 
its own nationals or companies, or of nationals or companies of any third country, whichever 
is the most favorable, subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain exceptions falling 
within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Annex to this Treaty. Each Party agrees to 
notify the other Party before or on the date of entry into force of this Treaty of all such laws 
and regulations of which it is aware concerning the sectors or matters listed in the Annex. 
Moreover, each Party agrees to notify the other of any future exception with respect to the 
sectors or matters listed in the Annex, and to limit such exceptions to a minimum. Any future 





exception by either Party shall not apply to investment existing in that sector or matter at the 
time the exception becomes effective. The treatment accorded pursuant to any exceptions 
shall, unless specified otherwise in the Annex, be not less favorable than that accorded in like 
situations to investments and associated activities of nationals or companies of any third 
country. 
2. (a) Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full 
protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by 
international law.  
(b) Neither Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable and discriminatory measures the 
management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of 
investments.  
(c) Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to 
investments.  
3. Subject to the laws relating to the entry and sojourn of aliens, nationals of either Party shall 
be permitted to enter and remain in the territory of the other Party for the purpose of 
establishing, developing, administering or advising company on the operation of an investment 
to which they, or a company of the first Party that employs them, have committed or are in the 
process of committing a substantial amount of capital or other resources.  
4. Companies which are legally constituted under the applicable laws or regulations of one 
Party, and which are investments, shall be permitted to engage top managerial personnel of 
their choice, regardless of nationality.  
5. Neither Party shall impose performance requirements as condition of establishment, 
expansion or maintenance of investments, which require or enforce commitments to export 
goods produced, or which specify that goods or services must be purchased locally, or which 
impose any other similar requirements.  
6. Each Party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with 
respect to investment, investment agreements, and investment authorizations.  
7. Each Party shall make Public all laws, regulations, administrative practices and procedures, 
and adjudicatory decisions that pertain to or affect investments.  
8. The treatment accorded by the United States of America to investments and associated 
activities of nationals and companies of Mongolia under the provisions of this Article shall in 
any State, Territory or possession of the United States of America be no less favorable than the 
treatment accorded therein to investments and associated activities of nationals of the United 
States of America resident in, and companies legally constituted under the laws and regulations 
of other States, Territories or possessions of the United States of America.  
9. The most favored nation provisions of this Article shall not apply to advantages accorded by 
either to nationals or companies of any third country by virtue of:  
(a) that Party's binding obligations that derive from full membership in a free trade area or 
customs union; or  
(b) that Party's binding obligations under any multilateral international agreement under the 
framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that enters into force subsequent 
to the signature of this Treaty.  
ARTICLE III  
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1. Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly through 
measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization ("expropriation") except: for a public 
purpose; in a nondiscriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation; and in accordance with due process of law and the general principles of 
treatment provided for in Article II(2). Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market 
value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory action was taken or 
became known, whichever is earlier; be calculated on the basis of the prevailing market rate of 
exchange at that time; be paid without delay; include interest at a commercially reasonable rate 
from the date of expropriation; be fully realizable; and be freely transferable.  
2. A national or company of either Party that asserts that all or part of its investment has been 
expropriated shall have a right to prompt review by the appropriate judicial or administrative 
authorities of the other Party to determine whether any such expropriation has occurred and, if 
so, whether such expropriation, and any associated compensation, conforms , to the principles 
of international law.  
3. Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments suffer losses in the territory of 
the other Party owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency, 
insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar events shall be accorded treatment by such other 
Party no less favorable than that accorded to its own nationals or companies or to nationals or 
companies of any third country, whichever is the most favorable treatment, as regards any 
measures it adopts in relation to such losses.  
ARTICLE IV  
1. Each Party shall permit all transfers related to an investment to be made freely and without 
delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers include: (a) returns; (b) compensation 
pursuant to Article III; (c) payments arising out of an investment dispute; (d) payments made 
under a contract, including amortization of principal and accrued interest payments made 
pursuant to a loan agreement; (e) proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an 
investment; and (f) additional contributions to capital for the maintenance or development of 
an investment.  
2. Transfers shall be made in a freely usable currency, as defined in Article 30 of the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, at the prevailing market rate of exchange on 
the date of transfer with respect to spot transactions in the currency to be transferred.  
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, either Party may maintain laws and 
regulations (a) requiring reports of currency transfer; and (b) imposing income taxes by such 
means as a withholding tax applicable to dividends or other transfers. Furthermore, either 
Party may protect the rights of creditors, or ensure the satisfaction of judgments in 
adjudicatory proceedings, through the equitable, nondiscriminatory and good faith application 
of its law.  
4. Each Party shall permit returns in kind to be made as authorized or specified in an 
investment authorization, investment agreement, or other written agreement between the Party 
and an investment or a national or company of the other Party.  
ARTICLE V  
The Parties agree to consult promptly, on the request of either, to resolve any disputes in 
connection with the Treaty, or to discuss any matter relating to the interpretation or 
application of the Treaty.  





ARTICLE VI  
1. For purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a dispute between a Party and a 
national or company of the other Party arising out of or relating to (a) an investment 
agreement between that Party and such national or company; (b) an investment authorization 
granted by that Party's foreign investment authority to such national or company; or (c) an 
alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with respect to an investment.  
2. In the event of an investment dispute, the parties to the dispute should initially seek a 
resolution through consultation and negotiation. If the dispute cannot be settled amicably, the 
national or company concerned may choose to submit the dispute for resolution:  
(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Party that is party to the dispute;  
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute-settlement procedures; or  
(c) in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3.  
3. (a) Provided that the national or company concerned has not submitted the dispute for 
resolution under paragraph 2 (a) or (b) and that six months have elapsed from the date on 
which the dispute arose, the national or company concerned may choose to consent in writing 
to the submission of the dispute for settlement by binding arbitration:  
(i) to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("Centre") 
established by the convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, done at Washington, March 18, 1965 ("ICSID Convention"), 
provided that the Party is a party to such Convention; or  
(ii) to the Additional Facility of the Centre, if the Centre is not available; or  
(iii) in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNICTRAL); or  
(iv) to any other arbitration institution rules, or in accordance with any other arbitration rules, 
as may be mutually agreed between the parties to the dispute.  
(b) Once the national or company concerned has so consented, either party to the dispute may 
initiate arbitration in accordance with the choice so specified in the consent.  
4. Each Party hereby consents to the submission of any investment dispute for settlement by 
binding arbitration in accordance with the choice specified in the written consent of the 
national or company under paragraph 3. Such consent, together with the written consent of 
the national or company when given under paragraph 3 shall satisfy the requirement for:  
(a) written consent of the parties to the dispute for purposes of Chapter II of the ICSID 
Convention (Jurisdiction of the Centre) and for purposes of the Additional Facility Rules; and  
(b) an "agreement in writing" for purposes of Article II of the United Nations Convention on 
the Recognition and enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, June 10, 
1958 ("New York Convention").  
5. Any arbitration under paragraph 3(a) (ii), (iii) or (iv) of this Article shall be held in a state 
that is a party to the New York Convention.  
6. Any arbitral award rendered pursuant to this Article shall be final and binding on the parties 
to the dispute. Each Party undertakes to carry out without delay the provisions of any such 
award and to provide in its territory for its enforcement.  
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7. In any proceeding involving an investment dispute, a Party shall not assert, as a defense, 
counterclaim, right of set-off or otherwise, that the national or company concerned has 
received or will receive, pursuant to an insurance or guarantee contract, indemnification or 
other compensation for all or part of its alleged damages  
8. For purposes of an arbitration held under paragraph 3 of this Article, any company legally 
constituted under the applicable laws and regulations of a Party or a political subdivision 
thereof but that, immediately before the occurrence of the event or events giving rise to the 
dispute, was an investment of nationals or companies of the other Party, shall be treated as a 
national or company of such other Party in accordance with Article 25 (2) (b) of the ICSID 
Convention.  
ARTICLE VII  
1. Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty 
which is not resolved through consultations or other diplomatic channels, shall be submitted, 
upon the request of either Party, to an arbitral tribunal for binding decision in accordance with 
the applicable rules of international law. In the absence of an agreement by the Parties to the 
contrary, the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), except to the extent modified by the Parties or by the arbitrators, shall govern.  
2. Within two months of receipt of a request, each Party shall appoint an arbitrator. The two 
arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator as Chairman, who is a national of a third State. The 
UNCITRAL Rules for appointing members of three member panels shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to the appointment of the arbitral panel except that the appointing authority 
referenced in those rules shall be the Secretary General of the Centre.  
3. Unless otherwise agreed, all submissions shall be made and all hearings shall be completed 
within six months of the date of selection of the third arbitrator, and the Tribunal shall render 
its decisions within two months of the date of the final submissions or the date of the closing 
of the hearings, whichever is later.  
4. Expenses incurred by the Chairman, the other arbitrators, and other costs of the 
proceedings shall be paid for equally by the Parties. The Tribunal may, however, at its 
discretion, direct that a higher proportion of the costs be paid by one of the Parties.  
ARTICLE VIII  
The provisions of Article VI and VII shall not apply to a dispute arising (a) under the export 
credit, guarantee or insurance programs of the Export-Import Bank of the United States or (b) 
under other official credit, guarantee or insurance arrangements pursuant to which the Parties 
have agreed to other means of settling disputes.  
ARTICLE IX  
This Treaty shall not derogate from:  
(a) laws and regulations, administrative practices or procedures, or administrative or 
adjudicatory decisions of either Party;  
(b) international legal obligations; or  
(c) obligations assumed by either Party, including those contained in an investment agreement 
or an investment authorization, that entitle investments or associated activities to treatment 
more favorable than that accorded by this Treaty in like situations.  





ARTICLE X  
1. This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the 
maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance 
or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security 
interests.  
2. This Treaty shall not preclude either Party from prescribing special formalities in connection 
with the establishment of investments, but such formalities shall not impair the substance of 
any of the rights set forth in this Treaty.  
ARTICLE XI  
1. With respect to its tax policies, each Party should strive to accord fairness and equity in the 
treatment of investment of nationals and companies of the other Party.  
2. Nevertheless, the provisions of this Treaty, and in particular Article VI and VII, shall apply 
to matters of taxation only with respect to the following:  
(a) expropriation, pursuant to Article III;  
(b)transfers, pursuant to Article IV; or  
(c)the observance and enforcement of terms of an investment agreement or authorization as 
referred to in Article VI (1) (a) or (b),  
to the extent they are not subject to the dispute settlement provisions of a Convention for the 
avoidance of double taxation between the two Parties, or have been raised under such 
settlement provisions and are not resolved within a reasonable period of time.  
ARTICLE XII  
This Treaty shall apply to the political subdivisions of the Parties.  
ARTICLE XIII  
1. This Treaty shall enter into force thirty days after the date of exchange of instruments of 
ratification. It shall remain in force for a period of ten years and shall continue in force unless 
terminated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article. It shall apply to investments existing 
at the time of entry into force as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter.  
2. Either Party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other Party, terminate this Treaty 
at the end of the initial ten year period or at any time thereafter.  
3. With respect to investments made or acquired prior to the date of termination of this Treaty 
and to which this Treaty otherwise applies, the provisions of all of the other Articles of this 
Treaty shall thereafter continue to be effective for a further period of ten years from such date 
of termination.  
4. The Annex and Protocol shall form an integral part of the Treaty.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.  
DONE in duplicate at Washington on the sixth of October, 1994, in the English and 
Mongolian languages, both texts being equally authentic.  
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: [signature] 
FOR MONGOLIA: [signature] 




1. The United States reserves the right to make or maintain limited exceptions to national 
treatment, as provided in Article II, paragraph 1, in the sectors or matters it has indicated 
below:  
air transportation; ocean and coastal shipping; banking, insurance, securities and other financial 
services; government grants; government insurance and loan programs; energy and power 
production; customhouse brokers; ownership of real property; ownership and operation of 
broadcast or common carrier radio and television stations; ownership of shares in the 
Communications Satellite Corporation; the provision of common carrier telephone and 
telegraph services; the provision of submarine cable services; use of land and natural resources; 
mining on the public domain; and maritime services and maritime-related services.  
2. The United States reserves the right to make or maintain limited exceptions to most favored 
nation treatment, as provided in Article II, paragraph 1, in the sectors or matters it has 
indicated below:  
ownership of real property; mining on the public domain; maritime services and maritime-
related services; and primary dealership in United States government securities.  
3. Mongolia reserves the right to make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment, as 
provided in Article II, paragraph 1, in the sectors or matters it has indicated below:  
land ownership and banking 
PROTOCOL  
With respect to Article 11, paragraph 1, the Parties confirm their mutual understanding that 
the national and most favored nation treatment obligations specified therein apply to the 
establishment and acquisition as well as to the expansion, management, conduct, operation and 












A P P E N D I X  I I  
1803 (XVII) RESOLUTION ON PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
The General Assembly, 
Recalling its resolutions 523 (VI) of 12 January 1952 and 626 (VII) of 21 December 1952, 
Bearing in mind its resolution 1314 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, by which it established the 
Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and instructed it to conduct a 
full survey of the status of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources as a basic 
constituent of the right to self-determination, with recommendations, where necessary, for its 
strengthening, and decided further that, in the conduct of the full survey of the status of the 
permanent sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources, due 
regard should be paid to the rights and duties of States under international law and to the 
importance of encouraging international co-operation in the economic development of 
developing countries, 
Bearing in mind its resolution 1.515 (XV) of 15 December 1960, in which it recommended 
that the sovereign right of every State to dispose of its wealth and its natural resources should 
be respected, 
Considering that any measure in this respect must be based on the recognition of the 
inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in 
accordance with their national interests, and on respect for the economic independence of 
States, 
Considering that nothing in paragraph 4 below in any way prejudices the position of any 
Member State on any aspect of the question of the rights and obligations of successor States 
and Governments in respect of property acquired before the accession to complete 
sovereignty of countries formerly under colonial rule,  
Noting that the subject of succession of States and Governments is being examined as a 
matter of priority by the International Law Commission, 
Considering that it is desirable to promote international co-operation for the economic 
development of developing countries, and that economic and financial agreements between 
the developed and the developing countries must be based on the principles of equality and of 
the right of peoples and nations to self-determination, 
Considering that the provision of economic and technical assistance, loans and increased 
foreign investment must not be subject to conditions which conflict with the interests of the 
recipient State, 
Considering the benefits to be derived from exchanges of technical and scientific information 
likely to promote the development and use of such resources and wealth, and the important 
part which the United Nations and other international organizations are called upon to play in 
that connexion, 
Attaching particular importance to the question of promoting the economic development of 
developing countries and securing their economic independence, 
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Noting that the creation and strengthening of the inalienable sovereignty of States over their 
natural wealth and resources reinforces their economic independence, 
Desiring that there should be further consideration by the United Nations of the subject of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the spirit of international co-operation in the 
field of economic development, particularly that of the developing countries, 
I 
Declares that: 
1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the wellbeing 
of the people of tile State concerned. 
2. The exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as well as the import of the 
foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in conformity with the rules and 
conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with 
regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities, 
3. In cases Ii-here authorization is granted, the capital imported and the earnings on that 
capital shall be governed by the terms thereof, by the national legislation in force, and by 
international law. The profits derived must be shared in the proportions freely agreed upon, in 
each case, between the investors and the recipient State, due care being taken to ensure that 
there is no impairment, for any reason, of that State’s sovereignty over its natural wealth and 
resources. 
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of 
public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely 
individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid 
appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such 
measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In any 
case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction 
of the State taking such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign 
Statesand other parties concerned, settlement of the dispute should be made through 
arbitration or international adjudication. 
5. The free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural 
resources must be furthered by the mutual respect of States based on their sovereign equality. 
6. International co-operation for the economic development of developing countries, whether 
in the form of public or private capital investments, exchange of goods and services, technical 
assistance, or exchange of scientific information, shall be such as to further their independent 
national development and shall he based upon respect for their sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources. 
7. Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and 
hinders the development of international cooperation and the maintenance of peace. 
8. Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign States shall be 
observed in good faith; States and international organizations shall strictly and conscientiously 
respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources in 
accordance with the Charter and the principles set forth in the present resolution. 






Welcomes the decision of the International Law Commission to speed up its work on the 
codification of the topic of responsibility of States for the consideration of the General 
Assembly;1 
III 
Requests the Secretary-General to continue the study of the various aspects of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, taking into account the desire of Member States to ensure 
the protection of their sovereign rights while encouraging international co-operation in the 
field of economic development, and to report to the Economic and Social Council and to the 
General Assembly, if possible at its eighteenth session. 
1194th  plenary meeting, 
14 December 1962. 
                                                 
1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/5209), paras 67-69. 
